The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – a brief overview in January 2026

Maria Valentina NISTE

The relations between the United States and Venezuela date back to 1835, shortly after Venezuela gained independence. In the following decades, cooperation between the two countries was relatively good, focusing mainly on oil supplies to the US. With the rise to power of Hugo Chávez, amid the Bolivarian Revolution of 1998, and later Nicolás Maduro in 2013, bilateral dialogue between the US and Venezuela has deteriorated (Colmenares, 2018; Big-Alabo and Okafor, 2021). The interactions between Washington and Caracas have become increasingly complex, with the return of President Donald Trump to power in 2025. At the same time, on January 10, 2025, Maduro began his third term as president of Venezuela, following the 2024 elections, in a controversial context in which opposition leaders such as Maria Corina Machado and representatives of Venezuelan civil society denounced electoral fraud and irregularities (Directorio Legislativo, n.d.). During his first term between 2017 and 2020, President Trump waged a campaign of “maximum pressure” on Venezuela, imposing economic sanctions on the Venezuelan oil industry and on Venezuelan officials.

Currently, the US-Venezuela relationship has reached a point of military escalation through recurring American campaigns against narco-terrorism in the Caribbean region and, indirectly, against Maduro’s regime. This escalation has been gradual, beginning with February 2025 with the designation of cartels such as Tren de Aragua and, a few months later, Cartel de los Soles as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the US; to the deployment of naval forces (e.g., the transfer of the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean) and air strikes in the vicinity of Venezuela, since August 2025 (De los Reyes Ramírez, 2025; Angell, 2025; Walter, 2025). To date, there have been at least twenty attacks on vessels suspected of drug trafficking, perceived by Caracas as a direct threat to Venezuela’s sovereignty (Walter, 2025).

In this context, this brief aims to provide a brief historical, geographical, and economic overview of Venezuela, as well as the evolution of the conflict between the US and Venezuela from August 2025 to January 2026.

Inhabited since the late Paleolithic period by Amerindian tribes (Arawak and Carib), Venezuela came to the attention of colonial Spain in the 15th century c.e.. In August 1498, Christopher Columbus landed for the first time in Latin America (Paria Peninsula) on the Venezuelan coast (Haggerty, 1993; Heckel, et al., 2025). Impressed by the beauty of the native landscapes, Columbus named the shores of Venezuela Tierra de Gracia in a letter addressed to the Catholic monarchs, making this the first written mention of Venezuela (Palacios, 2019). The Spanish colonization started around 1523 and ended in 1811. During the colonial period, Venezuela lacked political unity, consisting of a number of provinces governed independently of each other. Venezuela’s economy was predominantly agrarian. In 1811, Venezuela was the first Spanish colony to formally declare its independence (Haggerty, 1993; Heckel, et al., 2025). Venezuela gave to Latin America Simon Bolivar Palacios (“The Liberator”), who played a key role in expelling the Spanish colonial authorities from the territory. The first Venezuelan federal constitution was drafted in 1830.

For over a century, Venezuela entered a phase of “rule by force” under “caudillos”—leaders who were supported by their own armies, and exercised power for their own benefit (Haggerty, 1993; Heckel, et al., 2025; Palacios, 2019).  This period ended with the death of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1935) in 1935, marking the end of an authoritarian era. However, authoritarian regimes persisted in Venezuela over the following decades, such as the regimes of Eleazar López Conteras (1935–1941), Isaias Medina Angarita (1941–1945), and Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1952–1958), during which time the oil industry began to develop (Heckel, et al., 2025; Palacios, 2019).

Venezuela’s transition to democracy occurred around 1958, and with the election of President Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964), the country experienced a period of relaxation that continued to some extent in the following decades. Despite the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 (under Carlos Andrés Pérez), Venezuela faced various economic crises and social unrest (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], 2025). Democratically elected governments predominated until 1999, when Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) came to power and exercised authoritarian control over other branches of government. This pattern continued under the current leadership of Maduro, following his claim to a second term as president (2018) in an election considered fraudulent and boycotted by most opposition parties (CIA, 2025).

3.1. Physical geography

Venezuela (officially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) is located in South America, between Colombia and Guyana, and is bordered by the Caribbean Sea, the North Atlantic Ocean, and Brazil. It has an area of 912,050 km², of which 882,050 km² is land and 30,000 km² is water. The length of its borders is 5,267 km, of which: the common border with Brazil is 2,137 km, with Colombia 2,341 km, and with Guyana 789 km. Venezuela has a tropical climate, hot and humid, being more temperate at high altitudes. In terms of landforms, the country’s north-western part features the Andes Mountains and the Maracaibo Plain, plains in the central part and the Guiana Highlands in the south (CIA, 2025). The main rivers of Venezuela are the Rio Negro (2,250 km), shared with Brazil and Colombia, and the Orinoco (2,101 km), which also crosses Colombia. The largest lake, in terms of size, is Maracaibo, with an area of 13,010 km² (CIA, 2025).

3.2. Human geography

According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (CIA World Factbook), the estimated population of Venezuela in the year 2024 was 31,250,306 (CIA, 2025).  Based on data provided by the Worldometers statistics platform, Venezuela’s estimated population in 2025 was 28,516,896, with a density of 32 people per km² (Worldometers.info, n.d.). The three most populous cities are Caracas, with a population of three million, followed by Maracaibo, with 2,225,000, and Maracay, with 1,754,256 (Worldometers.info, n.d.).

According to World Bank data for 2024, approximately 89% of Venezuela’s population lives in urban areas and approximately 11% in rural areas. (World Bank Group, n.d.) According to the CIA World Factbook (2025), most of Venezuela’s population is concentrated in the mountainous areas, in the North and West, as well as around the capital, Caracas. In 2017, the literacy rate of the population (for both genders, age groups 25-64) was 97.8%, according to UNESCO World Education Statistics (2024), and in 2022, it remained at 97.6% (age group 15+), according to statistics from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis compiled from the World Bank (2024). 

The official language of Venezuela is Spanish (98.2%), and in terms of its ethnic composition, approximately two-thirds of the population is mestizo (a mix of European and indigenous ancestry) and mulatto-mestizo (a mix of European, indigenous, and African ancestry) (McCoy, 2025; CIA, 2025). Approximately one-fifth of the population is of European origin, and one-tenth is of African origin, with the indigenous population being relatively small (McCoy, 2025). Other ethnic groups include Portuguese, Italians, Arabs, and Germans, and the main religions, according to CIA World Factbook estimations from 2023, are: Roman Catholic (48.1%), Protestant (31,6%), Jehovah’s Witnesses (1,4%), African American/Umbanda (0,7%), agnostics (0,1%), atheists (0,4%), and others (CIA, 2025).

3.3. Political geography

Venezuela is a federal republic comprised of 23 states, including a capital district (Caracas), a federal dependency (consisting of 11 federally controlled island groups, with a total of 72 individual islands), and states such as Amazonas, Barinas, Bolivar, Falcon, etc. (CIA, 2025). It has a legal system based on the Spanish civil code, and it’s most recent constitution was adopted on December 15, 1999, and came into force on December 30, 1999 (CIA, 2025).

In terms of political system, Venezuela is a federal presidential republic. The main branches of government are: the executive branch – the president, elected for a six-year term and acting as head of state and government; and the cabinet of ministers (appointed by the president). The legislative branch, which consists of a unicameral congress elected for a five-year term, and the judicial branch which consists of the Supreme Court, which has 32 members (elected by Congress for a 12-year term).

In addition, the institutions also include the National Electoral Council, which is elected by Congress for a seven-year term, and the citizen power, consisting of institutions such as the Attorney General, the Ombudsman, and the Comptroller General (elected by Congress for a seven-year term) (U.S. Department of State, 2009-2017). According to the CIA World Factbook (2025), there are 24 political parties and at least two coalitions in Venezuela, including: the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV, Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela), which holds the majority of seats in Congress; Acción Democrática (AD), the main opposition party; Cambiemos Movimiento Ciudadano; the Social Christian Party (COPEI); the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP, a party affiliated with Maduro), etc.

Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world (303.2 billion barrels), is one of the oldest producers, and a founding member of OPEC (World Population Review, 2025; EBSCO, 2024). The extractive industry has been and remains one of the core pillars of the Venezuelan economy. Until 2008, Venezuela was the eighth largest oil producer in the world, and in 2023, the country was producing approximately 135,000 barrels per day (EBSCO, 2024). Venezuela’s economy is mainly based on services (51.7%), mining (37.2%), followed by agriculture (5%) (Lloyds Bank, 2026). 

Venezuela produces: raw materials, machinery, equipment, construction materials, pharmaceuticals, steel products, transport equipment, as well as agricultural products such as milk, sugar cane, corn, rice, bananas, pineapples, and chicken (CIA, 2025). However, the country’s economy is South American in nature, characterised by hyperinflation since 2010, and chaos, given the inefficient economic and financial policies compounded by corruption (CIA, 2025). In 2024, the country’s public debt was 164.3% of gross domestic product (GDP), according to data from the International Monetary Fund. Venezuela’s GDP in 2025 reached US$ 82.77 billion, with a GDP per capita of US$ 3,100 and a real growth rate of 0.5% for the year 2025. The consumer price inflation rate at the end of the period reached 548.6%, and the unemployment rate in 2018 was 35.6% (International Monetary Fund, n.d.). Venezuela’s economic collapse was caused by a combination of factors over time, starting in the late 1980s and continuing until the crisis of 2010, during Hugo Chávez’s term in office.

The 2010 crisis was considered one of the most severe among the Latin American societies, resulting in GDP losses of 62% between 2013 and 2019. Mortality rates increased significantly and public services collapsed, leading to the emigration of over four million people in the following years. In this context, Venezuela went from a “limited democracy” to an authoritarian regime, which continues to this day (Bull and Rosales, 2020). Given Venezuela’s structural problems, such as its dependence on the extractive industry, limited diversification, and corruption, the country’s economic situation deteriorated. 

This context has also fostered the development of illicit economic activities, from trafficking of illegal weapons, drugs, and counterfeit goods, to human trafficking and transnational crime, which have led to US sanctions since 2005 (Muci, 2024; GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME INDEX, 2023; Library of Congress, 2026). The sanctions have put pressure on Venezuela’s economy, targeting “individuals and entities engaged in criminal, anti-democratic, or corrupt activities” and focusing on the financial sector, visa restrictions, terrorism, export controls, drug trafficking, and the Maduro government, among other aspects. (Library of Congress, 2026).

The escalation of the conflict between the US and Venezuela began in January 2025, when Maduro began his third presidential term, which was considered fraudulent and controversial. Below is a chronology of the main events.

5.1. January–August 2025

Among the first actions undertaken by the US was the signing of an executive order by President Trump on January 20, designating criminal organizations and cartels, such as Tren de Aragua, as “foreign terrorist organizations” (Finley, et al., 2025). The main justification was the cooperation between Maduro and Tren de Aragua in drug trafficking and illegal immigration to the US. Although this matter was questioned by the US intelligence community, on February 20, the Trump administration formally designated eight Latin American criminal organizations as foreign terrorist organizations (Finley, et al., 2025).

On March 24, President Trump signed another executive order imposing 25% tariffs on Venezuelan oil imports to third countries. The order took effect on April 2 (The White House, 2025). The US pressure on Venezuela intensified on July 25, when the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury sanctioned and designated Cartel de los Soles as a specially designated terrorist organization, according to an OFAC press release published on the same day (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2025). Shortly thereafter, on August 7, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs within the US Department of State published a $50 million reward for President Maduro, a move seen as a kind of legitimization for a potential deployment of troops (U.S. Department of State, 2025; Bui, 2025).

   5.2. August–September 2025 and the onset of military escalation

The actual military escalation began in August 2025. The escalation was gradual. According to an article published by the Americas Society/Council of the Americas on November 17, 2025, on August 15, CNN reported that the US had increased its military presence in the Caribbean by deploying 4,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel and a fleet equipped with guided missile destroyers, and submarine assault ships. The exact destination was not specified. President Maduro’s response came on August 18, in a statement that Venezuela would deploy 4.5 million soldiers (Robertson, 2025).

However, on September 2, the first US attack on a vessel suspected of drug trafficking and belonging to the Tren de Aragua organization took place, resulting in the death of 11 people (Finley, et al., 2025). September 2 marked the beginning of successive US attacks on such vessels. During his visit to Puerto Rico on September 8, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that some of the Navy and Marine Corps personnel deployed on a warship had been sent to the “front line.” On the same day, the Venezuelan foreign minister, Yván Gil, told CNN that Venezuela was not seeking a conflict with the US (Robertson, 2025).

On September 10, Democrat senators sent a letter to the White House arguing that the Trump administration had no legitimate justification for these attacks (Finley, et al., 2025). Shortly thereafter, on September 13, US F-35 fighter jets landed in Puerto Rico, and on September 15, a second attack took place on a vessel in the Caribbean. Three people died, including two Venezuelan citizens and a Colombian fisherman, which drew criticism from Colombian President Gustavo Petro. The third attack took place on September 19, with intelligence services confirming that the targeted vessel was involved in illicit drug trafficking (Robertson, 2025).

5.3. October 2025 – a period of growing tensions and repeated attacks

On October 2, in a confidential memo, President Trump notified the Congress that the US was in a “non-international armed conflict” against drug trafficking, authorizing the Department of Defense to use force against so-called terrorist organizations. On October 3, a fourth attack took place off the coast of Venezuela, and on October 6, the press reported that President Trump had ended the diplomatic effort led by Richard Grenell toward Maduro’s government, which had resulted in the release of six American prisoners (Robertson, 2025). In addition, this initiative aimed to open up access for American companies to Venezuelan oil.

Between October 8 and October 14, Republican senators rejected a resolution that would have required congressional approval for attacks on non-military targets in the Caribbean, an event followed by a fifth attack (Finley, et al., 2025). Between October 15 and October 24, the US president publicly announced the authorization of covert CIA operations on Venezuelan territory, and three more attacks took place, resulting in the death of at least 10 people. During the same period, SOUTHCOM commander Admiral Alvin Holsey announced his early retirement (October 16), and short-lived tensions arose between the US and Colombia (October 17) in the wake of the attacks. On October 20, Adam Smith, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, requested a congressional hearing on these events (Robertson, 2025).

The US campaign expanded into the Pacific on October 22, and on October 26, a US destroyer arrived in Trinidad and Tobago for a military exercise. As a result, President Maduro suspended energy agreements with Trinidad and Tobago. Between October 27 and October 29, four more attacks took place, resulting in a total of 18 deaths, and on October 31, President Trump stated that he was not considering attacks on Venezuelan territory. Meanwhile, the Caracas administration requested assistance from China, Iran, and Russia (Robertson, 2025).

5.4. November 2025 – between escalation and a possible relaxation

Between November 1 and November 7, three more attacks were carried out in the Caribbean. Also, in an interview to 60 Minutes, President Trump reiterated that he would not “go to war” with Venezuela. However, on November 6, Republicans blocked a resolution in the Congress to restrict military action in Venezuela. A day later, El País reported that Russia had delivered military air defense aid to Venezuela. Between November 8 and November 15, a series of new air strikes occurred, with the one on November 15 being the 21st (Robertson, 2025). As a result of these strikes, 83 people lost their lives.

A significant event during this period was the US Navy’s announcement of the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford in the Caribbean and SOUTHCOM ships to support operations against illicit drug trafficking. On the same day, Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López said that Maduro had instituted a national military alert, activating all bases and deploying nearly 200,000 soldiers as part of “Plan Independence 200” (Robertson, 2025). The USS Gerald R. Ford arrived in the Caribbean Sea on November 16, marking a new stage in the conflict between the two states (Finley, et al., 2025). On November 17, France24 reported that President Trump was willing to engage in dialogue with President Maduro regarding this conflict. However, when asked if he would rule out the presence of American troops on the ground in Venezuela, Trump responded in the negative (France 24, 2025).

 5.5. January 2026 – Operation Absolute Resolve, the abduction of President Maduro and the appointment of Delcy Rodriguez as Venezuela’s leader

On January 3, following the operation Absolute Resolve carried out by the US in Venezuela, President Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were abducted and transported to New York to be tried in federal court for narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine, among other charges. Among the defendants are Diosdado Cabello, the current Minister of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Peace of Venezuela, and Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (“Niño Guerrero”), the leader of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua cartel (Ferragamo, 2026; Sisak and Neumeister, 2026; U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, n.d.).

The Maduros’ first court appearance occurred on January 5, in a federal court in the Southern District of New York, where Maduro pleaded not guilty. The next hearing is scheduled for March 17, 2026 (Latin America Post, 2026). On January 5,, Delcy Rodriguez, Venezuela’s Vice President, was appointed as the interim president of the country. Rodriguez has pledged to cooperate with the Washington administration to ensure Venezuela’s transition, and has launched a series of initiatives such as the hydrocarbon law reform project (investments in the oil industry) and the Amnesty Law offering clemency to political prisoners (Roston, 2026; Wells, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026).

These changes include the dismissal of Javier Marcano Tábata, commander-in-chief of Venezuela’s presidential guard, for failing to protect President Maduro (Buschschlüter, 2026).

Overall, the Operation Absolute Resolve has drawn mixed reactions and criticism domestically, regionally, and internationally. Venezuela’s traditional allies such as China and Russia have condemned the US actions, while UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has highlighted that Absolute Resolve has set a dangerous precedent (Hasselbach, 2026).

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About the author: Maria Valentina NISTE is the Vice-President of SDGAi