Oportunități și provocări în relațiile post-JCPOA dintre UE/E3 și Iran

Ecaterina MAȚOI

Vă rugăm să rețineți că acest articol a fost scris în februarie 2025.

Introducere

În ianuarie 2025, grupul E3, format din Franța, Germania și Regatul Unit (UK), ar fi încercat să relanseze negocierile cu Iranul (Rahn, 2025) privind un posibil nou acord legat de programul nuclear al acestuia. Deși cel mai recent format seamănă cu o consecință logică a Planului Comun de Acțiune Comprehensiv (JCPOA) eșuat din 2015, peisajul politic global a suferit transformări sistematice. Acest articol va reevalua pe scurt rezultatele JCPOA pentru a stabili cum ar putea fi definită o posibilă nouă cooperare între UE, Marea Britanie și Iran. Ulterior, va contextualiza provocările generate de un ordinea internațională fracturată, construcțiile neo‑naționaliste și paradigmele de cooperare concurente și va evalua punctele forte și slăbiciunile celor două părți reînnoite, adică E3 și Iranul. Studiul va folosi o perspectivă structural‑realistă în relații internaționale, concentrându-se pe putere, politică, comerț, competiție, cooperare și „câștiguri relative”, termen inventat de Kenneth Waltz (Mearsheimer, 2013).

One decade after JCPOA agreement

The concept of nuclear negotiations with Iran is essentially European. Through the October 2003 Tehran Declaration (parliament.uk, 2003), a E3 Group (France, Germany, and the UK) and Iran reportedly agreed on latter’s cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and sign the Additional Protocol. Literature suggests that this preliminary breakthrough managed to prevent a potential American military intervention in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion. In 2004, an EU foreign policy representative joined the format, and in early 2006, China, the Russian Federation and the US became part of the P5+1 (5 members of United Nations Security Council plus Germany) or E3+3 group (Billon-Galland, Raines, & Whitman, 2020). After the major breakthrough from 2015, cooperation prospects with Iran appeared to improve, but unilateral American withdrawal from the agreement and reimposition of essentially unilateral sanctions by the US blocked any consequent implementation of the framework.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 from 2015 endorsed JCPOA agreement, and it would represent a cornerstone of international law, but the fact that the US was the first party to quit implementing it, early 2025 reports hint that Iran cannot be held accountable for the failure (IRNA, 2025). Furthermore, it must be emphasized that E3 did not formally exit the agreement, but at the same time, there was no de facto implementation that would oblige Iran to account for subsequent policy decisions in a broadly acceptable manner.

Billon-Galland et all mention that E3 is a known format which would allow large economies from Europe to coordinate on Iran policy and form a counterpart to American influence, but Italy expressed willingness to join the group in 2018 and the alignment of E3 and EU policies became an additional challenge after Brexit and the initial strategic alignment might not be up-to-date  (Billon-Galland, Raines, & Whitman, 2020, pp. 3-4). Indeed, the initial nuclear non-proliferation policy was a mainstream international relations vector after Perestroika, and subsequent additions to the E3 agenda, like Syria or Yemen, have been apparently accepted by the Iranian counterpart as negotiations points. However, certain expansionist tendencies from West Asia, nuclear ambiguity of Israel and the perspective of Saudi Arabia potentially becoming a nuclear power (even for peaceful purposes), as well as the lack of commitment among major nuclear powers to disarm, might have fundamentally shifted the meeting point between E3/EU and Iran in the scenario of renewed negotiations.

JCPOA represented a peace pursuit specific to its historical period and it was structurally conditioned by American foreign policy priorities. The US is still dominant in global economy and security, but its influence is gradually decreasing amid a transformation of international relations based on new paradigms like multipolarism, and derisking from unilateral sanctions and tariffs, dedollarization, etc. Hence, a new plan of action will have to reassess the fundamental assumptions and goals in order to identify sustainable cooperation chapters between EU/EE/Europe and Iran.

Irrespective of the definition adopted for regionalization, the role of great economic and security powers may become even more relevant on short and medium term. From this perspective, a conservative approach to historical transformations may entail cooperation and competition between great powers, alliances including traditional and emerging powers, based on a fast-changing environment.

In this article, neo-nationalism is considered a pseudo-ideology characteristic particularly to Western political space that had become visible with Brexit and turned mainstream with subsequent political developments in Europe and the US. From a realpolitik perspective, the instrumentalization of historical narratives in order to realign priorities resulted in political mobilization and successful electoral gains in certain countries, but in the period 2015 – 2025, it did not impact significantly the international economic and security landscape. Should it be assessed as a reaction to globalism, then largest corporations from 2015 increased their turnover and reach, and many more large corporations emerged. For example, multinational retail corporations began to advertise products sourced from a country as local, increasing thus profits but maintaining or increasing market share in exogenous countries. However, if neo-nationalism was assessed as a mobilizing factor in advancing precise policy directions and increasing their acceptance on a global scale, then a separate analysis would be required to identify these directions.

It is difficult to establish whether the neo-nationalist wave originated in America, but the political struggle in this country appears to have peaked in recent decade. Internally, the confrontation between Democrats and Republicans became acute. Spats between these two poles were reflected in the war from Ukraine and West Asia, and JCPOA is one of the most relevant examples. It cannot be established whether the Democrats would have pursued this agreement to its maximum extent, given the American posture in conflicts from Ukraine and West Asia, but since this premise cannot investigated, other relevant developments require an assessment. For example, the expansion of the EU and NATO eastwards may be attributed to the expansionist nature of Western economic and financial systems, or to a presumed imperative to grow in order to cope with China’s growing influence. Hence, assuming that the US would have continued to support JCPOA, the question becomes how would have E3 and Iran managed an expansion reaching its borders through Central Asia.

The above considerations are underlining the necessity to identify potential sustainable cooperation goals between various parties in a contemporary international relations setting. On one hand, the American-led Western global order is affected by confusion, struggles reflected through tariffs and sanctions within blocks like G7 (former G8), a lagging reaction to transformation and an ambiguous position on core principles like free trade. No United Nations founding member would have envisioned in the 20^th century that the leader of a great power could simply declare the desire to take over a territory and people instead of upholding its self-determination while contributing to international peace through the appropriate means, or that the leader of an extremist organization will be legitimized while still on the wanted list of the country with largest military footprint on the planet. Despite the propaganda layer that accompanies any decision and action in the 21^st century, countries are faced with an impossible choice between upholding fundamental principles and the rule of law on one hand, and cutting corners in order to increase the level of preparedness should a larger confrontation ensue. This perspective however, can be eventually associated to the traditional world order and Weltanschauung.

The old-new world order already exists despite a visible struggle to conserve certain premises, and is probably still concerned with the danger of confrontation. But it appears to replace the dichotomy nationalism – international consensus (one imposed through analogies with the past) with a more flexible and transparent consensus, which is limited but probably more inclined to uphold the fewer rules: an agreement to disagree is still acceptable without direct major consequences. Both E3/EU and Iran can certainly identify benefits in a potential renewed cooperation plan, but this would have to be based on fundamental commitments in order to pass the test of time. And an important step towards future international cooperation is to reconcile own traditional representations with commonly upheld commitments if so agreed. Therefore, the cooperation does not represent a goal itself, but the relative gains on both sides would. And what could the E3/EU and Iran gain from a comprehensive cooperation plan?

The definition of a framework represents a fundamental prerequisite for the potential new cooperation between the EU/E3 and Iran. And based on the assessment above, the JCPOA framework is not up-to-date anymore. The traditional world order faces structural challenges, and should Iran and its European counterparts reach an agreement, why would it deliver outcomes since even G7 partners appear to escalate protectionism and retaliation? Likewise, if E3 did not manage to enforce JCPOA, what needs to be addressed in order to increase the chances of success in an increasingly contested global politics?

Should Iran require its partners to adopt a more multipolar approach and assuming that EU/E3 accepted a renewed working premise, it must be taken into account that Iran will likely maintain and develop its alternatives to the dollar system, and partnerships through frameworks like BRICS and CSO unless a guaranteed path to the EURO and Pound systems is provided. This could represent a shortcut to the exacerbation of sanctions and tariffs that cripple contemporary global economy without addressing its route causes.

Iran has maintained a relatively stable position on the international scene, but the economic interests in its region evolved significantly. Despite a relatively smaller role on transit routes between Asia and Europe like Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it may gain access to the Iraq – Türkiye trade corridor and its role in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is increasing.

Assuming that a nuclear settlement still represents a common goal, the fundamental issue of a Two States solution for the Palestinians will probably remain difficult to overcome. A relatively neutral European position on this matter would impact E3/EU’s group negotiations leverage and limit the scope of a new agreement.

In the eventuality of peace in Ukraine, relative advantages due to energy supply arrangements will remain a core issue for European economies on short term. Diversification of sources may tackle existential challenges, and Europe may survive by climbing down the renewables ladder, but if the global economy does not merge sooner rather than later the environmental and economic capital, competition based on traditional premises and monopolies will likely deliver new and unexpected outcomes. This working hypothesis does not downsize the importance of hydrocarbon supplies on short and medium term, but underlines that sustainability of agreements is conditioned by more factors.

An assessment of opportunities and challenges in cooperation between EU/E3 and Iran

Figure 1. Iran’s crude oil production and export, and OPEC crude oil price per year for the period 2015 – 2024.

In the year 2020, Iran experienced a combination of low oil prices and low exports volume, whereas in 2017 and 2018, i.e., before JCPOA retreat, its overall crude oil sales performance was significantly better. In 2024, Iran exported an estimated 1.58 million barrels per day (mbpd), which at a theoretical average OPEC price of $ 79.56 per barrel would result in approx. $ 126 bln. turnover. This is a significant amount when considering Iran’s 2023 Gross Domestic Product ($ 403.526 bln), but it is a computed value based on OPEC average oil price.

Despite the fact that Iran has the 4^th largest crude oil reserves and 2^nd largest natural gas reserves in the world, the income they generate and stability of exports are relatively reduced. In fact, Iran is considered the 5^th richest country in the world with resources valued at $ 27.3 trillion (Ziabari, 2023). These include, among others, significant quantities of zinc, copper, iron ore, lead, gypsum, barite, and manganese (IMNA, 2025). Detailed information on the distribution of resources and various industries is provided in literature and significant investment incentives are also provided (TCCIM, 2025). As a developing nation from West Asia, Iran signed a 25-years cooperation program with China in 2021 and became a BRICS member in 2024. The reorientation also coincided with the stalemate of JCPOA and renewed sanctions from Western partners.

On the other hand, EU/E3 include countries with very large and advanced economies, developed over long periods. The size of the EU economy is comparable in Purchase Power Parity (PPP) terms with that of the US. Despite the energy crisis, European industries are relatively large and linked to significant market segments. Likewise, although connected to the dollar, EURO is a very large monetary system.

Figure 2. Comparison between volumes of most exported Iranian goods in 2018 and 2023 [www.oec.world] database

A potential pattern of Iran’s trade volume increase can be simulated by comparing the 2023 export basket with the one from 2018, which represented a peak for the 2013 – 2023 decade. The Iranian registered export volume for 2018 was $ 87.7 bln. and for 2023 $ 13.2 bln. Assuming that these numbers are representative for real export volumes, the comparison reveals that oil and petroleum gas dominated Iranian exports in 2018 (OEC, 2025), as depicted in figure 2. Furthermore, the 2023 lower export volume is more diversified, exhibiting a ratio of 51.71 % of goods “other” than the dominant ones, when compared to a 27.12 % for “other” exported goods in 2018. Hence, should Iranian exports expand, an increase in absolute value of exports may be delivered primarily by crude petroleum, petroleum gas and derived products, like ethylene polymers and refined petroleum.

The most traded global goods in 2023 were crude petroleum ($ 1.28 trillion), cars ($ 976 billion), refined petroleum ($ 931 billion), integrated circuits ($ 910 billion) and broadcasting equipment ($ 619 billion). Germany still dominated global exports with a 17.8 % market share, followed by Japan with 12.2 % (OEC, 2025). The Harmonized System (HS2) category 72 (Iron and Steel) ranked 10 from 96 in 2023 ($ 477 bln.) and category HS 7601 Raw Aluminum ranked 47^th from 1217 ($ 73.8 bln.). These are among commodities for which the new American administration announced increased tariffs in early February 2025 on all global suppliers.

In the first two decades of the 21^st century, consensus on sanctions against Iran were relatively clear among Western partners, and foreign policy was clearly aligned with economic and political aims. However, the second term of President Donald Trump introduced from the very beginning new cooperation and competition paradigms meant to create new relative gains for the US. Announced tariffs on Canada or Mexico, on all aluminum and steel suppliers, and reciprocal tariffs are probably meant to relaunch industries considered strategic or vital for American national security. However, a series of factors can influence the outcomes of such essentially nationalist policies, and the resulting international relations.

From the perspective of deglobalization, the US and even G7 do not control a majority of global economy anymore. The costs of competing with large blocks like the EU, BRICS may be relatively higher, and a nationalist ideology may help larger countries and economies to maintain dominance. However, whether nationalism will deliver expected outcomes, or tariffs will increase the stance of dollar against other currencies on long term remain open questions.

The post-World War II dollar-based system was not a constant: it evolved from the connection to gold to petro-dollar, experienced the 2008 financial crisis and a contemporary inflation combined with decreasing ratio in global currency reserves. The combination of petroleum and gas sales in US dollars, and the delay of transitioning to renewable energies may maintain a short-term dollar dominance. And Iran may profit more if it managed to sell hydrocarbon reserves and derived products like plastics.

But the risk associated to the new “fair trade” paradigm cannot be underestimated. The term “fair” cannot be defined in terms of international trade due to many parameters and connections to other fields of international cooperation. When France realized in the 1960s that the US might not be able to redeem gold for all dollars, and asked the gold (Nieuwenhuijs, 2024), it may have accelerated the decoupling between dollar and gold. Furthermore, many countries that trade with the US invested the payments in US treasuries and other financial instruments, supported by American rating agencies against interest. The large sums of US dollars combined with liberal ideology allowed American companies, among others, to acquire shares and companies. Besides generating profit, this allowed a better alignment of foreign assets with American financial and economic interests. Therefore, a simple comparison of tariffs is not systematically relevant for global economy and international relations and should countries continue to strengthen large trade and economic blocks, reactions to the new initiative can be diverse. Countries with less dependency on American trade may gradually start to build alternative markets and deleverage in terms of American financial instruments. Furthermore, should the nationalist wave be supported further, countries with large Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may even resort to nationalizations if confronted with a derating of their relative negotiation position or unsustainable cooperation proposals.

A potential economic relation between the EU/E3 and Iran depends on the relation between EU/E3 and the US, as well as China’s trade and investment posture. It is probably unlikely for countries from organizations like ASEAN or BRICS to replicate the sanctions and tariffs policies of US administration, but many inter-state economic relations will be reviewed as a consequence of American pressures, which is itself caught between inflation, rising public debt and current account deficit. As history hardly repeats itself in the same form, an American global domination based on the dollar and an economy flooded with oil as in the 20^th century may be less likely. Hence, the question is whether the US will manage to maintain sufficient relative gains in order to influence a policy based on successors of the dollar and oil industries on long term. This parameter will likely impact the negotiating positions of the EU/E3 and Iran in a potential new JCPOA-like agreement, or an agreement between the EU and BRICS, and it represents both a challenge and an opportunity. Furthermore, from a globally systematic perspective, alliances that purpose peace and development, will probably blockchain currencies and actors at a very detailed level, being able to determine in real time if using a currency or cooperating with an actor may amount to support for conflicts.

Should the nationalist push regress in Europe, global projects like the trade routes connectivity will likely deliver the diversification that increases economic security. A constructive and competitive approach to solving the trade routes dilemma would be to support and question equally all new potential alternatives to the Suez Canal, and approach development in a sustainable manner, through projects like the European Super Grid. Likewise, instead of simply ending the use of plastics, the negotiating parties can develop either a sustainable transitional path or focus to transform this industry into a new one, more environment-friendly.

Conclusions

This article analyzed the historical context in which JCPOA negotiation format emerged in the post-1990 unipolar world and transformed until and after 2015. It was identified that the assumptions related to the JCPOA agreement may not be valid anymore, and reassessing the purpose of a renewed cooperation between EU/E3 and Iran would be necessary.

In the year 2025, two main international relations paradigms were contextualized for the purpose of assessing potential cooperation scenarios for EU/E3 and Iran. The “traditional” paradigm is dominated by renewed nationalism especially in the West, either due to romanticization of history or as a reaction to traditional globalization, and a confrontation with traditional tools like the US dollar or other 20^th centuries monopolies. An emerging and competing paradigm does not appear to counter the traditional one, but promotes a more flexible and less interventionist international cooperation, which is difficult to assess in comparison to the traditional one because it is not presented yet as a replacement. This perspective suggests that a neo-nationalist approach to international relations might generate relative gains for large states and economies, not alliances.

Cooperation between the EU/E3 and Iran might have to begin by establishing premises related to the most important goals, and which international relations paradigm would deliver better outcomes: the traditional one, the old and new one, or potentially a very specific one. Both the EU/E3 and Iran exhibit relatively stable political negotiating positions, but the global economic environment is transforming rapidly, for example through trade corridors. Furthermore, with or without conflicts, like the ones from Ukraine or Syria, the essential economic competition paradigm remains related to relative gains, and energy plays a fundamental role. Unless an enforceable global deal on hydrocarbon consumption is reached, for example in the form of taxes for products in function of fossil fuel consumed to manufacture and utilize them, relative economic position of constructive global actors risks to deteriorate without achieving results.

The main chapter of this research identified Iran’s natural resources and the size and stability of European markets as opportunities in the scenario of a renewed cooperation. Iranian energy reserves and the flexibility in delivering capacity represent particular assets that may contribute to a more stable European energy market. Reciprocally, European leadership in various industrial sectors like for example automotive, and the relative size of EURO monetary environment may enhance EU/E3 negotiating position.

Islamic Republic of Iran is a West-Asian country with one of the longest and most prominent heritages in human history. The influence of Zoroastrianism on Jewish and Christianity amounts to a common cultural element that defines a fundamental connection. In the era dominated by European empires and subsequently, the relation between Iran and European countries continued in various forms. Having considered the fact that the two camps were in contact for a relatively long period and risks can be approximated relatively well, and there are clear incentives to pursue an agreement, seizing the opportunity becomes a matter of political choice, determination and definition of a potentially shared common future that would be able to withstand time, i.e., sustainable.

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Image credit: Sepehr Aleagha, Tehran, via Unsplash. Cropped for layout

About the author: Ecaterina MAȚOI is the President of SDGAi