Ecaterina MATOI
1. Introduction
There is no ambiguity that Russian invasion of Ukraine burdened an already difficult situation of this country and shifted security calculus in Europe, but, at the same time, the connection between fundamental transformations of international order and this war represents an uncontested, dominant, variable.
While political definitions of international cooperation instruments have shaped developments in general, even throughout the proclaimed American-led liberalism that dominated 20th century, clear limits and conditions of what were considered universal values become apparent in the context of the war from Ukraine, and background processes. Irrespective of the political orientation of United States (US) administrations, two elements remain constant in Washington’s foreign policy after 2001 shift to post-unipolar military aggression: the expansion of wars in both scale and scope, and the increasingly-challenging task to rally allies, in order to claim legitimacy for the use of force.
If there was no War on Terror (WoT), financial crisis from 2008, competition with Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Western expansion along post-1989 Russian borders, or race to “counter” China, American policy since at least 2014 in Ukraine could be equated to a predominantly peaceful struggle for human, universal values and liberties. However, amid a growing contestation of its hegemony, and a lack of convincing proposals for the future, the US struggles to carry on its energy-based dominance, in an apparent push to stretch previous century’s global order. In this context, Ukraine appears to emerge as an US ally, that switched from the highly-supported and well-financed goal of defending its population and territory to a security provider and exporter of military equipment, although it finds itself in a war at home that is not anymore the main focus of its efforts.
Ukraine’s deployment of troops outside the front line with the Russian Federation, exports of drones, talks with countries such as Persian Gulf Arab states or Syria on security cooperation, as well as a dynamic financial linking to London, Wall Street and foreign Military Industrial Complexes (MICs), all signal a precise shift from defense to international activism: advertising drones free of Chinese components, and thus referencing a country that refrained from confronting Ukraine directly and actually allowed the supply of Chine drones, resembles lobby for particular suppliers rather than a pragmatic and desperate defense strive.
This analysis examines two interrelated phenomena against the backdrop of a rapidly decaying global order, rearmament, and escalating war rhetoric: first, the increasing US-led militarization of international relations and the economy and its ripple effects; and second, Ukraine’s shift, amid an ongoing war on its own territory, toward acting as an international security provider.
2. Global order dynamics and Ukraine’s contribution to US wartime economy
As many countries around the world strive to gain relative advantages in a dollar-led global economy, immediate economic and defense imperatives determined a series of shifts in political definitions that reshaped the nature and directions of international cooperation. In Europe for example, post-World War II (WWII) political culture was based on American military primacy, and a clientele system that transferred economic resources to the US as payment for military protection. In the early 1990s, the US was already a disproportionately large military in terms of power-projecting capability, and, after Soviet Union’s dissolution, it became even larger. The enormous material and human base of American military began to be diverted in the 1990s towards predatory wars, systematized as WoT at the beginning of 21st century. Two major factors contributed to this dynamic: European political and economic support, and the association of Perestroika with an irreversible victory against socialist economic systems.
For more than three decades, mainstream political definitions at international level allowed the US to claim the role of an essential global administrator. The complexity of definitions is not explored in detail throughout this paper, but the dollar-based financial control and an essentially unchecked credit system, based on trust that the US can always honor its credit position, allowed the transfer of vast economic resources into a system that appears to increasingly weaponize them. The definitions span from macro-economic level, such as the American-induced initial idea to confiscate Russian financial assets, to micro-economic settings such as details of relations between social media corporations and individual users. From this perspective, the US exhibited enough confidence as to convince and influence multi-level transformations in many countries, claiming vision, leadership and ultimately repeated victory.
The unchallenged acceptance of US-defined norms resulted in large-scale human tragedy, particularly after 2001, while an ostensibly peaceful yet fundamentally wartime economy expanded. Within this system, already substantial financial accounts accumulated both public funds from the United States and other countries, as well as spoils of war. The practice of amassing economic assets is not unique to the US political and economic milieu; rather, the specific conditions under which it occurs are distinctive. Flaws such as massive hydrocarbon pollution at the expense of vulnerable communities—who are by definition not entitled to compensation—false claims regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and a unilateral series of sanctions and tariffs, all reaffirm a standardless imperative to obtain economic gains at any cost.
The modern American wartime economy inherited its size from the Cold War era, and the privatization of war was considered an innovation in international affairs, although its role as economic pivot was capitalized upon essentially by the US. This legacy is fundamental in analyzing Ukraine-related developments, because this war was preceded by arrangements that appear to position American economic and military juggernauts in place simultaneous to political acts.
By way of illustration, major beneficiaries of the Iraq War included American military-industrial complexes (MICs) such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon (subsequently RTX), Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics; large private contractors and corporations such as Halliburton/KBR and Bechtel; and major oil companies including ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, and Shell. Even before the war in Ukraine has ended, essentially the same set of actors had already signed various contracts for military deliveries or reconstruction deals, both on the basis of prior appropriations and in anticipation of additional US and foreign funding. These contractual guarantees are applied largely through US standards and political goals, with the latter apparently oscillating within the context of superpower competition.
American oversight and guarantees, traditionally a standard in international relations, have become the subject of analysis in recent years. The US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their unclear benefits for the international community, unilateral tariffs and sanctions, the unprecedented recognition of former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS – designated as terrorist organization previously) leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani/Ahmed al-Sharaa after having placed a bounty for capturing him, the abduction of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, are all hinting to an increasingly unpredictable US policy path, impacting the entire global cooperation landscape.
The war from Ukraine has had a clear economic component for various US entities from the beginning. This spans from what has been officially reported by the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform as politics-related personal business, such as Biden family’s participation in Burisma (US House Committe on Oversight and Government Reform, 2026), to the US-Ukraine “Minerals Deal” that was expected to repay the US $ 500 billion worth of minerals for the war support (Baskaran & Schwartz, 2025).
This framework is complemented by secondary arrangements, like for example the Nasdaq listing of Swarmer, a drone technology company founded initially in Ukraine and based in Austin, Texas, who appointed Erik Prince as non-executive chairman in early 2026, and experienced a 700 % increase in stock price in its first listing day (Stretch, 2026). According to the same source, in fall 2025, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo joined the board of Ukrainian drone and missile manufacturer Fire Point, and Powerus, an American drone manufacturer supported by Eric Trump and Donald Trump Jr., was seeking cooperation with Ukrainian companies when export restrictions will allow it.
Indirect American economic and military interests include the adoption of low-priced drones for one-way attack. At the Gauntlet I competition from Benning, Georgia (US Mil Drone Dominance, 2026), the list of 11 suppliers of attack drones was topped by the British-Ukrainian model Skycutter, manufactured in the UK by the Ukrainian company Skyfall and UK company Skycutter (Encarnacion, 2026). The US seeks to reduce current cost level of $ 5’000 to $ 2’000 per piece, and is expected to order 30’000 pieces to manufacturers that scored high in the mentioned competition.
Based on the above analysis, Kyiv appears to match and support many US wartime economy endeavors, and the cooperation shifted from a simple war support to a multi-faceted alliance that does not pursue the sole aim of pushing the Russian Federation back from Ukraine. As many other international developments, this economic and military relationship is building up based on US legal and political guarantees offered to the international community, and designed to “revitalize” American military-industrial industry (Hoffman, Aldisert, Cook, Sanders, & Vakharia, 2024).
3. The challenges of shifting from defense to militarization actor: drone sector
In anticipation of victory against the Russian Federation, Ukraine is expanding its focus from foreign-backed defense to contributor in various international competition sectors. Beyond troops deployment to Africa or Asia (Syria) (Lindhardtsen & Mitchell, 2026), Kyiv has offered its war expertise, particularly in air warfare and drones, to multiple countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria (Al Arabiya Ukraine Syria, 2026), the US, and Europe (Beardsley, 2025). After reportedly resuming arms exports in September 2025 (Shumlianskyi, 2025), President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the opening of ten arms export centers across Europe in February 2026 (Vakulina, 2026), Germany being one of the first targets.
The Toronto-based Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) partnered with Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation for the Army of Drones project back in July 2022 (UWC, 2026). In the first year following the Russian invasion, the project managed to raise $ 325 million (Kushnikov, 2025). Besides contributions from NGOs and expected donors, the Army of Drones project reportedly received a UAH 500 million (as of April 2026 approx. $ 11.5 million) from the former Ukrainian Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, Mykola Zlochevskyi as part of a plea deal with the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. Zlochevskyi allegedly tried to bribe law enforcement officers with a record-high bribe (UP, Censor.NET, 2025), and had been previously investigated for corruption in the UK as well, although not convicted (Bullough, 2017).
Mykola Zlochevskyi (President of Burisma) and Andriy Kicha (Chief Legal Officer at Burisma), also sentenced (sentence suspended) for corruption and entering a plea deal with the prosecutor’s office that included a UAH 100 million contribution to the “Army of Drones” project (Brovko, 2023), were among key persons of Burisma Holdings (The New Voice of Ukraine, 2024), that reportedly hired and paid millions of US dollars to Hunter Biden (US House Committe on Oversight and Government Reform, 2026).
Ukraine fights corruption, bribery, and embezzlement even in circles close to President Zelensky, as the watchdog attempts to survive political takeover attempts (Melkozerova & Dettmer, 2025). A probe into State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSCIP) contract for purchasing 2’000 Chinese-made Autel drones via a Ukrainian company reportedly revealed “greatly inflated prices” (Kudryk, 2024), with further drone procurement programs reportedly adding 70 – 90 % to market prices (Ukraine NABU, 2025).
The corruption, bribery and embezzlement in drone and military procurement are not exceptions: the relatively recent arrest of former Energy Minister German Galushchenko in a $ 100 million kickback scheme while population was suffering from acute electricity shortages (Le Monde with AFP, 2026) emphasizes great efforts, but also the persistence of a chronic corruption tendency.
The lack of structure in foreign-backed Ukraine’s drone sector and overall defense industry, is confirmed by Defense Minister Fedorov’s announcement of reducing a so-called “Drone Zoo”, i.e. the elimination of ineffective systems (Kalchenko, 2026). While this action is necessary probably positive for Ukraine’s defense development it also emphasizes on previous poor planning, hasted spending, and an overall defense design with low accountability standards.
While acknowledging Ukraine’s efforts to fight corruption, the danger of unlawful behavior in war regions and in highly sensitive sectors such as arms and munitions. The recently-uncovered scheme of appropriating drones from the “Army of Drones” project represents a great success for the prosecutor’s office, but it reveals critical flaws in Ukraine’s ability to operate and safeguard military equipment, with potential repercussions deriving from international law for participants in the conflict.
According to reports, UAH 15 million worth of equipment had been appropriated through an illegal scheme involving military personnel and civilians: 343 drones delivered to an army unit through the “Army of Drones” program were written off the records, handed to civilian accomplices, who resold them or their parts online, through anonymous accounts (Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office, 2026). Such breaches expose systematic gaps in ensuring arms control, and the risk of undocumented transfers to parties that can potentially use them in actions breaching International Humanitarian Law (IHL): arms exporters are encouraged to “ensure respect” (Brehm & Giorgou, 2024) for IHL and specifically cautioned against transferring weapons to recipients that do not have the capacity to exert control over arms and munition (ICRC arms transfers, 2024).
Concerns over state’s sovereign ability to control the flow of weapons on an even larger scale are confirmed by President Zekensky’s Marc 2026 statement, according to which Ukrainian companies had built drone plants abroad “Behind the State’s Back” (Shumlianskyi, 2026). This increases risks for security partners, as Ukrainian-made drones could reach adversaries and be used to stage false flags in which genuine and legitimate users can be framed easier as perpetrators of illegal action.
A third major challenge is represented by the fluidity of Ukraine’s war goals, that appear to transform from defense of territory and population to an international political and military activism that was actually not funded and supported as such when the plans were agreed. While the US negotiates difficult arrangements with the Russian Federation, China, but also Iran at least in theory, Ukraine began to offer military products and services to various customers, although it requires extensive military, economic and moral support from abroad.
In its endeavor to outperform the Russian Federation, Ukraine aims to become a major rearmament enabler, in the context of and consistent with an American push to reconquer the world and control its energy lifeline. The Ukrainian drone sector meets at least two standards for being connected to the US financial system: the prices are relatively low and concepts are cost-oriented in a relatively new and strategic defense domain, and the political will managed to bridge challenges such as difference in standards.
Ukraine-linked defense and dual-use companies reportedly attracted a record $ 776 million in venture capital in 2025, and a total of $ 1.8 billion since 2022 (Latour, 2026). Although a significant portion of the capital is reportedly Ukrainian, financing schemes and examples, joint ventures and lack of data on undisclosed agreements suggest an increased American and European interest for the battle-tested Ukrainian drone technology.
4. Discussion and conclusions
This analysis identified a strong causality relation between American-led escalation at global level, and the conflict from Ukraine. While the US is attempting to capitalize on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and expand its influence in Ukraine in forms other than inclusion in the European Union or NATO. It also identified that a mainly American well-established clientele, encompassing large military and logistics contractors, is in position to capitalize on the war from Ukraine, and the main actors are almost the same as those from Iraq.
Both former President Biden’s and President Trump’s family members appear to have had or aim to pursue business in or involving Ukraine. Furthermore, an important set of Ukrainian assets, including military drones, appear to have been selected for inclusion in US military and economic environments.
Recent developments from Ukraine hint at Kyiv’s shift from a defender of population and territory to an offeror of defense expertise and drones in various conflicts outside its borders, and an adopter of a more or less anti-Russia, anti-China, and thus potentially anti-BRICS stance, i.e. an agenda complementing the US one.
Three major challenges have been identified related to Ukraine’s subtle transformation. The first one is multi-level chronical corruption, and more concerning, the attempt to politicize anti-corruption bodies instead of working towards a more transparent governance, including in the military and drone procurement or production systems. This is a multi-layer problem, that impacts acquisitions and sales, and the overall quality of financing and disbursement processes, endangers the chances of success and credibility of the war against Russian Federation, despite a support from the US and Europe probably unmatched in recent history. The mechanisms of corruption appear to be connected to a political class that is held back only by EU-backed anti-corruption body and strong popular protests, and whose activity was impacted by political strives to limit its reach.
Secondly, state’s inability to safeguard/secure a reassuring deployment and use of weapons systems, and the prohibition of arms or military technology exports reduces the probability of Ukraine’s flawless execution of potential contracts, as potential customer or supplier of military equipment.
Thirdly, the metamorphization of Ukraine’s initial war goals into a type of wartime alignment with certain partners’ interests, and its potential contribution to global rearmament is both hazardous and speculative.
Ukraine’s role in American/global rearmament has been justified almost similarly during Democrat and Republican recent administrations, as the US decides unilaterally on what is acceptable or not, based on own definitions that impact international cooperation.
Whether Ukraine manages to become a trustworthy military partner, or if was able to really compete with other military industrial complexes that manufacture lower cost drones, such as Türkiye or Iran, remain open questions. Likewise, no decisive action to systematically address corruption, bribery, and embezzlement has been identified, especially during the ongoing difficult war effort, as the number of victims increases, and the funding required to sustain a war effort carried out in a less efficient manner should financiers standards apply, increase by the day.
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Cover page credits: The photo was captured at IDEF 2023 in Turkiye and was sourced from the author’s personal archive. For illustrative purposes only.
About the author: Ecaterina Matoi is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.