Potential US Military Development in the Iran War

Cristian RADU

Context

Given the recent “Kabuki theatre” performance with regards to the so called fruitful discussions between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran and this week’s market manipulation concerns with regards to oil trade (roughly 6,200 Brent and West Texas Intermediate oil futures contracts were sold in a single minute) (Comsure Group, 2026), between 6:49 a.m. and 6:50 a.m. ET on Monday, just 15 minutes before President Donald Trump announced a pause on attacks against Iran on Truth Social), why not dive into something more palpable and therefore witness four potential scenarios of kinetic operations in this ongoing conflict:

To provide an overview of the situation, it should be mentioned that the island has a size of 1491 km² (for comparison, almost twice the size of Bahrain), and its population is approximately 150,000.

Key facilities of interest on the island include an international airport and multiple port facilities, as well as hilly areas that can be used as sites for Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems. The island can serve as a forward operating base at the junction between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. The 112th Zolfaghar Surface Combat Brigade, a unit operating fast-attack boats designed for asymmetric naval warfare in the Persian Gulf has its headquarters on this island. On Qeshm island there are also various coastal batteries as well as fortified underground missile facilities (Mansour, 2026). Finally, mangrove forests on the island can provide cover for forces attempting to counterattack a landing operation.

It is important to note that LCAC hovercraft can be launched from a maximum distance of 50 nautical miles, which would expose the US Marine Expeditionary Units. Iranian speedboats that have attacked various ships have been reported to operate roughly in the same area where amphibious units for a potential attack would need to stage.

Image 1: Comparison of Kharg, Qeshm and Bahrain:

Scenario 2 – Kharg Island

This scenario has been promoted by mainstream media (Ravid & Caputo, 2026). The island covers approximately 20 km² and is located 30 km from the Iranian mainland. Since the island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports, seizing it could severely cripple the Iranian economy. Several strikes on the island were launched on 13 March (targeting 90 sites by US forces, including missile bunkers, naval mine storage facilities, and other military targets, while apparently sparing the oil export terminals) (Chater, et al., 2026). The island’s airport runway was also struck multiple times, and a military communications node along with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system were destroyed (Reimann, 2026).

Any landing operation would have to cover approximately 700 km from the Strait of Hormuz to Kharg Island, during which the force could face threats such as mines, drones, missile attacks, and unmanned surface vessels (USVs). Another option would be to launch an air assault using the roughly 12 MV-22 Ospreys operating aboard the USS Tripoli. Despite the presence of some industrial sites and urbanized areas, the island remains highly vulnerable to counterattacks by missile strikes and drones due to its proximity to the mainland. Sending reinforcements and supplies under fire would be extremely difficult in a drone-contested environment, as demonstrated by experiences from the conflict in Ukraine.

Scenario 3 – Maritime security mission

This scenario would involve targeted vessel inspections, maritime interdiction operations, VBSS (Visit, Board, Search, Seizure) detachments, specialized boarding teams, mine countermeasures, drone neutralization, and escort of commercial traffic. The USS Tripoli would remain deployed in the Gulf of Oman but at a somewhat safer distance. The F-35Bs and AH-1Z Vipers could be employed to neutralize Iranian USVs, drones, and speedboats. In the region, Marines could board Iranian oil tankers and potentially tankers sailing under other flags (boarding Chinese tankers would disrupt the Chinese economy but risk an unimaginable level of escalation).

Image 2: US marines boarding a tanker off Venezuelan coast.

The US Navy had already bombarded Iranian positions in the early days of the war. Most Iranian naval assets and ships stationed in the area were “decommissioned” during the initial phase of the conflict. The distance from Tehran is approximately 1,500 km. This axis of attack would bypass the Zagros mountain range, which serves as a natural defensive barrier for Iran against attacks coming from the southwest.

Operations could therefore be launched from the Gulf of Oman and the Northern Arabian Sea, where amphibious forces could also be supported by the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group. These waters lie farther from the denial zones established by Iran through the concentration of drones and missiles in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.  The greater distance would likely reduce the effectiveness of Iranian drone and missile attacks. While not entirely risk-free for the US, this option could represent a safer variant compared to the scenarios mentioned above. It is also worth noting the proximity of the border with Pakistan and its potential permeability by separatist forces.

An interesting detail is that Marines from the 11th MEU conducted an exercise in November 2025 in Arizona, in terrain similar to this area, and another exercise earlier this year on San Clemente Island (Sgt. Joseph Helms, 2025).

In Konarak, there is the only international airport within a radius of approximately 600 km (the nearest alternative being in Bandar Abbas). Capturing it could provide a forward operating base and enable the rapid insertion of reinforcements, such as elements of the 82nd Airborne Division.

If a bridgehead were established in Chabahar Bay, it could be more easily defended, as the surrounding area is mostly flat with some low rocky hills and minimal vegetation. Moreover, there are only three main roads connecting Chabahar Bay to the rest of the country, allowing potential counterattack routes to be quickly identified.

In Sistan and Baluchestan province, the Baloch population forms the majority, while Sistani Persians constitute a minority — in contrast to most other regions of Iran. The majority of Baloch people in the Baluchestan area are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school.

Image 4: The Chabahar Bay

The region is also known for its low-level insurgency, driven by separatist groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army. Insurgents fighting for independence in western Pakistan could potentially be armed and redirected to fight inside Iran, despite the designation of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its alias, the Majeed Brigade, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in August 2025 (Rubio, 2025).

The CIA reportedly showed interest in this region even during the Cold War (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006). Other articles highlighting potential developments in the area include “The Kurds’ and Baluch’s Only Chance for Generations in Iran” published by the Middle East Forum Observer and “Fissures Among Iran’s Ethnic Minority Groups Are Poised To Break Open” published by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy (Radpey, 2026; Vaziri, 2026).

Potential units involved in future operations:

• The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), based at Camp Hansen, Okinawa, which has already deployed aboard the USS Tripoli (LHA-7). Estimated arrival in the area: 27 March. 

• The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), based at Camp Pendleton, California, which departed San Diego aboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4), USS Portland (LPD-27), and USS Comstock (LSD-45). Estimated arrival in the area: mid-April.

• The 82nd Airborne Division, which is currently deploying to the Middle East. The contingent includes the Division Headquarters led by Maj. Gen. Brandon Tegtmeier and elements from the 1st Brigade Combat Team (known as the “Devil Brigade”).

Together with the 11th MEU and 31st MEU, these reinforcements bring the total number of recently deploying troops to nearly 7,000.

All options would require exposing warships and embarked forces to persistent Iranian threats, not to mention the risk of significant escalation. It remains to be seen how the situation will develop.

Bibliography

1.     Chater, J., Cuddy, A., Davies, W., Knell, Y., Gardner, F., Beake, N., & Bachega, H. (2026, March 12). ‘Every military target’ on Iran’s key oil island ‘totally obliterated’, says Trump. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c4gqjyk0vx3t

2.     Central Intelligence Agency. (2006, June 2). Baluchistan: A Primer. Retrieved from Central Intelligence Agency: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP94T00754R000200070016-6.pdf

3.     Rubio, M. (2025, August 11). Terrorist Designation of The Majeed Brigade  . Retrieved from U.S. Department of State: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/terrorist-designation-of-the-majeed-brigade

4.     Sgt. Joseph Helms. (2025, December 11). B-Roll: 11th MEU Marines and Sailors conduct raid during RUT . Retrieved from Defense Visual Information Distribution Service: https://www.dvidshub.net/video/986486/b-roll-11th-meu-marines-and-sailors-conduct-raid-during-rut#:~:text=Training%20at%20Marine%20Corps%20Air%20Station%20Yuma,,exercise%20that%20enables%20the%2011th%20MEU%20to

5.     Radpey, L. (2026, February 28). This May Be the Kurds’ and Baluch’s Only Chance for Generations in Iran . Retrieved from Middle East Forum: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/this-may-be-the-iranian-kurds-and-baluchs-only-chance-for-generations-in-iran

6.     Vaziri, N. (2026, February 28). Fissures Among Iran’s Ethnic Minority Groups Are Poised To Break Open . Retrieved from New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy: https://newlinesinstitute.org/middle-east-center/fissures-among-irans-ethnic-minority-groups-are-poised-to-break-open/

7.     Vaziri, N. (2026, February 28). Fissures Among Iran’s Ethnic Minority Groups Are Poised To Break Open . Retrieved from New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy: https://newlinesinstitute.org/middle-east-center/fissures-among-irans-ethnic-minority-groups-are-poised-to-break-open/

8.     Mansour, M. (2026, March 17). Inside Qeshm, Iran’s underground missile fortress and geological marvel . Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/17/inside-qeshm-irans-underground-missile-fortress-and-geological-marvel

9.     Ravid, B., & Caputo, M. (2026, March 20). Trump mulls risky Kharg Island takeover to force Iran to open strait . Retrieved from Axios: https://www.axios.com/2026/03/20/iran-invasion-kharg-island-strait-hormuz

10.  Reimann, J. (2026, March 23). Attack on Kharg Island . Retrieved from The Left Berlin: https://theleftberlin.com/us-kharg-island-iran/

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of SDGAi. The author bears sole responsibility for the information, analyses, and interpretations presented herein.

Cover page credits: Hosein Charbagi via Unsplash.

About the author: Cristian RADU is a mentor at Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.