Ecaterina MATOI
1. Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked a long-term conflict that is turning increasingly violent as of 2026. Beyond direct military confrontation, reciprocal attacks on energy infrastructure have gained strategic importance—particularly as Europe grapples with a medium-term energy crisis accentuated by expensive hydrocarbon imports, draught, and the war from Iran/Hormuz Strait.
The Russian Federation recently ranked second globally in crude petroleum export capacity and volume, trailing only Saudi Arabia, and among top 5 exporters of pipeline and Liquefied Natural gas (LNG), Europe being historically one of its top markets. However, since at least 2022, a systemic shift in global energy flows is emerging as Europe strives to gain a certain energy independence and transition to renewable sources. Nevertheless, earlier attacks on Druzhba oil pipeline emphasized fundamental dependencies of Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic on Russian oil, as as demonstrated by Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar’s urgent request for reopening in April 2026.
Furthermore, the trilateral meeting between Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania from December 2025, on the drone attacks by Ukraine targeting Russia-bound oil tankers (Barron’s/AFP, 2025), emphasized on the importance of energy transportation security in the Black Sea, but failed to stop the tendency. Renewed Ukrainian drone strikes at Novorossiysk on tankers and a major crude petroleum terminal were reportedly halted only at the request of United States (US) Vice President JD Vance (Gotev, 2026), prompting further concerns from Black Sea Riparian states that still rely on Russian oil and gas supplies, as well as other international customers.
This study analyzes the impact of Ukrainian conflict evolution on the Black Sea energy ecosystem from a process perspective, employing a simplified power competition/balance framework justified by the evaluation of international relations as anarchic, unpredictable and dominated by great powers (Mearsheimer, 2013). The analysis framework allows the identification of competing or complementary developments that impact Black Sea energy ecosystem.
2. A brief review of Ukrainian conflict development and energy infrastructure attacks
As of August 2026, the war in Ukraine shows no clear end in sight, although approaches to the relation with the Russian Federation have become more nuanced. The cohesion of Ukraine-supporting front was consistent at the beginning of the conflict, as was the partnership between European powers and the US. Once President Donald Trump’s second term began—built on a platform that included a pacification pillar—the diversity of positions on the conflict became more apparent on the global stage.
Total appropriations from the US and European allies for Ukraine, in various forms, are estimated to exceed $400 billion over four years of conflict, and shortages of material resources as well as manpower surfaced on both sides throughout this period. The natural alliance that emerged between the West and Ukraine was founded on constructed concept of protection against the Russian Federation, as well as an envisioned common future in economic and military cooperation structures. Given the post-Soviet arrangements that defined Ukraine as a buffer state in the early 1990s, the post-2014 developments can be equated to a continuation or at least resurgence of a territory-control competition. Thus, Ukraine became in the 21st century a contested hard border and eventually a front line since 2014, when territorial modifications and rearmament commenced
The premise of a united alliance backing Ukraine from the outset is supported by clear joint action, including welcoming Ukrainian refugees and subsidizing their expenses in EU countries and beyond, imports of Ukrainian agricultural products despite significant opposition and protests from local farmers, etc. Ukraine received significant support from its allies, probably unequaled in any modern war, but the weight of war was certainly felt differently in Kyiv and allied capitals. The fear of Russian expansionism, combined with encouraging messages, such as the important role Ukraine could play as an emerging security provider (EC Ukraine, 2026) increased the weight carried by this country and by Ukrainian soldiers dying for the front in what was portrayed as saving Europe.
Thus, a profound connection with the Western alliance developed at multiple levels, despite limitations on both sides. When assessing public communications in the aftermath of 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine aimed to restore its territorial sovereignty, while Western partners invoked action aiming to protect Europe against Russian expansionism, aims that presumably converged. However, this convergence on broad strategic goals did not preclude unilateral Ukrainian actions that directly undermined the economic and energy interests of its European backers.
Nevertheless, a first significant instance of actions clearly connected to conflict in Ukraine, but favoring at most only a part of the alliance, was the September 2022 bombing of Nord Stream. Germany issued arrest warrants for indicted Ukrainian perpetrators; one was reportedly arrested in Italy, extradited, and now faces trial (Gupta, 2026). Thus, while the alliance with and for Ukraine remained strong, various actions touched upon sovereign national interests of countries, such as Germany in the example above, as the demolition of energy infrastructure on both sides of the conflict was unravelling.
Another peak of the confrontation was reached when the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) caught fire in August 2024 at one of the cooling towers, with sides reportedly trading blame for the incident (Santos, 2024). However, this was not the first or last incident, this plant remaining an important chokepoint in the conflict. Russian strikes in Ukrainian energy infrastructure targeted primarily power plants, stations and transport infrastructure, and while a brief pause may have emerged in 2023, the attacks resurfaced in 2024. Recent reports for December 2025–May 2026 indicated heating disruptions as temperatures dropped below -20°C (UNHR, 2026).
Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure include strikes on 24 out of Russia’s 33 major oil refineries as of May 2026, including the ones from Syzran, Ryazan, Moscow, Kirishi and Nizhny Novgorod (Balestrieri, 2026), reportedly generating losses in amount of $ 100 million per day. The number of Ukrainian strikes on oil and gas infrastructure in the Russian Federation is the highest (700), exceeding strikes on power lines (600) and transformer stations (350), with Rosneft the single most targeted company, sustaining over 71 strikes across 10 of its 13 refineries (Morokhin & Sokolovna, 2026).
Thus, the targeting of critical infrastructure is notably asymmetric: while Moscow aimed specifically at electricity grids, whose destruction impacts the morale of population and creates difficulties for the state in providing citizens with basic supplies, Kyiv aimed predominantly at economic and military infrastructure aiming to cut Russian resources for pursuing the conflict.
On August 15, 2026, the Russian Federation reportedly closed the Sheskharis oil export terminal at Novorossiysk, after a Ukrainian drone attack (Fenbert, 2026). While it represents a continuation of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil and gas infrastructure, the action strongly impacts the Black Sea energy trade particularly for countries like Türkiye, Romania but also Kazakhstan.
Beyond Russian oil, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)—whose shareholders include Chevron and ExxonMobil—was reportedly delivering 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports (Caspian Policy Center, 2026) through the Sheskharis terminal. The terminal was loading oil for major Romanian oil refineries Petrobrazi and Petromidia (owned by the Kazakh state company KazMunayGaz), the latter alone processing 46.3 % of Romania’s total refining capacity (Rusu, 2026). This development unfolded as European refiners confront a supply crisis, low stored reserves, low water levels on transportation routes, and while countries also battle drought, wild fires and electricity production challenges in terms of hydropower and nuclear. Furthermore, the grain terminal from Novorossiysk was also hit (AlJazeera & Reuters, 2026).
Thus, when estimating that Ukrainian grain export costs will rise by $50–70 per ton, as its ports operations were halted and Kyiv has to rely on land routes, particularly a connection to the Romanian Constanta port through Moldova (liga.net, 2026), it must be taken into account a circular effect generates higher costs, even when considering the strategic rationale for destroying Russian Black Sea infrastructure. Even before the interruption of oil supplies from Kazakhstan to Romania, determined by attacks on the Novorossiysk port, Romania was fighting an acute energy crisis, thus inflation and prices increase. Even more so after the attacks, Romania’s ability to offer lower transit tariffs (liga.net, 2026) is becoming increasingly constrained—unless Bucharest unilaterally decides to subsidize the resulting costs, as Ukraine apparently hopes.As Europe endures a parched summer in 2026, oil and gas supplies in the Black Sea are likewise drying up, and generally from the Russian Federation to Europe. While the isolation of Russian supplies has a clear role in the conflict, it also affects large-scale oil supply patterns, for Moscow but also neutral parties and allies such as Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania or Germany.
3. Energy ecosystem changes in the Black Sea region
The previous section demonstrated that latest Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure at Novorossiysk are neither singular nor particularly specific to the Black Sea region. However, they consolidate a potential divergence of interests that may well surpass the scope and timeline of the ongoing conflict for Black Sea riparian states.
Novorossiysk is not only the largest Russian port in the Black Sea, but also a strategic oil and grain export hub. The combined oil export capacity of the Sheskharis terminal (Transneft) and the CPC terminal (an international consortium including Transneft, Chevron, and ExxonMobil), both at Novorossiysk, is estimated at 2.2–2.3 million barrels per day. The Novorossiysk capacity is estimated at 30 % of Russia’s total crude and refined petroleum export capacity, and at the pre-sanctions peak in 2017, it exported 3.2% of total global oil supply (Ballast Markets, 2026).
As of November 2025, it was estimated that Novorossiysk was exporting roughly 2% of global oil supplies (Global Banking & Finance Review, 2025), surpassed only by major terminals from the Persian Gulf or Corpus Christi/Ingleside (US). Novorossiysk served mainly Indian and Chinese markets, and to a lesser but yet relevant extent Türkiye and Europe. The conflict from Ukraine resulted, alongside increased pollution due to the lengthening of oil trade routes from 5–6 days to 30–35 days, in a shift of 90 % from Russian oil supplies to China and India (Erkul, 2023).
Türkiye alone is connected to Russian export infrastructure at Novorossiysk, at Russkaya, where the control station for TurkStream gas pipeline is located, and at Beregovaya, where the control station for Blue Stream gas pipeline is located. Ankara’s Black Sea energy infrastructure has been presented as adverse to Ukrainian interests by the Cold War-old propagandistic outlet Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty back in 2020, in an article claiming that Turkstream “will bypass Ukraine”.
The article cites Margarita Assenova of the Jamestown Foundation, who states that TurkStream “directly undermines Ukraine as a gas-transit country and directly undermines Ukrainian security” (Prince, 2020). The merit of this claim is limited by its core assumptions, particularly the generalization of oil and gas transit routes as connecting the Russian Federation to “Europe”. While Ukraine is a northern transit route, Türkiye is clearly a southern transit route, with significant implications for cost points of final user prices situated in various regions of Europe: neither Ukraine can achieve the cost efficiency that TurkStream does for Türkiye, Bulgaria, Greece and neighboring countries, nor can Turkish infrastructure compete in real apolitical terms with Ukrainian routes for countries such as Hungary, Slovakia or Czech Republic. Romania benefited from a direct sea connection to Novorossiysk, and it is not necessarily favored by any route diversion through Türkiye or Ukraine.
The analysis identifies in above sections a dual relationship between Ukraine and its allies in confronting Russia: alignment on pushing Moscow back and restoring Ukrainian territory, Türkiye being among the most determined opponents of Crimean Peninsula’s takeover, and a long-term geopolitical competition that will clearly outlive the conflict. The competition is not emphasized only by considerations on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, but also by the previously-analyzed cost determinations for Ukrainian grain exports. Novorossiysk serves both energy and trade (including grain) sectors for Moscow—and Constanta-Navodari serves similar functions for Bucharest.
The Constanta port, reportedly the largest Black Sea port (DP World Constanta, 2026) connects Danube riparian states to the Black Sea. Novorossiysk, Odesa (less operational for grain exports in summer 2026 due to the conflict), Varna, and Istanbul also hold important stakes in regional trade, and represent natural competitors in the Black Sea for both energy and trade. Thus, the unilateral-multilateral escalation in the conflict results in a mix of results that can be assessed in the framework of the conflict but also in the long-term regional competition: ultimately, Ukraine must pursue the legitimate development of Odesa port as a matter of national interest.
The shift of Russian energy supplies to Asia after 2022 is broadly documented by various sources (Erkul, 2023), (Wickenden, 2026). However, the assessment of energy supply routes to Europe, be they from the Russian Federation, Central Asia or elsewhere, as simple source – Europe connections is not accurate, particularly for Ukraine, Türkiye, and countries from Eastern Europe.
The map of oil and gas pipelines presented by Esen (Esen, 2016) which focused on Türkiye’s energy supply security, now contains outdated data, including projected routes that were either never initiated or never completed. In general, competing pipeline projects remain highly fluid, with many of them languished at the proposal stage for decades. To provide an accurate, real-world overview of the pipelines currently operating or under construction in the region, Figure 1 draws on updated data from the Global Energy Monitor (Global Energy Monitor, 2026), with author annotations highlighting key routes relevant to the present analysis. As such, it presents what appear to be, at minimum, complementary—and potentially competing—pipeline systems: on one hand, the CPC pipeline; on the other, the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipelines.
In Figure 1, the CPC line connects Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to Novorossiysk—a route that traditionally exports 80% of Kazakh oil. The closure of the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk halted these deliveries, prompting Astana to consider alternative routes such as Baku-Supsa and BTC.
Figure 1. CPC, Baku-Supsa, and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines (based on August 2026 Global Energy Monitor tracker data, with author’s annotations(Global Energy Monitor, 2026).
The upper-most dashed blue line from Fig. 1 represents (interrupted as of August 17th, 2026) sea route connections from Novorossiysk to Romanian port of Constanta and nearby Petromidia refinery, and the further connection to Petrobrazi oil refinery, the latter connected to Constanta via an approx. 10000 tons per annum pipeline. The other two blue dashed lines represent typical sea routes for oil to India and China from Novorossiysk terminals, normally carrying Russian and Kazakh oil. As the attacks on Novorossiysk increased in frequency and scale from the second part of 2025 to August 2026, culminating in the closure of oil terminals, Kazakhstan was prompted to consider alternative export routes, and so it did: oil was redirected in 2026 from Novorossiysk to Aktau port, Atasu-Alashankou pipeline (China) and the Atyrau-Samara pipeline (Russian Federation), with further consideration to expand deliveries through Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines (Abuova, 2026).
Coincidentally, the construction of the two bypass pipelines—Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan—was completed by British Petroleum (BP) in 2026, before the consequential closure of Novorossiysk oil terminals (including CPC) and transferred to the operator, i.e. Azerbaijan’s SOCAR state energy company: Baku-Supsa was transferred on June 8th, 2026 (Interfax Baku-Supsa, 2026), and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was transferred on July 1st, 2026 (Pipeline & Gas Journal BTC, 2026).
The total project costs for the two pipelines were estimated to surpass $ 4.5 billion, and although operational control was transferred to SOCAR, the pipelines are owned by consortiums in which BP maintains leading positions, with approximately 30% shares in both projects.
While the alternative routes are positive developments for their shareholders and mainly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan’s oil output capacity remains affected. While CPC capacity for Kazakh oil was estimated at 64.8 million tons per annum (2025), the Baku-Supsa pipeline’s total capacity is estimated at only 7.5 million tons per annum, and the share of Kazakh exports through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan may be increased from 1.5 million tons to a still modest 2.2 million tons per annum (Abuova, 2026), hence by far not sufficient or comparable to CPC export capacity. Consequently, the two BP- and SOCAR-related pipelines cannot replace CPC for Kazakhstan, which is thus forced either to pursue exports through CPC or to redirect more oil to China and alternative Russian pipelines.
For Türkiye, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan is a newly added high-capacity oil pipeline that certainly compensates for CPC oil import losses, as long as the trend of isolating Russian oil and gas exports does not result in further closures of TurkStream and Blue Stream, as it happened with Nord Stream and Novorossiysk. This development replaces Kazakh oil with essentially Azeri oil, but the relations between the two countries are developing well, hence less overall regional risk for Ankara. However, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine remain increasingly distant from this new oil route—leaving them exposed to potential price increases at best.
4. Global geopolitical implications of energy rerouting around the Black Sea
Although the Tengiz-Baku route could theoretically be developed to reroute large quantities of CPC crude to Europe, costs would likely be significant—and Baku’s capacity as a node is constrained by its own export interests. This partial rebalancing places BP and SOCAR at the center of Central Asian oil deliveries to Europe as a potential alternative to Russian—and partially Kazakh—supplies through Novorossiysk, but it does not address supply replacement for Asian customers, and it redistributes supply accessibility for Eastern European countries by lengthening certain routes.
The envisioned potential reconfiguration may disadvantage main western CPC shareholders Chevron and ExxonMobil, but other US companies may still benefit financially from the overall expansion of oil and gas exports through the two new pipelines. As of August 16, 2026, the largest BP shareholder was BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd, followed by Norges Bank, Vanguard Capital Management (US), Legal & General Investment Management (UK), and SSgA Funds Management (US) (Market Screener BP, 2026). BP (offshore) and ExxonMobil (onshore) reportedly signed exploration agreements with SOCAR in 2025, in a potential expansion of business (Bagirova, 2025).
Furthermore, Azerbaijan, now Türkiye’s largest pipeline gas supplier (Daily Sabah Azerbaijan, 2026) and a growing oil exporter, received a positive rating at the end of 2025 from S&P Global (S&P Global Azerbaijan, 2025), and borrows predominantly from Asian Development Bank (by far the largest creditor – dominated by the US and Japan), World Bank and among others, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Trend Az, 2026). A similar debt pattern emerges for Georgia, a key component of the Baku-Supsa route, where the US-Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank is the largest creditor, followed by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank (Caliber, 2026).
Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, foreign creditors list for Kazakhstan is dominated by the Netherlands (estimated $ 41 billion), significantly in front of the UK and Russian Federation (each estimated in the range $ 10 – 15 billion) (Omirgazy, 2026). Thus, although Western and allied (Japan) creditors are expanding loans south from Russian borders, the Asian Development Bank and World Bank particularly focused on countries between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, i.e. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and reportedly Armenia, a region striving to become a new energy artery for Europe and the Mediterranean Sea region. Although no new American or allied military bases appeared in the region, Washington’s security interests are underscored by the investment and borrowing patterns of regional states. Consequently, although the unavoidable global transition to renewable energies poses a medium-term challenge the Black Sea energy supply dynamics are impacted by great power competition considerations, particularly investments in new Central Asian production and transport capacity, combined with economic cooperation and borrowing.
5. Conclusions
Like Ukraine’s energy fundamentals, the broader Black Sea energy ecosystem has been traditionally dominated by Russian Federation supplies—which still maintain globally significant crude petroleum and natural gas export capacity. However, the energy supply of riparian states such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye is significantly affected by the Ukraine conflict, which has escalated into large-scale reciprocal strikes on energy infrastructure.
The data analyzed reveal that attacks on energy infrastructure were asymmetric: while Moscow primarily targeted power grids, Kyiv focused on oil and gas infrastructure—with Rosneft the most targeted Russian company.
As Europe is battling a multi-layered energy crisis, the August 2026 attacks on Novorossiysk’s crude petroleum export facilities exposed significant dependencies—such as the Kazakh-owned Petromidia refinery’s role in more than 40% of Romania’s refining capacity.
Ukraine’s dual approach to the conflict—both unilateral and within the framework of its Western alliance—is analyzed, with limitations on both sides identified. On the one hand, the narrative development in Europe induced in Ukraine the perception that it has a responsibility to defend Europe from Russian expansionism, besides the fight to recover territory. The contested outcomes of Perestroika contributed to Ukraine’s transformation from a buffer state into a hardened frontline, as the West maintained its influence expansion policy near Russian borders and Moscow began to contest a potential Western-dominated neighborhood. From a Cold War bipolar perspective, Ukraine is caught in a great power competition that risks overshadowing regional peace.
From a national security perspective, Ukraine has chosen to act unilaterally in securing its regional interests—with impacts on the energy security of its neighbors and their ability to offer competitive grain transfer prices (e.g., Romania). From this perspective, striking Russian energy infrastructure is considered as a potential mean to tip the balance of power and ultimately receive better peace conditions when the time comes. The intensity of confrontation is emphasized by the reciprocal moral hazard associated with grain supply at global level, the Black Sea remaining a key export corridor. Although it is probably much too early for a shift to Odesa, Ukraine’s clear aspirations to reduce reliance on the Constanta port surfaced in various forms, including the additional transfer costs per exported ton of grain. These considerations emphasize the limits of cooperation between allies in the conflict, as well as potential post-conflict regional competition patterns.
In absolute terms, the August 2026 strikes on Novorossiysk impact Russian crude petroleum exports to India and China far more than those to Europe and Türkiye, but significant disruptions and supply uncertainty burden energy supply in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, neither Ukraine nor neighboring countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary appear to be as well positioned as Central Asian countries to capitalize on a systemic route shift, the latter in cooperation with oil majors such as BP and ExxonMobil. American, British and allied investment and borrowing patterns in countries situated between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea appear to anticipate a systemic rerouting of oil flows to Europe, resulting in new supply patterns, with Türkiye emerging as an increasingly important connection node.
However, while highly significant for certain European countries, the general trend of shifting crude petroleum and natural gas deliveries to Asia, away from Ukrainian transit infrastructure and Black Sea routes to Europe appears to persist as dominating outcome. Although consistent with the confrontation narrative, the shift of energy flows away from the Black Sea region—particularly its western part—draws a clear distinction between conflict-related developments and the broader dynamics in which great powers build infrastructure based on global competition considerations.
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Cover image credits: Vlad Patana via Unsplash. For illustrative purposes only.
*Ecaterina MATOI is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.