Ecaterina MAȚOI
Context
In the chain of historic events unfolding in recent years, on the path of a new global order, German officials reportedly criticize the United States (US), and without being particularly called out, the Israeli war on Iran. Germany’s critique was expressed by President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, as reported on March 24th, 20261,2, and represents a long departure from Chancellor Merz’s “…this is not the time to lecture our partners and allies” declaration from March 1st, 20263.
Brief context of Germany’s position in the war on Iran
There are at least two significant contexts relevant to German shift vis-à-vis the war on Iran: the broader/global and European stance on the war, and the preceding dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic relations.
As a traditionally non-armed country, Germany did not support the American wars from Afghanistan and Iraq at a scale comparable to that of the United Kingdom (UK), and its position in Ukraine, although in line with other European powers, remained relatively cautious. Subsequently, despite initially supporting the attack on Iran at declarative level, Germany clearly downplayed any military involvement whatsoever4.
In the wider Middle Eastern conflictual landscape, Berlin remained in an ever-smaller camp of countries that do not recognize Palestine when United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members France and UK decided to enact the recognition of Palestine as a state, in a row of recognitions throughout 2025. This dynamic shifted the power balance, when considering that the Spanish, Norwegian and Irish 2024 initiative extended in Europe, and might have triggered an asymmetrical escalation.
Spain was also a country criticizing the bombing of Iran from the beginning, while the UK expressed initial concerns on the legality of this initiative. Swiss decision to halt the delivery of weapons to the US during the attack on Iran represents yet another direct call for return to observing international law, which was implied but not necessarily requested previously by Spain, the UK and others.
From the second perspective, President Trump’s first and second terms impeded the development of relations across the Atlantic, especially due to unilateral approach. It was the case of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) unilateral cancellation by the US, multiple waves of tariffs in European and implicitly German goods, and a clear divergence on Ukraine. The large American military contracts in Europe, in the wake of Russian invasion of Ukraine, did not lead to more convergence in trans-Atlantic relation, but rather a tendency to demand more economic concessions, although the post-Nord Stream energy arrangements clearly impacted Germany’s economic competitiveness.
A potential determination that the US cannot deliver a short and clear victory in Iran, și triple dilemma of energy industry in Europe (quantity of supply available, given Washington’s potential future needs, price and price volatility of hydrocarbon energy, and a lacking arrangement between Europe and the US to partner in developing a competing world-class renewable sector), may have both contributed to Germany’s shift on the war from Iran.
Not mentioning Israel is consistent with Germany’s historical stance, but is can be equated to a factual recognition of shares held by the US and Israel in the aggression: besides US military and financial support, a stable Israeli Shekel, despite a continuous war state since 2023, hints at structural arrangements that are not consistent with a simplistic view on state dependencies, and impact of wars on economy and society.
Significance and implications
Germany’s decision to call out the attack of Iran as illegal echoes the message from more progressive states such as Spain and Switzerland to reconsider international law. Although not fully coordinated, this tendency is of great significance for the greater Middle Eastern conflict, and trans-Atlantic relations, and it opens the path for more conservative countries with respect to this relation, such as the Netherlands, to reassess potentially new security paradigms.
Berlin’s strive to regain a military role, and its independent military satellite network as national sovereign asset, considered as potentially redundant with European defense projects and rising fragmentation risks5, represent major dynamics in foreign policy. From a European cohesion perspective, the re-nationalization of certain sectors like defense can be equated with a push towards more sovereignty, but from an economic perspective it may have multiple roles.
Firstly, as the European renewables push had a sinuous success, and China and the US remained entangled in fierce, quasi-dual competition, Germany’s post-2022 (post-Nord Stream) re-industrialization cannot occur in any freely-chosen direction. Secondly, German political balance reunites a social approach with competition: supporting European security and collective defense can be pursued by both participating in Europe-wide frameworks, but also through competing the established military-industrial complex in certain segments, especially in the context of military exports increase from countries such as Türkiye. Hence, should the tendency of ignoring calls to restructure global cooperation systems such as UNSC and potentially European Union (EU) not manage to produce consequential outcomes, the next peaceful option is to outcompete outdated paradigms, as Germany appears to envision.
Germany’s critical stance on America’s role in the war on Iran represents a shift in modern trans-Atlantic history, and a call to reconvene talks on international law. The implementation of this shift recalls the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire, since the contestation of Washington’s cited departure from international rule of law appears to be unsynchronized, but based on similar judgements. The recent European stance on the relation with the US bears the marks of the first non-coalition that fundamentally questions American foreign policy after World War II, and the world order it has imposed throughout recent decades.
Germany has been Europe’s reference economy in contemporary history, and unless supra-national governing bodies, at global and European levels, manage to account for the rifts between worldviews based on a fading order and define coherent and modern cooperation paradigms, both supporters and competitors of a Germany-centered European economy may face the past-future dilemma, with potential implications for European development and security. Neither Germany nor its European partners can underestimate Germany’s contribution to Europeness, or attempt to replace it with a nationalistic competition that is not taking into account contemporary interdependencies and development opportunities.
Europe’s central economic power has broken ranks with Washington on a major military engagement involving Israel. For the first time since the Second World War, this public criticism of the US-led military campaign against Iran signals a historic inflection point in trans-Atlantic relations. Berlin’s stance, though still cautious and framed in legal rather than ideological terms, reveals a growing willingness to prioritize strategic autonomy, adherence to international law, and long-term European interests over automatic alignment with American policy. Whether this represents the beginning of a broader European reorientation toward a more multipolar order — or merely another episode in the gradual erosion of trans-Atlantic cohesion — will depend on whether Berlin can translate its rhetorical stance into sustained diplomatic and economic action, and whether other European capitals choose to follow. In either case, this repositioning underscores a deeper truth: the post-1945 trans-Atlantic consensus is fraying, and a new, more contested global order is already taking shape.
- https://www.dw.com/en/germany-laments-trumps-avoidable-unnecessary-iran-war/a-76501370. Accessed on 24.03.2026. ↩︎
- https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-president-frank-walter-steinmeier-slams-us-donald-trump-iran-war-as-illegal/ Accessed on 24.03.2026. ↩︎
- https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/chancellor-statement-near-east-2409224 Accessed on 24.03.2026. ↩︎
- https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/merz-no-german-military-involvement-in-iran-war Accessed on 24.03.2026. ↩︎
- https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/german-military-satellite-plan-fuels-eu-fragmentation-fears-2026-03-24/. Accessed on 24.03.2026. ↩︎
Cover page credits: Levin, via Unsplash.
About the author: Ecaterina MAȚOI is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.