Ecaterina MATOI
Introduction
Presuming that recent political discussion in Europe related to ending the war in Ukraine represents a genuine endeavor and not a false flag operation, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent remarks about reviving the older draft law 11214 submitted by Member of Parliament Serhiy Hryvko indicates a shift in the ongoing war. The draft law, in its 2024 form, was reportedly in contradiction with the Constitution of Ukraine and additional legislation such as “On Defense of Ukraine” and “On Intelligence” (Khomenko, 2024), hence a revised form is to be expected in the next period.
Media reports underline potential business opportunities particularly for veterans and the export of Ukraine’s wartime security expertise (Kyiv Post PMC, 2026). Under normal conditions, at the national and international levels, this pathway could represent a compelling postwar demilitarization strive. However, as in many regions across the globe, including Europe, appear to remilitarize at an accelerated pace, the transition of military assets from the setting of the Ukrainian defense against Russian invasion to the international market of private military services has two potentially competing implications: the reduction of hard power assets within Ukraine and the increase of available hard power choices for contractors.
As certain traditional great powers fail to uphold fundamental peace and their leadership responsibilities, and increasingly turn to hard power in order to settle perceived or real threats based on the assumption of hard power availability and projection, Ukraine risks becoming entangled in an unpredictable and risky power play at global level, upon which it can barely exert real influence.
This article analyzes Ukraine’s renewed bid to legislate Private Military Companies (PMCs) in the context of a still ongoing war on its territory, global PMC landscape and geopolitical shifts that announce a general return to hard power projection as alternative to an established global governance system and diplomacy, with the aim of identifying potential challenges Ukraine may experience in its expected postwar recovery.
The revival of Ukrainian legislation on private military companies and its context
The Ukrainian political debate around legalization of PMCs precedes both the 2024 draft law 11214 and the Russian invasion. In early February 2020, the draft law No. 3005 was submitted by Member of Parliament Olga Vasilevskaya-Smaglyuk, and defended in public (UNIAN I, 2020); (UNIAN II, 2020). The declared goals of mentioned legislation proposal included the monetization of the industry that was reportedly already present in Ukraine, but based and taxed in other jurisdictions, Vasilevskaya-Smaglyuk mentioning Bulgaria, Türkiye and the United Kingdom (UK) and five companies though without naming them (UNIAN I, 2020). Furthermore, companies such as Omega Consulting Group, founded by Andrei Kebkalo (Grey Dynamics, 2023), was recruiting Ukrainian nationals for various missions abroad before 2022, alongside known Western and Russian industry giants.
As the draft law was being debated in 2020, Vasilevskaya-Smaglyuk reportedly stated that passing the law might be challenging due to resistance of countries perceiving Ukraine as a potential competitor, while invoking the 2008 Montreux Document on PMCs as basis for legislative initiative (UNIAN II, 2020). Both the initial, i.e. 2020, Ukrainian draft law for PMCs, and 2024 draft law number 11214 would prohibit the involvement of approved companies in direct wars. The 2024 version would have authorized organizing security for persons, legal entities, and facilities, providing training and demining activities, using weapons and equipment and establishing permanent bases on Ukrainian territory (SOFX, 2026).
The 2021 raid carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) on a training camp reportedly owned by DBC Corp. represents an instance of Kiyv’s effort to contain illegal private military organizations. DBC Corp. was reportedly led by Semyon Semenchenko, had connections with Ihor Kolomoisky, and had accumulated a significant stockpile of rounds of ammunition, anti-tank rockets, hand-grenades, grenades and launchers, rifles and pistols (Ponomarenko, 2021).
In early May 2026, President Zelensky reportedly stated that the discussion on private military companies was related to the one on “postwar opportunities for our warriors”, according to a Business Insider report that catalogues the transition as one towards “postwar mercenary work” (Loh, 2026). Hence, the strive to legalize PMCs has a primarily economic component, although it may be significant for other postwar dynamics as well.
There is no basis for comparison between the cases of Iraq and Ukraine, but should Iraq be revisited from a state-reconstruction perspective, with emphasis on the military sector, two relevant topics require analysis in the context of Ukraine’s PMCs law. Firstly, Iraqi military’s reconstruction was supervised by a foreign entity (Central Provisional Authority – CPA), with the United States (US) as an experienced occupying power present on Iraqi territory, and represented a war phase, not the end of the war. Phase IV, or “post-combat operations” (Bensahel, et al., 2008, p. XVIII), is equated to “where the wars are really won” (Crane, 2005), hence a crucial stage in an ongoing war.
Secondly, disbanding the Iraqi Army by the CPA, that resulted in large-scale social and security threats represents a lesson-learned which can be theoretically addressed through professional reconversion. However, besides differences that are addressed in the following sections, the size of army in Iraq was fundamentally different in 2003 to the one of Ukraine in 2026: while Iraq had a standing/regular army of approximately 300 000 – 350 000, plus the Republican Guard amassing 60 000 – 70 000 troops, and the Special Republican Guard (Otterman, 2005), who served as a source of income for a large Iraqi population depending on state salaries, Ukraine’s Armed Forces numbered 165 000 at the end of 2013 (before the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula), of which 120 900 military personnel (Vovk, 2024). As a reference number for the pre-2022 war, the Ukrainian armed forces reportedly exceeded 200 000 in 2021 (Lviv Herald, 2025), while in May 2026 is more than 880 000, according to sources (Loh, 2026).
The data presented above implies, that most of Ukraine’s military personnel was added through post-2022 conscription. Hence, from the Ukrainian troops that survived, the majority may not be career military personnel, but recruits with a brief military training and at best a few years of frontline experience. Furthermore, assuming an orderly peace process, the number of Ukrainian troops cannot drop sharply from an estimated 880 000 – 1 000 000 (Loh, 2026) to pre-2022 level for at least two reasons: a potential postwar Russian threat, and the global geopolitical tensions.
In this context, while Ukrainian government’s concern with postwar career trajectory of recruits with a relatively short frontline experience represents a legitimate question, Ukraine along global powers and European allies will have to responsibly take into account either a genuine pacification process that would accommodate the settlement of an already burdened body of Ukrainian troops, or the continuation of a warlike approach to international relations, by absorbing former frontline soldiers into further conflicts.
The challenges of retraining Ukrainian troops in the envisioned postwar scenario are of primary importance to Ukraine and its neighbors, but also for the wider geopolitical calculus. While part of the global community invests in efforts to maintain peace, through Geneva Conventions, Montreux Document on PMCs and other constructive measures, the increase of military budgets and overall militarization in certain regions, along with the refusal to accommodate new economic and geopolitical paradigms in an orderly and sustainable manner, create new and potentially irreconcilable gaps that have historically led to continuous wars.
Hence, the international peace landscape is sensitive to both the addition of hard power workforce and the influence of regional military and economic powers in general. This state of affairs in international relations does not represent a constraint on Ukraine’s options to navigate outside a devastating war, but it underlines the continuous risks that developed on the globe since 2022 in parallel to the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The ongoing war in Ukraine and its intersection with private military
A February 2026 media report (Psaropoulos, 2026) claims that the Russian Federation suffered 1.25 million casualties, of which 418 000 troops were killed, citing Ukraine’s General Staff estimations, other sources cited being more conservative. Citing statistics hint at 140 000 dead Ukrainian soldiers and 460 000 additional casualties, i.e. a total of 600 000 casualties for Kyiv. The report additionally mentions that 5 million people came under Russian occupation as of 2023, and 5.9 million Ukrainians left the country.
Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation have spent massive amounts of capital on the war, which might need decades and generations to recover, with additional post-war challenges related to development gaps. Europe has reportedly allocated EUR 205.3 billion and the US has allocated EUR 115.4 billion for Ukraine in the period February 2022 – May 2026 (Gaudiaut, 2026), a total of EUR 320.7 billion that exceeds the yearly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, and that of Ukraine itself in 2025.
The abrupt increase in foreign funding, technological upgrading and number of military troops represents a challenge for any country, and for Ukraine as well. In the aftermath of 2014 Crimean Peninsula’s occupation, Ukraine reportedly launched the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine. As the country had a reduced number of troops and its military arsenal was relatively old, the 2014 presidential Decree on Mobilization led to volunteer battalions beginning to be created in April/May of the same year.
Literature cites four types of battalions: formed by oblast governments (Aydar, Kryvbas, etc.) at territorial level and incorporated into regular army, special police battalions (such as Dnipro-1), battalions joining the military reserve (for example Donbas, Azov), and non-incorporated battalions such as Pravy Sector military units, Dzhokhar Dudaev and Sheikh Mansour battalions, the latter coordinating directly with ATO (Klein, 2015). According to cited literature, there were 40 – 50 volunteer battalions active in Ukraine as of April 2015, with size in the ranging from dozens to hundreds of members per unit.
From 2022, three types of new volunteer units additionally appeared in Ukraine. Territorial Defense Forces (TDFs) amassed 110 000 troops by May 2022, and in addition, 70 000 joined territorial formations under the law “On fundamentals of national resistance” (Bielieskov, 2023). The second category encompasses Ukrainian volunteer units at national level, encompassing what sources call “active units of Azov” (regiment), the list including the 3rd Assault Brigade (SSO Azov-Kyiv), Special Purpose Unit Lyubart, and Kraken Detachment (Rendall, 2023).
The 8th Battalion Aratta was transferred to reserve units after being active since 2014, but reactivated in 2022 under the supervision of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) (MilitaryLand, 2026). Thirdly, foreign volunteer units have been formed, with individuals from neighboring countries and third countries. These include Polish Volunteer Corps
(Military Watch Magazine, 2026), Norman Brigade (Blackwell, 2022), Kastus Kalinouski Regiment (Kastus Kalinoŭski Regiment, 2026), and Freedom of Russia Legion and Russian Volunteer Corps (Satanovskii, 2023).
The International Legion for the Defense of Ukraine (ILDU), (ILDU, 2026), was created at the request of the Ukrainian President in 2022 (Foreign Recruitment Center, 2026). It lists available jobs in English, Spanish, Portuguese and French, while an available online guide explains the benefits of joining the Defense Forces of Ukraine, including training on modern weapons with $ 490 financial support, as well as four types of roles/payment schedules ranging from $ 715 per month to $ 5 030 for a 2-month frontline deployment (joinarmy.org, 2026).
The Washington D.C.-based company Silent Professionals became famous for position listings in 2022, when an Extraction/Protective Agent for Ukraine contract was paid with $ 1 000-2 000 per day, plus bonus (Debusmann Jr, 2022), an extraction operation being reportedly estimated to cost between $ 30 000 and $ 6 million.
Acknowledging that also the Russian Federation relied on foreign soldiers or hired mercenaries, Ukraine’s defense is organized based on both regular soldiers and hired third parties. While itself a years-long importer of foreign military talent, Ukraine’s aim to export or in certain cases re-export security/military workforce will have to consider heterogenous character of the current defense forces, that encompasses various groups and individuals, that coordinate differently with central military authorities. Particularly the foreign private contractors, with Ukrainian citizenship or not, along with their primary allegiances and postwar perspectives, add to the complexity of a potential law allowing the export of private military services and expertise.
Ukraine’s influence on an increasingly unstable balance of power
In the landscape of global security, the privatization of war was assessed in the context of an eroding state authority (Leander, 2006). Reports hint that the UK is at the center of “global mercenary industry” (Norton-Taylor, 2016), (Benevilli, Bruun, & Overton, 2018), while the US has also stepped up the privatization of multiple military activity sectors.
While the market for international private military services may be supplied by organizations or individuals from multiple countries, such as the Colombian mercenaries from Sudan (NBC News/Associated Press, 2026), the beneficiaries are in many cases great powers that are members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Hence, should Ukraine build an indigenous ecosystem for PMCs, that serves third parties, an impartial contribution to the global security landscape may become an insurmountable goal, as major security contracts support political goals.
The claim of temporary countering Russian global influence has at least two major characteristics. Should the war in Ukraine indeed end soon with a peace agreement, the role of Ukraine in the wider landscape of global order contestation by both Economic North and Economic South will become more pronounced. In this framework, the question whether Ukraine continues to receive economic support or has to increase its contribution towards consolidating a broader alliance may require additional considerations related to the export of security. Secondly, the capacity of Ukraine to become an established enforcer of international law must be assessed in a longer historical process analysis.
Ukraine’s extended international reach to operations outside its borders can be assigned to a far-reaching defense strategy, but in the context of global competition, unless Kyiv asserts itself as a great power, it cannot be equated solely with the defense of national territory and population. The April 2026 attack on the Russian tanker Arctic Metagaz off the Libyan coast has been reportedly carried out by Ukrainian officers and military experts with British intelligence support. Ukrainian military personnel, reportedly numbering 200, are located at Misrata, Zawiya (near Mellitah oil and gas complex), and on a coastal site placed at disposal by the Tripoli government (RFI Ukraine Libya, 2026).
Reports of Ukrainian defense intelligence units in Sudan have been published in March 2024 (Sapwood, 2024), and the presence of Ukrainian special forces fighting alongside Syrian rebels to “decimate Russian mercenaries in Syria” was reported by Kyiv Post (Zakharchenko, 2024). Hence, Ukraine’s approach to ending the war it was subjected to its own territory includes defeating the Russian Federation on multiple international competition fronts rather than a settlement of the particular dispute between Kyiv and Moscow, which aligns Ukraine and its allies in a broader confrontational pattern.
Irrespective of the model Ukraine adopts for its post-war military, potential regional security dilemmas could arise. While this may not threaten Poland, with its vast size and military, smaller neighbors like Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova possess comparatively smaller economies, populations, and defense budgets.
Acknowledging the diverse approaches to European security by various powers on the continent, and foreign interests, it becomes rather improbable for neighbors to ignore a 1-million-strong Ukrainian army or an equivalent, even if downscaled, PMC sector with combat experience and future international presence in various theatres. Hence, chain reaction of regional rearmament or additional expensive security guarantees from outside the region may be required to fend against a large and dynamic military force. Particularly in the case of PMC scenario, where the state exerts oversight but less direct control, regional competition, as well as spats with neighbors, over minorities, over environmental coordination (Bystroe Canal), territorial claims (Serpent Island), the balance of power may shift in the medium and long term towards Ukraine’s advantage.
Consequently, a potential peace on the front in Ukraine may result, among others, in a gain in influence should Ukraine maintain a state-run or private militarized ecosystem, and the transfer of hard power assets to other fronts or contested regions. At national level, this force can be eventually mobilized to support various political goals, and at international level, Ukraine may capitalize on a higher coercion capability or reshape alliances and outcomes of systemic confrontations.
Conclusions
In May 2026, pre-2022 plans of Ukraine’s parliament and government to establish indigenous private military companies (PMC) industry resurfaced. Initial legislation proposals, initiated based on the 2008 Montreux Document, according to proponents, reportedly require modifications to comply with both international and domestic law. In the context of global rearmament and contestation of existing global order by both traditional and emerging powers, adding hard power to the global private security market increases tension and has the potential to influence the fragile balance of power.
Ukraine has adopted a flexible recruiting strategy for foreign fighters in its bid to fend off Russian invasion. Its 2026 large military, the size of the pre-2022 Russian military, encompasses a core of officers and soldiers, but is complemented by volunteer groups and foreign fighters, which the Russian Federation considers mercenaries despite integration efforts. The international safeguards for preventing mercenary activities can be easily met with formal integration into one country’s military, supporting contracts and citizenship, among other things.
President Zelensky’s call to revisit PMC legislation presents both the Russian Federation and Ukraine’s allies with the prospect of a long-term postwar presence of significant military force on Ukrainian territory, less controlled by the state and thus being less accountable. On one hand, planning for the reintegration of military personnel following a peace agreement may represent a valuable lesson learned from previous conflicts that later spiraled into insurgencies. However, several challenges require an assessment of whether transitioning these personnel into PMCs will deliver optimal results for Ukraine, its neighbors, and its allies.
The list of open questions includes the projected size of post-conflict Ukrainian army, the precise approach towards the heterogenous structure of the current Ukrainian defense forces, the political constraints of a potential Ukrainian military workforce with global presence vis-à-vis global competition, with potential impact on Kyiv’s long-term economic and trade development, and the security dilemma it would create for certain European allies. Furthermore, no studies have been identified on the possibility of reconverting current Ukrainian military personnel for more peaceful economic projects, especially since the bulk consists of post-2022 recruits and not career officers and soldiers, the latter category requiring preservation as a standing army in any case.
Ukraine’s actions to counter Russian influence in various regions across the globe are consistent with both its defense goals and major competition directions among great powers. These have been carried out in coordination and with the support of leading PMC ecosystems, such as the UK. Therefore, a fundamental competition with PMC powerhouses such as the UK and the US is rather unlikely, integration being a more plausible scenario.
An additional significant PMC sector in Ukraine, like in any other country, is consistent with the renewed adoption of hard power in settling disputes at international level rather than diplomacy and soft power in general. The accumulation of military assets, either in PMC form or as state military, by Ukraine, its neighbors in turn, allies and adversaries, increases the risk of large confrontation, as the war from Ukraine was paralleled by additional escalations such as the failure to reaffirm New START (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Hence, in adopting a postwar hard-power stance, Ukraine might increase its exposure to prolonged conflicts that generally generate costs rather than economic benefits.
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Cover Image credits: “Azov – Mariupol – formation” by Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine via Wikimedia Commons / Used in unedited form under CC BY-SA 4.0. For illustrative purposes only.
About the author: Ecaterina MATOI is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative (SDGAi).