Ecaterina Matoi
Introduction
The European Union (EU) represents one of the world’s most ambitious and historically-consequential projects, with the potential to compete economic superpowers on long term should it manage to overcome past intra-continental issues and speed up economic progress and integration.
As of 2026, the EU is still a slow/less unitary actor when compared to Chinese or American economies, though it remains a very large market that is relevant for global commodity and services trade. It also faces multiple dilemmas in the dynamics with its traditional partner, the US, and appears to oscillate in policy-making, one of the clearest examples being the approach to energy supply. In the context of two major military confrontations that have fundamentally disrupted global supply patterns, Europe has failed to lead the renewable energy transformation. Combined with its ineffective coordination—both at the intra-bloc level and with the US—on the wars in Ukraine and Iran, this has transformed Europe into a much less predictable international actor, while its competitors have strengthened their positions and revenues.
This analysis investigates whether, amid political necessities and commitments, the EU has developed a reliable energy supply policy, as this represents a fundamental prerequisite for both defense and continuous progress, even in the eventuality of a successful and competitive transition to renewable energy.
European energy supply in numbers
According to reports (Strategic Perspectives, 2026), the EU remains highly dependent on natural gas imports, 90 % of supply originating from outside of the bloc in 2024. The dependence on imported crude petroleum is even higher, with 97 % being purchased outside the bloc (European Council Oil, 2026). Cited sources hint that the US, Kazakhstan, and Norway became the top three suppliers of crude oil for the bloc, while Norway and the US are the main suppliers of natural gas (European Council Gas, 2026). In the broader range of (total) energy, the dependency on energy from outside the bloc stood at 58.4 % in 2023 (Eurostat Energy, 2025 (data extracted)), which cannot be equated to energy independence from any perspective.
In the Eurostat 2025 study on energy availability by fuel for the period 1990 – 2023 (Eurostat Energy, 2025 (data extracted)), it can be noticed, that starting with 2002, the amount of energy from renewables and biofuels began to increase, while the energy from solid fossil fuels decreased. The energy from oil and petroleum products slightly decreased, and the one from natural gas remained almost constant on long term, with a slight decrease in the period 2021-2023. In order to estimate the potential of renewable energy replacing the oil and gas energy from a theoretical perspective, following assumptions are considered:
a) For the purpose of this projection, EU energy consumption shall be considered constant, at the level of year 2023;
b) In 2023, 21’091.58 Petajoule (PJ) were available from oil and petroleum products, and 11’431.55 PJ were available from natural gas. In the same year, 10’926.55 PJ were available from renewables and biofuels;
c) An averaged rate of renewable and biofuel adoption increase can be calculated based on the values from 2002 (4’099.26 PJ) and 2023 (10’926.55 PJ). The average rate of growth in adopting renewable and biofuel energy is 325.11 PJ per year;
d) The task becomes to replace the sum of energy available from oil and gas in 2023 (32’523.13), with renewable energies and biofuel, at a rate of 325.11 PJ per annum.
In Fig. 1, a linear decrease of combined oil and gas energy was assumed, and a linear increase of renewable and biofuel energy. The data for years 2002 and 2023 is from cited Eurostat report, while the linearly predicted data has been generated separately.
Figure 1. Theoretical projection of oil and gas energy replacement with renewable energy and biofuel at constant replacement rate based on Eurostat data in the years 2002 and 2023.
At an average rate of replacement amounting 325.11 PJ per annum, the 2023 amount of energy from oil and gas will be completely replace in 100.04 year, i.e. in the year 2124, while the replacement of solid fossil fuel has not yet been factored in. Further assumptions, such as the availability of oil and gas, and the necessary financial means to acquire it, must be added to the theoretical projection. The amount of renewable and biofuel energy would equal and surpass oil and gas energy around the year 2056.
Hence, even if the pace is increased in order to meet the Net Zero 2050 climate goals, the EU is expected to remain dependent on oil, petroleum products and gas imports for at least the decades to come. Considering the existential reliance on imports for a large percentage of energy available in the EU, the European energy policy is subjected to geopolitical and economic rivalry at international level.
Energy supply in global context
The EU becoming a leading environmentally-sustainable region, while maintaining its economic competitiveness and geopolitical stance has become a burdening narrative, especially in the Ukraine war context. While the dependence on oil and gas has not sufficiently decreased as to replace it with alternative energy sources, the EU shifted to a risky balance between phasing out Russian supplies and an already pre-2026 colossal prices. In the context of the American-Israeli attack of Iran, and the disruption of entire Persian Gulf energy supplies to the world, the EU finds itself in a deepening crisis.
The supply of petroleum and natural gas from Russia to the EU has significantly decreased in the aftermath of Nord Stream gas pipeline bombing, and the Druzhba oil pipeline subsequent destruction, the latter representing an energy lifeline at least for countries such as Hungary and Slovakia. EU’s self-association with the concept of phasing out fossil fuels aimed at setting standards for environmental sustainability, but it resulted in two systematic setbacks for the bloc.
Firstly, the EU did not accelerate the transition from fossil fuels to renewables and biofuel, but rather switched suppliers. Secondly, in the context of a tough competition and negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, the EU increased its dependence on the US natural gas and petroleum, as well as petroleum products. Major flaws in this policy shift include the inconsistency in energy supply strategy weakens EU’s negotiation position with the US but any other competitor as well.
Furthermore, the very replacement of relatively environmentally-friendly pipeline energy with very expensive, much less environmentally-friendly shale oil and gas, transported via ships, hence again very burdening for the environment, depicts the ineffectiveness of EU’s erroneous promise to the world. From this perspective, the EU is forced to spend generational fortunes on supporting an unsustainable policy, as there is no pact in place to favor environmentally-friendly economies.
The global petroleum and products, and natural markets represent leading commodity trading domains. The American perspective of outcompeting Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its wider post-2016 format aims to increase revenue and maintain hegemony in the context of a Global South breaking with Washington’s control over global trade and financial infrastructure. In pursuing the war in Iran, the US both strengthens European dependency on American hydrocarbon resources, and reinforces its skepticism about to the theoretical smooth transition to renewables. At the same time, the US determines the EU to compete with dynamic Asian economies for its increasing exports of oil and gas, with significant strategic and financial consequences at least on short and middle term.
The main characteristic of the US policy that contrasts with European energy policy is economic consistency. The American upstream infrastructure and integration with Canadian crude supplies is already in place and effective. On the other hand, the European imperatives are not clearly addressed. For example, instead of maintaining existing refining infrastructure, Europe is advancing the closure or replacement of refineries (Harvey, 2025), without having secured vital replacements or economic arrangements to compensate for energy scarcity.
OPEC countries have already pivoted to Asia for energy deliveries, and the Russian Federation, that continues to develop natural gas extraction, for example in the Yamal field, is also redirecting its efforts towards Asian markets. Consequently, EU’s strive to lead the transition to renewable energy resulted so far in European deindustrialization and disconnection from large suppliers, except the US, hence not an example the globe is tending to follow. As the European commodities production and exports shrink, in key sectors like automotive (Raasch, 2025), Asia is benefiting from an uncoordinated European response to America’s energy hegemony bid, in the context of an outdated and fractured global order in which European leadership is not a norm anymore.
Energy policy and wider coordination imperatives
The European energy dependency must be analyzed in the wider context of global economic and, more recently, geopolitical and military confrontation. Particularly, the divergence between a European plan of shifting away from fossil fuels on the one hand, and geopolitical and defense imperatives on the other hand, may have become dominant. Data hints that from this perspective, as Europe strives to maintain its relative historic position in global affairs, competitors are already racing to define a new framework based on new realities.
As Europe was attempting to simulate American hegemony by imposing financial sanctions and confiscating foreign assets in what falsely appeared to be a US-Europe coordinated move, the war from Ukraine appeared to cost the Old Continent both money and the sensible pre-2022 economic security: trans-Atlantic tariffs had been already floated.
The harsh European reality is that despite the size of this economic bloc, Brussels did not manage to secure a coordinated, effective energy policy that meets its demands. Furthermore, it went to a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, relying on American speculative energy contracts and American weapons. As Europe dives into American energy dependence, long-term weapons purchase agreements both transfer hundreds of USD billions to Washington and compete local development of defense industry.
In addition, trade dependencies emphasize European reliance in the US commodity market, that functions anyway on a combination between payment promises (treasury bonds and credit in general) and actual payments, itself at the limit of reform with further potential impact on European economies. From this perspective, while certain European countries maintain economic relations with the rest of the world, a significant part of European trade was developed with the US, based on post-World War II (WWII) arrangements and an eroding Bretton Woods agreement.
European response to the energy crises determined by the wars from Ukraine and Iran was clearly not sufficient for all member countries. Particularly Hungary and Slovakia were impacted by attacks on Druzhba pipeline, and the critical situation was emphasized by two developments: new Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar’s call to Ukraine to open the pipeline immediately after winning the elections (Shenouda, 2026)
, and release of European EUR 90 billion loan to Kyiv as oil supply through the pipeline was resumed
(Kyrby, 2026), the latter confirming Europe’s critical energy crisis.
While the EU has passed the stress test as of April 2026, and the Union experienced just London’s departure decided one decade ago, the coordination is crippled by weaknesses. As Hungary and Slovakia depend on Druzhba pipeline, Greece depends more on energy from the Persian Gulf (Ergocun, 2026). The EU failure to act on the developments from Occupied Palestinian Territory determined countries to act at national level and recognize Palestine as a state.
Similarly, the response to the American-Israeli war from Iran was not coordinated at EU level, but each country acted separately, with Spain notably interdicting the US access to its bases for carrying out the war (Maturana, 2026)
. Hence, the flaws in essential coordination at European level span from energy policy to international cooperation positions, but also critical defense projects, as emphasized by Germany’s potential exit from the European 6th generation fighter project Future Combat Air System (FCAS) (Larson, 2026).
Consequently, while European consolidation remains a must in the context of American and Asian material power consolidation, the EU has to overcome its past and centrifugal tendencies in order to successfully address competition.
Conclusions
This analysis examined a potential European energy policy in the context of systemic supply challenges posed by the wars from Ukraine and Iran to a continent that is very dependent on external markets.
It was identified that recent EU renewable energy transition policy is very slow, and cannot amount to a realistic plan of replacing significant petroleum and natural gas supplies from abroad.
The increase in dependency on the US shale oil and gas supplies has at least three systematic flaws: the prices and availability limits threaten Europe’s economic outlook, it weakens EU and its countries’ position in negotiations with the US, and it exposes the European disregard to environmental impact of shale extraction and marine shipments, short-circuiting, thus, the moral high ground it claims in this fundamental global matter. A divergence between European sovereignty aspirations and deepening dependencies, be they American or from other regions, instead of breakthroughs in energy supply, becomes obvious.
The need of improvement in essential coordination on energy policy, that may capitalize on EU market size, is paralleled by coordination imperatives in other fields as well, such as defense and international cooperation. While the EU has achieved a unique integration of centuries-old competing countries, contemporary international environment and economic breakthroughs in Asia and generally Global South countries, require a more robust and coordinated approach to European energy policy as an existential pre-condition for sustainable progress.
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Cover page image: Maksym Kaharlyt via Unsplash. For illustrative purpose only.
About the author: Ecaterina MATOI is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.