Ecaterina MATOI
1. Introducere
As Ukraine and the Russian Federation announce yet another Easter Holiday truce, the US and Iran met in Islamabad on April 11th, 2026, with the declared goal of reaching a permanent ceasefire agreement. No agreement has been reached in the first session, as US representatives reportedly left Pakistan, a mediator that enters center stage in Middle East’s new security calculations.
This paper reassesses the American-Israeli attack on Iran from a systematic, i.e. systems perspective, applied to international relations, in order to determine political, security and economic dynamics triggered by the evolution of this conflict, at regional and global level.
A main assumption of current investigation is that the conflict is not an exception to the rule, but rather a next stage in the long, basically unilateral, escalation process the US is carrying out against traditional and newly-declared enemies or targets, identifiable particularly after 2001. Furthermore, a process-based analysis, relying on time variation of various indexes is considered, in order to identify relevant goals and dynamics determined by actions of main actors.
The next section will review the conflict and its evolution, and will be followed by two sections identifying regional and international aftershocks of a US-led war that promotes fragmentation, rearmament, and encourages, particularly when considering the power of own example, many parties to disregard international law and gamble with war.
2. A review of American-Israeli war on Iran: 6 weeks on
2.1. Preliminary war casualties and damage
The war on Iran was initiated by the US and Israel on February 28th, 2026, and in the first 40 days, the US reportedly hit 13’000 targets on Iranian territory, including 1’500 air defense sites, 450 ballistic missile storage facilities, and 800 one-way drone storage facilities (AP & TOI, 2026). The attacks inflicted upon Iranians according to previously-cited report, destroyed 80 % of Iran’s air defense capability, sunk 95 % of Iran’s regular navy fleet, and aimed at 90 % of weapons production sites. Israel reportedly carried out 10’800 strikes on more than 4’000 targets, with 8’500 sorties carried out by Israeli jets on Iranian territory.
Besides attacks on US military bases in Persian Gulf Arab countries, on indigenous infrastructure in these countries considered by Iran as connected to US activity, and in Israel, Iran reported the destruction of one F-35 fighter jet, an A-10 attack aircraft, military helicopters (DF News Desk, 2026), and F-16 fighter jets.
As of April 10th, 2026, estimates on death toll in Iran range from 3’000 to 3’636, including according to reports, 1’701 civilians from which 254 children, while 13 US military members were killed and 300 wounded. In Israel, 12 soldiers and 23 civilians were reportedly killed (Abdallah & Alaaedin, 2026). An April 6th, 2026, report, hints at 7’142 Israelis injured (Khalil, 2026).
While the damages inflicted to Iran are significant, the latter asking for war reparations, the toll on US economy and many other countries depending on it, and on outcome of the war, are difficult to assess due to censorship and war propaganda, especially since the conflict is still ongoing. However, the second war on Iran, following the one from 2025, has significantly damaged the invincibility myths the US and Israel propagated, with potential impact primarily on the volumes and prices of military equipment and ammunitions these countries commercialize.
The reason of the attack, although a lifetime policy goal of Israeli Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has evolved in US public discourse across the conflict. The failure to replace the Iranian theocratic governing model in a regime change bid, led US Vice-President JD Vance to default to an updated policy of curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons program, i.e. a fluid, circular and overall not convincing argument. The US and P5+1 had reached an agreement with Iran in 2015, which the former actually refused to honor. Hence, adding a new requirement to nuclear disarmament in Islamabad by the American team, i.e. that of avoiding means to obtained nuclear weapons, isolates the US and its foreign policy from allies, rather than serving justice to the US, Israel, Iran and global community.
2.2. Actors in the conflict: a review
Without assessing the casus belli for this particular conflict, the largest and most powerful actor of this conflict, the US, is repositioning itself as a more aggressive actor within the global community. Hence, its action in Iran is the continuation of both what Tehran calls neo-imperialism after 1979, and a unilateral increase of pressure/coercion that Washington pushes against traditional competitors such as Cuba, Iran, Venezuela, emerging competitors like China, but also allies such as Canada, European countries, particularly Denmark, through takeover bids, tariffs, and political definitions that allows it to extract capital through large technology corporations at low costs.
The US morphed from a peace-promoting country in the aftermath of World War II (WWII) into an increasingly aggressive international actor, especially after 2001. The inconsistency of its policy with respect to global peace is reflected by its unilateral war initiation, i.e. without the support or approval of United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is emphasized by the disconnect between electoral campaigns slogans promising to end endless wars in “one day” and ramping up war and war rhetoric.
As a post-1991 hegemon, the US managed to impose its agenda on the world stage for at least a decade, in a hard but still transparent and coordinated manner. Before the year 2000, the US exported relatively small quantities of oil and gas, and its current account balance was still relying on industrial production and innovation to a considerable extent. However, in the post-2001 era, the US increased its crude oil and petroleum products exports, to levels exceeding those of traditionally leading rentier states such as Saudi Arabia. Two stages are visible in US increase of oil and related products exports: an increase from less than 500’000 barrels per day (bpd) before 1980, to approx. 1 million bpd after the Islamic Revolution and nationalization of Aramco, that spanned from 1979 to approx. 2005, and a surge from approx. 1 million bpd in 2005, to 11.565 million bpd in December 2023 (EIA 12.04.2026, 2026).
In the year 2024, US imports amounted $ 3.12 trillion while exports amounted $ 1.9 trillion, with a current account deficit of $ 1.22 trillion. The top 3 exported products were crude petroleum ($ 124 billion), refined petroleum ($ 115 billion), and petroleum gas ($ 84.8 billion) (oec.world, 2026).
The sum of $ 323.8 bln. for crude oil and petroleum products represents 17 % of US total goods exports, and slightly exceeds US 2024 military equipment exports, that reportedly amounted $ 318.7 bln. (Army Technology, 2025). As an international actor, US economy is very much depending as of 2026 on exports of services, crude oil and petroleum products, and military equipment. Any other export sector is significantly smaller in volume. Hence, US hegemonic position, and the demand for US dollars on the foreign exchange market depends on maintaining or increasing the exports of significant commodities. The US still consumes significant amounts of energy compared to exports, hence its post-2005 posture was developed based on increase of imports and additional (shale) production. Therefore, the US expanded its position from an energy producer and consumer to an energy trader, rivaling other global leaders in production and exports such as the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.
As the main initiator of most recent attack on Iran, and despite significant bombing campaigns, the US recently responded to Iranian position in the negotiations from Islamabad with an unexpected initiative to control/block the Strait of Hormuz for ships paying tolls to Iran, i.e. the only ships that had been allowed to pass anyway (Rozovsky & Reuters, 2026). While this is a clear escalation, it can also be perceived as a last resort, hazardous, measure, when considering the general threat rhetoric President Trump employs in conflict management.
Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu, a leader on whose name an international arrest warrant had been issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and who was indicted recently by a prosecutor from Istanbul over the attack on Gaza aid flotilla (Anadolu Staff Netanyahu, 2026), has pursued a US attack on Iran for decades and instead of considering a relatively accepted framework, such as the Two States solution, increased the aggression on its neighbors Lebanon and Syria, while continuing to kill, displace Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Prof. Yossi Mekelberg claims that “Settler terrorism has become the norm in West Bank” (Mekelberg, 2026), while reports hint at arrests carried out by Israeli forces in Syria’s Daraa province
(YPA, 2026).
Israel’s bid to take over or control at least parts from Lebanon is not new, but the latest war on Iran has probably been interpreted as a mediatic and legal cover to advance war on Lebanese soil. The right to self-defense is not disputed in reports, but the proportionality and end goal of actions are: as of April 6th, 2026, the latest Israeli attacks on Lebanon, with the declared aim of fighting/dismantling Hezbollah, reportedly displaced approx. 1.2 million people, and killed 1’450 persons, from which 126 children, wounding over 4’400 persons (Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, EPA, Reuters, 2026).
While Israeli strategy of killing leaders has been apparently overtaken by the US in the war on Iran, Tel Aviv appears to pursue a dual-track policy consisting on one hand in attacks and territorial expansion by force, and a now past charm offensive meant to attract regional countries into an arrangement promising peace with certain conditions. The attack on officials by Israeli jets from Doha in 2025, and the 2026 attack on Iran, prompted Persian Gulf Arab states to reconsider the premises for peace and transition to post-oil economies, as the US and Israeli guarantees became questionable.
Israel recently shared an initial cost with Iran of approx. $ 11.5 billion (Wrobel, 2026), i.e. 25.1 % from the $ 45.8 billion spending approved for the Israeli Defense Ministry as part of 2026 state budget (Karmel & Sokol, 2026). The financial effort comes after a record $ 75.9 billion (278.4 billion shekels) fundraising by Israeli government in 2024 in order to sustain war efforts (Altstein, 2025), that significantly increased its Debt-to-GDP ratio. As of 2026, Fitch maintained an “A” rating, outlook negative, for Israel, forecasting a debt-to-GDP ratio of 71.4 % one day before the American-Israeli attack on Iran (Fitch, 2026), as Moody’s had downgraded Israel’s credit rating to A2 with negative outlook already in 2024 (Moody’s, 2024).
Literature claims that most of wartime financing has been secured from national market, with pension funds, provident funds and insurance companies exhibiting high absorption capacity. Jewish diaspora channeled funds directly into the treasury through the Development Corporation for Israel. Other investors are over 90 US state and municipal pension funds, while banks such as Citi, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, helped Israel to sell debt on international markets. Literature hints that funds based in Abraham Accords countries also participated in Israel’s fund-raising efforts (Hooper, 2026). The transformation of Israel’s economy into an “expensive reality”, is equivalated by Gali Ingber to one from a “consumer-led, peaceful growth model to a security-first industrial complex”, and requires innovation in order to endure (Ingber, 2026).
Iran struggled with long-term sanctions after it refuted American dominance in 1979, and is probably overtaken only by Cuba in terms of American sanctions duration. Despite hardships and significant losses, Iran apparently managed to foil American-Israeli bids for quick regime change. Its memberships in BRICS and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) do not appear to shield it from superpower attacks yet, but unlike Saudi Arabia, that oscillates between Western and Eastern influence, Iran appears to have clearly chosen the East. Among Middle Eastern countries, should it be considered one, Iran is among the most consequent supporters of Palestinians, hence obviously not supporting projects such as Greater Israel.
The third parties most directly affected by the recent war were Persian Gulf Arab states. Even after the ceasefire, attacks of infrastructure on their territories continued, particularly in the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait. Gulf Research Center claims that from a total of 6’992 attacks until April 10th, 2026, at least 158 occurred after the ceasefire (@Gulf_Research, 2026). While Saudi Arabia is methodically employing infrastructure and backup systems to sustain exports, Qatar reportedly is expected to lose $ 20 billion per annum revenue loss, for 3-5 years, due to the destruction at the Ras Laffan Industrial City caused by missile strikes. The official report by Qatar energy does not mention the source of missiles to be Iranian (Qatar Energy, 2026).
The impact of the war on deliveries of crude petroleum, natural gas, derived or byproducts such as helium, sulphur and fertilizers affect global prices and consumers. Particularly Europe, is entering another crisis, after COVID19, the war from Ukraine and already very high energy prices, and the lack of policy breakthroughs in its attempt to pioneer transition to renewable energies, amid China’s dominant position in key renewable sectors. Hence, while the attack on Iran cannot be considered a world war, the interconnectedness degree the global economy is experiencing transform the effects of war imposed on Iran into a global burden.
3. Regional dynamics determined by the war on Iran
Data hints that there two types of dynamics unfolding since February 28th, 2026, in the Middle East: determined by pre-existing conditions and new ones. This section aims to distinguish between the two categories, in order to identify more precisely conflict’s impact.
In President Trump’s second term, which lasted less than two years, two attacks on Iran were carried out alongside Israel. The alliance between the US and Israel was always strong, but under President Trump, the US appears to be more lenient to Israel’s regional geopolitical goals, although Israeli observers call Israel’s relation with the US “toxic” (Levy, 2026). In terms of relative change, the relation between the US and Israel can be assessed as improved, although the systemic impact this type of reproachment triggered has the potential to outpace the gains Tel Aviv pocketed: the impact of all measures, irrespective of aims, becomes global especially when Middle Eastern resources and capital are at stake.
In terms of region’s oldest active and continuous conflict, i.e. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli takeover of land and influence has been ramped up, amid an interruption of Iranian focus on the matter. Annexation plans and ethnic supremacy rhetoric have been systematically ramped up, amid an inconsistent American peace plan, oscillating between a takeover and the so-called Board of Peace, and a silenced Europe that, in many other cases, it selectively deals with post-colonial problems some of its countries had created around the world.
Hence, the Palestinian problem aggravated for Palestinians, increased the stakes and costs for Israel, that expands its deployment of force across multiple fronts. As of April 12th, 2026, the death toll of Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip reportedly amounted 72’320, with over 172’192 injured as the medical capacity is crippled by comprehensive Israeli bans and blockades on medical equipment and materials (Majed, 2026). Furthermore, the war determined Indonesia to deploy its peacekeeping force under President Trump’s initiative, for an indefinite period according to reports from March 2026, after suspending its participation in the Board of Peace (MEMO, 2026).
The Abraham Accords were apparently yielding results, and before Israeli attack on Hamas leadership in Doha, from September 2025, Saudi Arabia was still committed to joining the Accords, conditioned by the Israeli-American recognition of a Palestinian state. However, Doha assassinations by Israel prompted a tectonic shift in regional security balance: realizing the futility of American security guarantees, Riyadh instantly signed a common defense pact with Pakistan. The American-Israeli attacks on Iran, and latter’s response, proved Sadi Arabia right in looking for additional security guarantees, but also exposed an existential dependency of Persian Gulf Arab states on previous American expensive security guarantees, that did not maintain the peace necessary to develop large-scale post-oil economic projects.
Pakistan, alongside Türkiye, are two security actors that had gradually entered the region before the 2026 war on Iran started. However, while cautious on language, Saudi Arabia welcomed the arrival of a Pakistani military force that includes fighter jets in the Kingdom on April 11th, 2026. In this context, the deployment of French Rafale jets over the UAE to protect its installations, and that of British Rapid Sentry air defense system to Kuwait earlier in the conflict, are consistent with older defense arrangements, hence not necessarily a new dynamic. The importance of this Saudi-led security reconfiguration is fundamental to regional security dynamics: the fact that a nuclear-armed state has been solicited instead of Egypt, for example, gradually shifts region’s dependency matrix towards the East, with potential impact on Western security calculus, energy supply and weapons sales.
The prospect of this war, as well as Israel’s relentless attacks in Lebanon and Syria, alongside an uncontrollable blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, diminish the success chances of economic projects such as NEOM in Saudi Arabia, or the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) throughout the region. Furthermore, landmark real estate in the UAE, world-class ports and airports from Dubai and Abu Dhabi may quickly lose long-term clients, as security and predictability are non-negotiable conditions for modern business.
4. Global dynamics determined by the war on Iran
Assuming that the US pursues a consolidation of its top exports, i.e. oil and gas on one hand, and military equipment on the other hand, the war on Iran may yield mixed results. On short term, dollar demand and hence exchange rate may be sustained by a demand for American oil and gas exports (Reuters American Oil, 2026): Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan and partially Arab deliveries are crippled by wars and political barriers, in a market that still considers itself “free”. However, since their final pricing for customers such as Europe is not competitive, American supply is not sustainable on long term since it burdens end products’ prices. Hence, the current energy supply situation may result is accelerating the adoption of renewable energy systems, and nuclear power generation.
The US arms sales rely on a strong customer base and continuity, but as Europe strives to indigenize more military technology, and US unpredictability determined Canada to announce the retreat from massive purchases of US military equipment (Kurt, 2026), it would require a miracle for the US to maintain the sales level to pre-2026 levels on a global scale. In the Middle East, Pakistan’s presence does not only complement the existing security architecture, but comes with a new philosophy and JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, that proved successful at least in the short conflict with India from 2025, as well as nuclear deterrent. Hence, even if regional countries maintain purchases of American gear, the pressure on price may increase alongside renewed political conditions and defense policy goals.
American-initiated conflicts and increase in military spending determine a cascade effect in global defense landscape. Its large war machine encompasses besides a leading military industrial complex, vast financial resources, a large army, lawfare infrastructure and an energy sector in need of both supplies and customers. However, the case of Soviet Union’s dissolution emphasizes the thin line between high numbers and the ability to maintain a system balanced, efficient and competitive, especially in the context of fundamental industrial transformations.
In terms of services, a multi-level approach to de-dollarization is pressuring traditional payment systems such as SWIFT, and payment processors VISA and MASTERCARD. On one hand, digital central bank currencies, such as the digital yuan, speed up processing and reduce costs, while cross-border payment systems, such as mBRIDGE, BRICS-PAY compete Western projects. In this context, the American monopoly on certain services at global level may be subjected to systematic pressure, a dynamic that triggered strong American political reactions.
In the competition for dominance, the US exhibited unprecedented levels of belligerency, renaming the Department of Defense to the Department of War being a clear sign of its power projection plans. The unilateral action, clearly outlined by the wars on Iran, has the potential to both perpetuate war and fragment a world order that traditionally relied on the US dollar and attached financial system, as well as US energy and military dominance. As much as Israel attempts to introduce a regional dominance based on US support, the Saudi reaction to Doha bombing confirms a slow but already ongoing transition towards stronger Asian interconnection, consistent with oil markets the Persian Gulf supplies and imports from China.
Hence, the theoretical bid of replacing the US with Israel as regional security guarantor requires at least two milestones. On short term, Iranian defense must be completely defeated, and the peace deal imposed would have to generate financial gain and reassert US/Israeli regional supremacy. However, as the days into the conflict pass, the prospects of a US-led reconstruction of Iran, or seizing oil proceeds into a New York account, as in the case of Iraq, appear to diminish while the costs rise. Should this operation succeed in any way, the reaction of China, the Russian Federation and Europe, may further isolate the US from strategic, growing markets. The new Asian paradigm reveals clear separation lines between innovation environments and politically-defined financial, trade and military walls that maintain traditional wealth-generation systems.
On long term, the US would have to sustain growth, and ideally without infringing upon sovereignty of allies such as Denmark or Canada, in order to be able to channel resources towards competition from Asia or South America. However, recent takeover attempts hint at difficulties in maintaining such a line, and the directionless escalation from Iran, that clearly boosts sales of American oil and gas at least temporarily, is justified with rotating arguments, hence cannot be turned into international policy.
As the US strives to define and achieve a meaningful victory against Iran, an increasing number of countries, especially the ones that hold natural resources, are considering measures to protect themselves from an imminent takeover bid without prior notice. The cooperation guarantees that the US holds, in forms of gold deposits from Germany and Italy, or as treasury bonds investments from Japan, the UK, China, Canada and other economic partners represent a unique asset in imposing its worldview on the international stage. However, an assessment of winning and losing sides is difficult to define based only on projected or achieved goals in the war imposed by the US and Israel to Iran. The long-term competition may be slightly impacted by the outcomes of this conflict, but it depends in which manner: if the US triggers a systematic rearmament and economic repositioning, the spoils of war, should they be obtained, may be offset by losses on other fronts.
5. Conclusions
This paper investigated dynamics and main actors involved in the American-Israeli war against Iran. The data analyzed hinted at three sectors of American economy, i.e. exports, that support its balance sheet and current account: crude oil and petroleum gas, weapons and services. The study identified how the US improved its economic stance by two combined measures: the increase of oil and gas exports and the political redefinition of market conditions that allowed obtaining higher prices. From this perspective, the war on Iran further improves American position in the oil and gas markets.
In terms of weapons sales, the European arms frenzy translated into record sales for American manufacturers, but the sinuous evolution of war on Iran, and the previous arrival of new security guarantors in the Middle East, such as Pakistan and Türkiye, may shift the long-term economic outlook of security guarantees offered to Persian Gulf Arab states.
In terms of services, particularly financial services, the US war on Iran may trigger further derisking measures across the world, and diversification in borrowing and payment services may erode America’s hegemonic position.
The paper identifies that irrespective of whether Israel overtakes America’s role in regional security and geopolitical affairs, the cost of imposing an American-Israeli peace on Arab states or Iran is anyway increasing, due to Asian competition in economic, and potentially geopolitical affairs in the future. It is not necessarily the divergence between American promises and developments that are contributing to the long-term pre-war shift in security policies, but the imperative of achieving a balanced power ratio that allows capitalizing on investments in post-oil projects, that are projected to amount trillions should the Persian Gulf Arab states manage to transit away from hydrocarbon sales dependence as projected.
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Cover image credits: Hassan Hedayatzadeh via Unsplash. For illustrative purposes only.
About the author: Ecaterina Matoi is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative.