1. Introduction
Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East has undergone significant changes over the past 15 years. In terms of the dynamics between states in the region, 2011 represented a turning point, serving as a launching pad for the political and strategic divergences that subsequently arose between the main regional actors. Turkey’s pro-Arab Spring stance in 2011, as well as subsequent disagreements over offering refuge to members of the Muslim Brotherhood after the 2013 coup in Egypt, have caused deep tensions in Ankara-Cairo relations. Tensions intensified in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood being declared a terrorist organization in Egypt after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took power.
At the same time, Ankara’s political support for actors associated with political Islam in the post-2011 period contributed to the deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia, which perceived such movements as threats to internal stability and regional order. Tensions between Ankara and Riyadh reached a critical point in December 2018, following the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, an episode after which the Turkish authorities publicly accused the Riyadh leadership of direct responsibility. This event amplified the rivalry between the two states, in a context where the two powers were seen as competitors for influence in the Muslim world: Saudi Arabia through the religious legitimacy conferred by its status as custodian of the two holy mosques, and Turkey through its demographic size, with an estimated population of 87.9 million ( World Population Review, 2026), its military capabilities, and its projection as a model of modern Islamic governance.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s two recent visits to Riyadh and Cairo in February 2026 mark a warming of relations and suggest the emergence of a new alignment of power in the Middle East (The New Arab, 2026). The context in which these visits took place is crucial, as the security architecture and geopolitical environment are undergoing a reshuffle, regardless of the angle from which regional actions are viewed. As a result of various events, the way threats are perceived has changed, which is also reflected in the agenda of these visits, with tensions between the US and Iran being one of the key points of discussion (Miş, 2026).
2. The objectives of the two visits
2.1. Political and security objectives
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo were aimed at strengthening bilateral relations and coordinating the response to major regional crises. The visit to Saudi Arabia took place shortly after confirmation that Turkey would not join the mutual defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a context that underscores Ankara’s preference for an autonomous security architecture (AFP, 2026).
Discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh focused on resolving conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, as well as joint support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. President Erdoğan also reiterated Turkey’s support for stability in Syria and Ankara’s willingness to collaborate with Saudi Arabia in the post-conflict reconstruction process (Hayatsever, 2026). At the regional level, Erdoğan expressed his opposition to any possible military escalation in the context of tensions related to Iran. Security and defense were central themes of the visit to Riyadh. The agenda included cooperation in the defense industry, with Erdoğan explicitly mentioning the possibility of a joint Turkish-Saudi investment in the Turkish KAAN fighter jet program, signaling a strategic partnership in the field of defense (The Arab Weekly, 2026).
To strengthen strategic ties with Egypt, the second meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council held in Cairo aimed to translate political agreements into practical measures (Frantzman, 2026). At the same time, the governments signed a framework agreement on military cooperation, relaunching bilateral cooperation in the field of security. The document was signed by the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Abdel Meguid Saqr, and the Turkish Minister of Defense, Yaşar Güler (Middle East Monitor, 2026). During the talks in Cairo, President Erdoğan mentioned that the Palestinian cause was at the top of their agenda. Both leaders condemned the lack of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and called for an agreement in this regard. At the same time, broader regional conflicts were addressed, including the civil war in Sudan, the situation in Iran, and the recognition of Somaliland, which was described as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty (Quillen, 2026).
2.2. Economic objectives
At the same time, the visits also had an important economic component, aimed at revitalizing trade and attracting investment. In Riyadh, the importance of finalizing a “Free Trade Agreement” between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Turkey was emphasized (Saudi Press Agency, 2026), and it was agreed to strengthen economic cooperation between the two parties in sectors such as oil, petrochemicals, electricity, and renewable energy (Quillen, 2026). At the same time, Saudi Arabia has expressed its willingness to invest approximately $2 billion in the development of two solar parks in Turkey, signaling a major influx of Saudi capital into the Turkish energy sector (The New Arab, 2026).
At the invitation of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the economic component of the visit focused on strengthening the existing bilateral framework and expanding sectoral cooperation. The two leaders set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $15 billion and signed a series of memoranda of cooperation in areas such as agriculture, health, social assistance, and youth policies. In this context, President Erdoğan also participated in a Turkish-Egyptian business forum, through which he emphasized the role of the business community in supporting the new bilateral dynamic. Overall, these economic initiatives reflect Ankara’s determination to take relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt to a higher strategic level based on economic integration, development projects, and mutual investments, which are considered pillars of regional prosperity. (Mikail Biyikli & Esra Tekin, 2026).
3. Regional implications
Turkey’s gradual rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and Egypt is recalibrating the power dynamics in the Middle East. Ankara and Riyadh, once rivals for influence in the Sunni world, now seem to be adopting a pragmatic approach. The normalization of Turkish-Saudi relations does not indicate the formation of a lasting strategic alliance, as both countries continue to compete for regional leadership; rather, their rapprochement represents a transactional marriage of convenience, allowing each to pursue its interests in the new context (Jabbour, 2022). However, increased cooperation between Ankara and Riyadh has the potential to alter the regional balance and may even alarm Iran by bringing together two major rivals under the Sunni umbrella (Çevik, 2024). This regional reset reflects a broader reconfiguration among the major Sunni powers, marked by a decline in ideological rivalries in favor of collaboration. After a decade of hostility, both Ankara and Cairo have concluded that pragmatic cooperation, in which differences are well managed, serves their national interests much more effectively than a zero-sum game (Morsy, 2025).
President Erdoğan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo are also important from the perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Ankara’s vocal support for the Palestinian cause—including its open support for Hamas—has strained relations with Israel and limited Turkey’s role as a mediator in the past. During the 2023 Gaza war, Turkey’s rhetoric (accusing Israel of genocide) isolated the country diplomatically, leading Israel to prefer Qatar as an intermediary in negotiations (Aydıntaşbaş, 2023). By coordinating more closely with Saudi Arabia and Egypt—two key powers involved in the peace process—Turkey may regain its influence on the Palestinian issue. If Ankara synchronises its diplomatic efforts on Palestine with other medium-sized regional actors or Russia and China, its impact on the negotiations will increase considerably (Aydıntaşbaş, 2023).
Overall, by repairing relations with former adversaries and positioning itself alongside other pillars of the Sunni world, Turkey is increasingly emerging as a pivotal mediator and dialogue partner in the new Middle East architecture—one geared toward détente, collective security, and diplomatic solutions rather than military confrontation. Turkey is also using its unique leverage in post-Assad Syria to secure a role that will allow it to shape the region’s trajectory (Salim Çevik, 2025).
4. Conclusions
President Erdoğan’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Egypt indicate a normalization of relations with these countries and mark a transition from rivalry to a pragmatic partnership focused on concrete regional interests. Politically, Ankara has sought to rebuild ties with two major regional players, with security taking center stage – Turkey has pursued defense partnerships aimed at strengthening regional security and contributing to a complementary security architecture. The signing of a framework agreement in the defense industry with Egypt signals a new level of military cooperation. Economically, Ankara has sought to expand trade and investment, while also targeting increased exchanges.
At the regional level, Turkey is reaffirming its status as a power pole by adopting a strategy that brings it closer to its old rivals, indicating that this repositioning is aimed at achieving strategic autonomy and integrating Turkey into the new Middle East architecture. It is difficult to predict whether the current Turkish-Saudi-Egyptian convergence will consolidate into a lasting alignment or remain a temporary pragmatic rapprochement, depending on how the parties manage persistent rivalries and historical mistrust. In this volatile context, a certain degree of unpredictability will persist.
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Cătălin-Adrian VASCUL, B.A student,
Security Studies, Faculty of History and Philosophy
Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania