Drought, Nuclear Cooling, and Renewable Gaps: An August 2026 Review of the Danube Energy Crisis

Ecaterina MATOI

1. Introducere

On August 2nd, 2026, Hungary reduced output significantly its only nuclear power plant, Paks, that ensured approximately half of its electricity production (Szakacs, 2026). In a similar move, Romania preemptively turned off one of the two nuclear reactors from the Cernavoda nuclear power plant on July 28th, 2026. On August 3rd, 2026, the country detonated explosives to remove rock in order to divert water towards the remaining nuclear reactor, and on August 6th sank four barges laden with rocks (McGrath & Ghirda, 2026) to maintain the necessary waterflow for cooling (Reuters Rock Danube, 2026), in a desperate attempt to save roughly 10 % of its electricity production amid a multidimensional energy crisis in the country, and across Europe in recent years.

Danube river’s low water levels, along prolonged drought and wild fires, add another layer to Europe’s challenges in a commonly agreed but less coordinated strive to transition towards a cleaner and more sustainable energy sector, that was supposed to insulate it from Russian dependency and high import prices.

This study assesses energy challenges of East-European countries, in addition to relevant Danube riparian states, with emphasis on electric energy generation and consumption during summer time, when particularly solar energy is abundant, but becomes much more valuable when stored for peak consumption hours. The focus countries are Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and contextually Albania, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine.

The analysis focuses on major production, consumption and trade patterns, from a simplified state/institutional capacity model (Kim, Kumar, Ramalho, & Russell, 2026), emphasizing on state policies, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), as well as major or innovative actors that shape energy markets.

2. A contextual review of recent energy dynamics in Europe

In Fig. 1, energy products’ relative share in European Union’s (EU) final energy consumption are presented along energy consumption sectors across the EU for the year 2024.

Figure 1. Energy consumption in the EU by source and sector for 2024 (Eurostat Energy 2026, 2026).

The analysis reveals that petroleum products, electricity and gas dominate as energy sources, whereas transport remains both the highest energy-consuming sector, which is highly dependent on petroleum products (imports). Household consumption and industries, which account for more than 50 % of total energy consumption in the EU rely primarily electricity and natural gas as common/shared sources. It must be emphasized, that, as of 2024, two thirds (i.e. approx. 66 %) of energy used by private households was employed for heating (Eurostat Energy 2026, 2026). Therefore, while energy security for both residential and industrial sectors remain important, an important baseload consumption for household heating is not required during the summer, when resources can be stored in dams and natural gas storing facilities, or production exported.

Although transportation sector’s electrification represents a major endeavor of European environmental policy and this process is likely to result in more electricity production, this particular demand will not be particularly analyzed in this study. Drought in Europe impacted directly household and industrial energy consumption, although the measure of stopping electric trains was discussed in certain contexts as of August 2026. Furthermore, despite an already steady process of household energy consumption efficiency optimization (Dell’Anna, 2026), heating remains a core energy consumption factor that will likely take additional decades to tackle.

The supply of natural gas from the Russian Federation to EU countries dropped in the aftermath of Ukraine’s invasion, resulting in both lower reserves for winter and higher acquisition prices when purchasing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from global markets. This development did not only affect the ability to heat households during winter, but also the ability to produce on-demand “dispatchable” or “spike consumption” electricity, since gas power plants can be quickly turned on and off, unlike other plants such as nuclear.

For the purpose of this study, four types of electricity production are defined: baseload, dispatchable, long-term predictable (e.g. solar), and short-term predictable (e.g. wind). In Table 1, main electricity production sources and imports/exports are analyzed and countries are compared by means of installed production capacity, based on 2025 “Inventory of Generation” statistics from the ENTSO-E platform (ENTSO-E Generation, 2026).

Table 1. Inventory of generation by country and type as of 2025 in selected countries (ENTSO-E Generation, 2026).

CountryInventory by sourceInventory capacity [MW]Type (primarily)Observations
AustriaHydro2195BaseloadHigh dependency on hydro, pumped storage
Fossil Fuel3766Dispatchable
Other (incl. solar, wind, pumped storage)11922Long-term predictable
BulgariaNuclear2080BaseloadKozloduy NPP (40 %), lignite (Maitsa Iztok): depends on Danube water level for NPP cooling
Hydro1148Dispatchable
Fossil Fuel4682Baseload
Other (solar, wind, batt. storage)15712Baseload/dispatchable
HungaryNuclear1915.6BaseloadPaks NPP (45 – 50 %), natural gas for peak loads, depends on Danube water level for cooling
Fossil Fuel4227.8Dispatchable
Solar4850.8Long-term predict.
Wind46Short-term predict.
Other (incl. solar, etc.)15446.3Baseload/dispatchable /long-term predictable
RomaniaNuclear1300BaseloadCernavoda NPP (20 %), natural gas also for baseload. Dependent on Danube for NPP and hydro power
Fossil Fuel3952Baseload/dispatchable
Hydro1881Baseload
Other (solar, wind, etc.)14266Long-term predictable
SerbiaFossil Fuel5032.5Baseload/dispatchableLignite coal (60 %), hydro (30 %)
Hydro2174Baseload
Other (solar, etc.)14413Long-term predictable

In Table 1, the label “Other” was employed to designate uncategorized data from ENTSO-E database. Except Austria, which rather relies on vertical drop of water rather than large rivers for its core electricity production baseload, all other countries are highly dependent on the Danube either directly (hydropower, in the case of Romania and Serbia) or for cooling Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) reactors (in the case of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania). Thus, low levels on the Danube are generally impacting baseload capacity.

As of August 10th, 2026, the only unaffected NPP from selected countries was Kozloduy, as Bulgarian authorities reportedly negotiated with Serbian and Romanian counterparts to ensure the necessary downstream waterflow from the Iron Gates mega-powerplant. Furthermore, the design of Kozloduy NPP relies on water cooling for secondary loops (non-nuclear parts), and the water pumps are installed in a deep bay, ensuring a far superior resilience when compared to Cernavoda NPP (Romania) (Nuklearna Perspektiva, 2026). However, should Bulgaria manage to install the AP1000 units (Units 7 and 8) at Kozloduy, its dependency on Danube water levels will increase, as the consumption through evaporation will increase and impact downstream water levels, in addition to requiring greater intake water volumes.

The largest rivers contributing to Danube’s flow volume are Sava (typically 1500 – 1700 m³/s – one third of volume downstream from Belgrade, oscillating between 250 – 300 m³/s during drought conditions and 6000 m³/s when flood risks appear – flows into Danube at Belgrade), Tisza River (typically 790 m³/s – flows into Danube at Vojvodina, Serbia), Inn (typically 730 m³/s – flows into Danube at Passau, Germany) and Drava (typically 670 m³/s – flows into Danube at Osijek, Croatia).

Literature generally hints that dams and reservoirs constructed upstream do not contribute significantly to a reduction in water levels on the Danube. However, human action, in the form of either dams or protection dikes, have modified the characteristic of Danube’s riverbed. The so-called sediment starvation effect is produced when dams stop the flow of sediments downstream, eroding the riverbed especially when large quantities of water are released and displace non-renewable sediments downstream of dams. Furthermore, the elimination of floodplains through flood protection measures pushes strong streams of waters into eroding non-renewable sediment layers, lowering the riverbed bottom and thus altering both nearby underground water levels and the downstream erosion rate. The irregularity and increasing unpredictability of Danube’s water levels is accentuated by much shorter water circulation cycles, as the Alps and Carpathian Mountains increasingly fail to retain water in the form of ice and snow, that is gradually released during spring and summer, intensifying short-term water discharge events and prolonging drought periods. Consequently, energy security in analyzed countries is likely to be fundamentally impacted by systemic events such global warming, as the Danube represents a core energy ecosystem in its lower basin.

A second major dynamic impacting energy dynamics in the analyzed region is the war in Ukraine, which transformed the latter from a net energy exporter until 2022, into a large importer. In the year 2024, Ukraine imported most of its electricity from European neighbors (while exporting or re-exporting less than 10 % of imported quantities). Fig. 2 hints that, at an estimative price of EUR 50’000 – 100’000 per GWh (theoretical estimations), Ukraine would have spent between EUR 221.83 million and 443.66 million on imported electricity. The total quantity (4436.6 GWh) imported is in the same range as Moldova’s 2024 consumption (estimated at 5500 GWh), although this country is relatively small and less industrialized, importing energy predominantly from Romania.

Figure 2. Ukraine’s electricity imports in 2024 from neighboring countries (Dixi Group 2024 Ukraine, 2025).

However, the war from Ukraine does not only dry up the region in terms of electricity, Kyiv importing very large quantities of refined petroleum in 2024 ($ 7.29 billion or EUR 7.043 billion at the exchange rate from 31.12.2024) from Poland ($ 1.32 billion), Greece ($ 1.27 billion), Lithuania ($ 663 million), Türkiye ($ 598 million) and Slovakia ($ 432 million) (oec.world Ukraine, 2026). Hence, Ukraine does not only fight a war, but absorbs immense quantities of energy, rising inflation throughout Europe particularly through energy prices and availability in the context of this study, especially due to loans extended by European allies which might produce economic benefits, but at best in middle or long term.

The third important element in region’s energy dynamics is represented by the rollout of vast but less integrated renewable energy projects, that created disparities on energy markets, accentuated by the atomization of prices on an increasingly important spot market that devalues solar energy when abundant during sunny intervals of the day, and increases energy price during peak consumption time intervals, as solar energy without storage remains non-dispatchable.

In the second half of 2025, Romania (+58.6 %) and Moldova (approx. + 48 %) experienced the highest price increases in national currency for household consumers compared to previous year, followed by EU members Austria (+34.3 %), Ireland (+32.7 %) and Luxembourg (approx.+ 32 %) (Eurostat Electricity Prices, 2026). Türkiye also experienced a price increase in excess of 30 %, but its inflation rate also increased, as a general regional reference.

In Fig. 3 hourly electricity prices for August 9th, 2026 are estimated on a European energy portal for Romania in local currency LEI (EUENERGY Romania, 2026).

Figure 3. Electricity price in Romania by the hour as of August 09th, 2026, in local currency (EUENERGY Romania, 2026).

The context of pricing from Fig. 3 is multilayered. Sunday, August 09th is a weekend day, reflected by stable but not peak prices in the early morning hours (school holidays as well). Furthermore, country’s largest industrial plants, Dacia Pitesti and Ford Craiova facilities were both closed. In the sunny summer day, energy production from solar panel skyrockets at 11:00 AM when the prices collapse before becoming negative, as supply exceeds demands. The price starts to recover around 17:00 hours, before reaching a peak of LEI 956.57 (EUR 182.42) at 21:00 hours. The prices drop to EUR 0.00 between 12:00 and 16:00 in Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Poland, Germany as well, and they are very low (close to EUR 0.00) in Austria and Serbia.

Thus, at the current stage of battery storage capacity in the researched region, and despite a baseload/dispatchable energy crisis, free or negatively-priced energy is available on the market. However, this aspect of the energy crisis from Europe is particularly connected to the type of energy rather than the volume.

Consequently, this chapter identified three important factors in energy dynamics of researched countries: climate change and modification of Danube’s river characteristics, the war from Ukraine that consumes important resources including energy, and the deployment of renewables that, amid poor storage conditions, produce intervals with very cheap and very expensive energy in the course of a single day.

3. Renewable energy trends in studied region

Amid a global competition for dominance in renewable industries, and a resurgence of American hegemony in the hydrocarbon energy sector, particularly petroleum and derived products, as well as natural gas, Europe’s renewable energy deployment appears rather slow. China leads the race in terms of solar panel installed capacity (an estimated 1 TW) (Aurora Solar, 2026) and a battery storage capacity project to increase from 215.5 GWh in 2024 to 721.2 GWh in 2027 (Venditti & Parker, 2025). A May 2026 report hints that operational capacities of European countries seldomly exceeding 2 GWh (only Germany and Italy score significantly better) (Yanatma, 2026), although capacity pipelines are very dynamic. In all cases, European projections remain small in scale, in line with the anticipated reduction in energy consumption.

Among studied countries, only Bulgaria managed to have a meaningful battery storage capacity as of August 2026, with an estimated 12 GWh installed storage (Nikolov, 2026). Bulgaria successfully secured EU-backed RESTORE funds in order to rapidly scale-up installed battery capacity and thus stabilize summer solar production for neighbors such as Greece, Romania, but also other regional countries facing energy supply disturbances (such as Hungary). In October 2025, Sofia-based International Power Supply (IPS) opened a large-scale battery factory. Although some countries apply 0 % Value Added Tax (VAT) on residential solar panel systems (Germany, Belgium, Croatia, the Netherlands, other), Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Serbia do not apply such measures.

In the aftermath of Cernavoda NPP partial closure, the Romanian Association of Producers/Consumer and Energy Communities (APCE) required the Parliament to adopt the German model (0 % VAT) for photovoltaic systems up to 27 kW and necessary batteries (Isopescu, 2026), after it rebounded to 21 % from a 5 % level in 2023. Poland applies a reduced 8 % rate instead of the normal 23 % VAT rate (Rakholiya & Neumann, 2026), but this has not resulted in significant installed battery capacity yet. In fact, Poland and Hungary host large Electric Vehicle (EV) battery production facilities (LG Energy Solution in Wroclaw, EVE Energy in Hungary), and Romanian company Prime Batteries (Ernst, 2025) already scaled up, but is active mainly in competitive markets rather than local projects.

The state capacity level of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Serbia, and of any other EU member is to be assessed in conjunction with EU regulations and enforcement mechanisms. In deciding to allow the elimination of import tax and reduction of VAT on photovoltaic systems, the EU has contributed to the relatively large production capacity when compared to battery storage systems except Bulgaria, but not overall sufficiently high to start replacing baseload production. It is thus to consider that the flexibility to balance production with storage or trade is left to the states. EU legislation, including Energy Performance of Building Directive (EPBD), mandates rooftop solar panels on new and existing buildings, in a gradual transformation until 2030 that would reach 700 GW capacity (European Council PV, 2026).

According to the report, public and non-residential buildings with surface higher than 250 m² require photovoltaic (PV) installations from the beginning of 2027, existing public building larger than 2000 m² from the beginning of 2028. From 2030, all new residential buildings and all roofed carparks adjacent to buildings will require PV systems, and from the 2031, all public buildings larger than 230 m² as well (European Council PV, 2026). Furthermore, the declared EU target for minimum 15 % of import capacity through electric interconnection with neighboring countries by 2030 aims to further balance energy storage with trade.

The framework presented above hints at a fundamental shift towards photovoltaic systems in Europe, that when fully implemented in terms of interconnectivity and storage, will likely be able to gradually eliminate fossil fuel consumption. It does not exclude other types of energy generation, but it clearly leads as energy transition policy.

Both solar panels and storage batteries are thus central elements of a technology that is likely to become the backbone of European energy independence. Thus, companies such as Cylib (specialized in automatic disassembly) and Tozero (specialized in recovery of lithium and graphite) from Germany, or Hydrovolt (recycling of vehicle batteries) from Norway are speeding up the recovery of materials and decrease of dependence on extra-EU components.

Even at connectivity rates from 2026, lucrative businesses have been developed on the European energy market. In Table 2, active energy traders that benefit from the booming European electricity sector are listed.

Table 2. Selected electric energy trade actors in studied countries as of 2026.

CompanyHeadquartersAustriaBulgariaHungaryRomaniaSerbia
Alpiq HungarySwitzerlandYes Yes  
Axpo GroupSwitzerlandYesYesYesYesYes
MET GroupSwitzerlandYesYesYesYes 
Energieallianz EAAAustriaYes    
VNG AustriaGermanyYes    
Energy MTBulgaria Yes   
Nomad EnergyBulgaria Yes   
Electrohold TradeBulgaria Yes   
Energy Market ADBulgaria Yes   
MVM GroupHungary  Yes  
CEZ HungaryCzech Rep.  Yes  
Milleyson HoldingsHU/Cyprus  Yes  
Alive CapitalRomania   Yes 
Tinmar EnergyRomania   Yes 
Respect EnergyRomania   Yes 
EFT Group/RudariSerbia    Yes
SCM PowerSerbia    Yes
HEP EnergijaSlovenia    Yes
NIS A.D.*Serbia    Yes

*owned by Gazprom Neft, subject to sanctions and waivers (Reuters NIS, 2026).

Except Swiss companies Axpo Group and MET Group, most companies operating in energy trade are acting only in their country’s territories or in a nearby country. Thus, the market is more balkanized than consolidated, with great potential for uniformization and efficiency improvement. However, the representation in cross-border and local energy markets is also representative of a less consolidated EU energy sector, that will certainly undergo further transformation.

Current chapter identified a significant but still lagging photovoltaic generation and storage capacity development in European countries analyzed, and across Europe overall especially when considering current baseload energy sources. EU- and national level measures converge, but they are certainly less coordinated than in larger and more consolidated jurisdictions such as China or the US.

4. Future regional renewable energy development challenges

In the context of decarbonization, several projects aim to connect Europe to North Africa through High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) cables. It is the case of ELMED (Tunisia to Italy), GREGY Elica Interconnector (Egypt to Greece), Sila Atlantik (Morocco to Germany), Xlinks (Morocco to the UK), although the latter is in under restructuring as of August 2026 and all other except ELMED are still in the planning phase.

Although certain HVDC lines, including the approx. 500 kV lines listed above, and other lines from Scandinavia to mainland Europe and the UK (ENTSO-E Grid, 2026), mainland Europe including researched countries still rely on high voltage AC power lines for connectivity, the latter being able to match overall of HVDC lines only up to 600 – 800 km in the air, up to 50 – 95 km in underground cables and 24 – 50 km underwater (Law, 2022). For longer distances, the high voltage AC power lines, that dominate continental Europe and researched region, are generating more energy losses. Hence, besides a legal system that, as of 2026, maintains energy trade mainly between neighboring countries, the reduced deployment of HVDC lines, and at voltages less than 800 kV lines from China, India or Brazil (although distances are fairly shorter in Europe), is impacting the overall large-scale development of energy transportation infrastructure.

Technical and legal limitations related to energy transport are also impacting the ability of countries to access cheap peak solar energy, that unless stored, is wasted instead of being delivered to countries with a time difference or situated in cloudy areas at a given time. On Monday, August 10th, 2026, the price of energy at 20:00 hours in Romania was LEI 1410.87 (EUR 269.14)/MWh (EUENERGY Romania, 2026), whereas at the same hour (18:00) in Portugal, the price was EUR 135.21, i.e. half the price. The differential may suggest a significant although yet theoretical potential for savings, as well as an environmental long-term advantage when compared to similar investments in battery storage at distances exceeding normal cross-border in Europe.

Innovative concepts such as cars with installed solar panels that despite low yield avoid secondary infrastructure (Toyota Prius with solar roof package, Hyundai Sonata Hybrid, the project Aptera EV and others), or Switzerland’s project with removable solar panels along railway tracks, are yet to complement a large-scale European strive to successfully transition towards a sustainable and competitive energy sector.

5. Conclusions

In the context of energy crises due to low Danube water levels, potential causes and energy-related structural developments in Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Serbia have been analyzed.

In terms of dependency on rivers and hydropower, Austria is not relying on the Danube for water production, but all studied countries are generally impacted by the shorter glacier melting cycles and less snow retention that reduce the constant delivery of water to hydropower plants on the Danube and on mountain rivers. This affects electric energy baseload production on a large scale in Eastern Europe, requiring massive storage infrastructure to equivalate traditional water flow characteristics to a satisfactory extent.

Assuming a unidirectional trend on short and middle term (decades), countries relying on hydropower and nuclear power with consistent cooling requirements are expected to be increasingly affected. From this perspective, global warming impacts water’s function in energy generation through two main mechanisms: shortening the circulation cycle in time (sea, rain in mountainous regions, rivers, sea) and faster evaporation, the latter extracting higher quantities of flowing liquid.

Bulgaria was less affected by low water levels on the Danube, when compared to Hungary or Romania, but it still had to take exceptional measures and coordinate with Romania and Serbia in order to maintain the safe operation of its NPP. Both Hungary and Romania had to reduce outputs and to enact major energy conservation measures to protect grid stability.

Another important contributing factor in the August 2026 energy crisis from Eastern Europe was the war from Ukraine, which prompted Kyiv to turn into an electricity and petroleum/products importer from the previous status of exporter. This development impacted both availability and price of energy products in nearby countries.

Despite lagging when compared to China and the US, EU’s policy measures appear to favor the development of solar energy in the coming decades. As of 2026, studied countries are rapidly scaling up, but only Bulgaria holds significant regional battery storage capacity, while neighboring countries, particularly Romania and Greece, do not have matching storage capacity compared to their booming production capacity. Cross-border energy companies have developed business in studied countries, but price variations during summer time between noon and evening are revealing a fundamental problem that requires serious investment in short and middle term, without solving yet the winter energy need.

Considering the additional transportation sector’s energy consumption and household heating during winter, solar energy may become a substitute for studied countries only if storage capacity is developed and substantial connectivity improvement between southern and northern regions of Europe. Otherwise, this long-term predictable energy source can hardly replace baseload energy production.

Even in the case of a potential baseload energy production through winter, the output of nuclear power plants may become less stable across the entire year, adding to already increasing energy transportation infrastructure costs, that will likely have to handle higher and more often power peaks.

As of 2026, indicators point at sustained investment to transform solar energy into a baseload production capacity similar to classical hydropower supplies, while its potential to further replace hydrocarbon sources for transportation and household heating will require an even greater effort and investment.

The low level of water on the Danube triggered energy supply gaps in Eastern Europe, but not as a bilateral cause-effect process. It actually acted as a trigger, exposed a set of multiple fundamental challenges, such as global warming and lack of sustained action at global level, impact of armed conflicts on energy supply, and the lack of a pro-active policy that anticipates downturns rather than responding to repeated acute energy crises.

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Cover page credits: Andrey Metelev via Unsplash. For illustrative purposes only.

*Ecaterina MATOI is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.


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