Mohammad Ali Fallahi
Introducere
Türkiye’s foreign policy has undergone significant transformation since the establishment of the Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Over time, this transformation has been shaped by recurring international crises, shifting global security challenges, and the rise of competing political parties and elite coalitions. A recognizable pattern has consequently emerged in Turkish foreign policy, often described as global swing state behavior. As a global swing actor, Türkiye has adopted a foreign policy that reflects the fluidity of the international system. It combines cooperation and competition, manages friend and adversary relations simultaneously, and seeks to reduce the likelihood that broad coalitions will form against Ankara.
This swing model has faced serious pressure since the events of October 7, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, and Israel’s increasing securitization of Türkiye. Within this context, Iran has come to represent the final unresolved element in the consolidation of a new Western led regional order and the preservation of United States hegemony. Following the disarmament processes targeting Hamas, the severe blows inflicted on Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the management of Ahmed al Sharaa’s behavior in Syria, Iran remains the last major bastion of the Axis of Resistance and the critical remaining obstacle to the stabilization of the Western preferred order in the Middle East.
The geopolitical and geoeconomic shock generated by the confrontation among the United States, Israel, and Iran, together with strained relations between Ankara and Washington and escalating rhetorical tensions with Israel, has pushed Türkiye toward another major strategic reorientation. Although these tensions with Israel remain largely confined to the political and discursive sphere, they have acquired growing strategic significance. Ankara has carefully monitored the divergences between the United States and NATO, the Alliance’s limited effectiveness in addressing the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and the growing frictions between Washington and London. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional transatlantic structures, Türkiye has increasingly selected Britain as its pivotal partner in redefining its relationship with Europe. This emerging Anglo Turkish axis offers Ankara several strategic advantages. First, Türkiye’s defense and military industries have expanded rapidly in recent years. Cooperation with Britain, particularly through the transfer of advanced technology and expertise, can further strengthen Turkish military capability.
Second, Ankara can use this partnership to enter segments of the European defense market and establish itself as an indispensable actor in Europe’s evolving security architecture. The unveiling of the Tayfun intercontinental ballistic missile was therefore not merely a technical demonstration. It was also a political signal directed at adversaries and uncertain allies alike. Europe and the United States face depleted missile and munitions stockpiles, while many European states remain dissatisfied with their limited military capabilities, weak defense management, and excessive dependence on United States power within NATO. These pressures have generated significant divisions within NATO and the European Union regarding military self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy.
Ankara has not overlooked these divisions. Türkiye is seeking to exploit them through a more militarized foreign policy and through defense industrial engagement. The objective is to redefine relations with Europe and open a new chapter in Turkish European ties. In this strategy, Britain is viewed as the essential gateway. Over the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy has experimented with several models. These have included the zero problems with neighbors’ doctrine, Turgut Özal’s commercial state approach, active regionalism, and the present turn toward the militarization of foreign policy combined with distinct geoeconomic strategies. Historically, Türkiye has sought to export its own model to the Middle East, drawing on its Ottoman legacy, cultural ties, identity linkages, and deep regional embeddedness.
This model, which attempted to synthesize Islam and liberalism, was designed to position Türkiye as a model country, strengthen its standing with the European Union, facilitate eventual membership, and elevate Ankara’s place in the global hierarchy of economic and political power. However, the September 11 attacks, the Damascus Spring, the Arab Spring, and the intense rivalries among Arab blocs and Sunni Shia axes obstructed the realization of this vision. Europe also showed limited enthusiasm. The unresolved status of Northern Cyprus, Türkiye’s instrumentalization of migration as a gateway to Europe, human rights concerns, and the Kurdish question repeatedly complicated relations between Ankara and Brussels.
Several developments have nevertheless increased Türkiye’s strategic value to Europe. These include the partial easing of the Kurdish issue through expanded legal rights in Turkey, the weakening of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the growth of Turkish defense capabilities, Türkiye’s emergence as an energy and transit hub within China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Ankara’s expanding influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The war in Ukraine in 2022 weakened Russia’s influence in its perceived backyard and increased the relevance of the Organization of Turkic States. That organization has evolved from a primarily cultural and linguistic platform into a more pragmatic institution that shapes norms through trade, economic cooperation, and regional convergence. Türkiye’s management of energy hubs, transit routes, and corridors leading to Europe has become especially important given Europe’s chronic energy vulnerability, first exposed sharply by the war in Ukraine and then reinforced by the 2026 Iran conflict.
Türkiye’s influence over Ahmed al Sharaa also positions Ankara, alongside European actors, to channel major investment into Damascus once hostilities subside. Because Syria occupies a central strategic position in the Middle East, the ability to influence reconstruction and political stabilization there gives Türkiye additional leverage in its dealings with Europe. Türkiye was previously viewed mainly as a passive corridor through which its neighbors reached Europe in the domains of migration and energy geopolitics. Ankara is now attempting to reverse that historical equation. By using the political capital it has accumulated in Africa and by institutionalizing alignment with Britain after the 2026 Iran war, Turkey is shifting from an east to west conduit into an active intermediary (4). Through its privileged post Brexit defense and commercial partnership with Britain, Türkiye presents itself as a project manager for Europe’s entry into Africa.
This model offers two advantages for Europe. It reduces the direct political risks faced by European capitals operating in Africa, and it replaces the European Union’s normative and human rights frameworks with Turkish standards in security, logistics, drones, military bases, commercial corridors, and defense industries. The result is a reverse corridor of influence. With British support, Ankara can facilitate European access to African resources and markets while also shaping the architecture of that partnership in accordance with its own strategic interests. What began as a defense industry showcase at SAHA 2026 has developed into a wider geoeconomic doctrine.
Redefining Relations with Europe: Why Britain Is the Key?
The surge in high level diplomatic engagement between Turkish and British officials, especially Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to London on 23 April 2026 and the signing of a Strategic Partnership Framework, sends a clear signal regarding Ankara’s renewed engagement with Europe (1). The sophistication of this diplomatic move lies in its starting point. Turkey has chosen a partner that is no longer constrained by the institutional procedures of the European Union. For Brussels, this is an important indicator of Ankara’s strategic intent. In the context of the 2026 Iran war, which reshaped regional and international dynamics and disrupted existing coalitions, alliances, and security arrangements, Türkiye’s selection of Britain was not merely tactical. It reflected a deeper structural requirement in Turkish foreign policy.
Ankara needed to navigate, and eventually bypass, the political disarray within the European Union. Relations between Ankara and Brussels have long been characterized by volatility, with disputes over Cyprus, human rights, migration, and democratic governance preventing more effective alignment. By contrast, post Brexit Britain offers greater diplomatic agility and fewer institutional constraints. Ankara now regards this flexibility as strategically useful.
Through intensified outreach to London, Türkiye is weakening the rigid obstacles imposed by the European framework. Britain remains a sophisticated diplomatic actor with continuing influence in European security debates. It can therefore serve as a bridge between Türkiye and continental Europe. By deepening defense cooperation with the United Kingdom, Ankara anchors itself directly in Europe’s security supply chain without requiring explicit approval from Brussels. This framework, which also includes negotiations for a modern free trade agreement, functions as a pragmatic route back into Europe (2). London is also well positioned to mediate any future escalation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, particularly if such mediation carries wider European support. Türkiye’s primary concern remains the Syrian theater.
The 2026 Iran war demonstrated Israel’s capacity and willingness to deliver overwhelming strikes when it fully securitizes a perceived threat. Israeli officials have repeatedly portrayed Türkiye as a second Iran, meaning a high-capacity actor capable of shaping a Sunni centered version of the Axis of Resistance. During the 2026 conflict, Israeli operations in Syria directly endangered Turkish interests in the Levant (3). In a joint press conference with his British counterpart, Hakan Fidan explicitly stated that Israel had become the greatest threat to regional security. Because Britain is not aligned with Israel in the same unconditional way as the United States, Ankara sees London as a potentially useful actor in managing Israeli behavior.
Beyond the Middle East, Türkiye is systematically expanding its presence in Africa. This expansion is driven by the high-risk environment in Turkey’s traditional neighborhood and by Europe’s growing concern over energy security. Ankara has accumulated substantial political capital in Africa through infrastructure projects, cultural diplomacy, development assistance, and defense cooperation. By combining this capital with the post 2026 Anglo Turkish axis, Türkiye no longer presents itself as a passive corridor between east and west. Instead, through its privileged defense and commercial partnership with Britain, it positions itself as the manager of Europe’s strategic entry into Africa.
This Turkish model has two distinct implications. First, it lowers the political cost of European re-engagement with Africa by allowing European states to operate through a partner whose presence is not immediately associated with the continent’s colonial memory. For countries such as France, Britain, Belgium, or Italy, direct strategic involvement in Africa often activates anti-colonial narratives, domestic resistance, and accusations of neo-imperialism. Türkiye, by contrast, enters African political spaces with a different symbolic repertoire: Islamic affinity, development assistance, infrastructure investment, defense cooperation, and a discourse of sovereign partnership rather than tutelage. This does not make Turkish engagement neutral or altruistic, but it makes it politically more acceptable and less visibly extractive than direct European intervention.
In this sense, Ankara functions as a strategic buffer: it absorbs part of the legitimacy cost that Europe would otherwise face, while converting that intermediary role into diplomatic leverage over both African governments and European capitals (5). Second, it substitutes the European Union’s normative and human rights-based approach with Turkish standards of security, logistics, drones, military bases, commercial corridors, and defense industrial cooperation. The result is the consolidation of a reverse corridor of influence. With British backing, Türkiye can enable European access to African resources and markets while ensuring that the institutional design of this access advances Ankara’s long term strategic interests.
Defense Leap: Technology Transfer, Not Merely Arms Procurement
The recent wave of Turkish British diplomatic engagement extends beyond economic and political cooperation. One central objective is to use British expertise to modernize Turkish defense capabilities and to capture important segments of the European defense market. Europe’s persistent shortage of structured strategic autonomy and its fragmented defense production system have created an opening that Ankara is determined to exploit.
One of the main pillars of the strategic partnership signed during Hakan Fidan’s visit to London is Türkiye’s acquisition of 20 Typhoon 4.5 generation fighter aircraft (6). Yet the significance of this transaction lies not only in the procurement of advanced combat aircraft. Its deeper importance rests in the associated technology transfer. Access to Typhoon systems, production knowledge, and operational expertise is expected to accelerate Turkey’s indigenous fifth generation fighter program, known as Kaan, also referred to as TFX. The cooperation model established between Ankara and London also integrates Türkiye into the European fighter aircraft supply chain.
Despite repeated efforts during the previous year to join various global supply networks, Turkey had not secured full operational entry into Western fighter production chains. Israeli lobbying had been particularly effective in limiting Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 program and its associated supply chain. Israel’s concern was not limited to air parity or the risk of fifth generation capability in Turkish hands. It also reflected the broader scientific and technological benefits that F-35 integration could have provided to the Kaan program.
Under the core provisions of the agreement, a comprehensive Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul center for Typhoon airframes, engines, and avionics will be established at Turkey’s 1st Air Maintenance Facility in Eskişehir. This development transforms Türkiye from a buyer of advanced weapons into a strategic partner responsible for sustaining and upgrading European air power. The arrangement creates mutual interdependence through military and economic ties mediated by Britain. Human capital development is equally important. Britain has extensive experience in professional military training.
The training of 10 Turkish instructor pilots and approximately 100 technicians in the United Kingdom will create a new cadre of highly skilled personnel within the Turkish Air Force. Through this defense industrial deepening, Türkiye aims to move beyond its existing strength in unmanned aerial systems and become a regional and European hub for more sophisticated platforms, especially fighter aircraft. This evolution raises the profile of Turkish defense industries and makes Ankara an indispensable partner for European states seeking cost effective, reliable, and politically trustworthy alternatives that do not require complete dependence on the United States.
In this sense, the 2026 Iran war served as a strategic gateway for Türkiye. It enabled Ankara to demonstrate its growing defense industrial and military capabilities to Britain, to assert its intention to redefine relations with the Western world without exclusive reliance on the United States, and to open a new chapter in Turkish European relations in which Britain plays a leading role.
The Tayfun Intercontinental Ballistic Missile: Deterrence Against an Existential Threat
The unveiling of the Tayfun intercontinental ballistic missile, with an announced range of approximately 6,000 kilometers, by the Turkish Defense Minister at the SAHA 2026 exhibition generated significant concern in the Western world, particularly in Israel. To understand the significance of this development, it is necessary to examine why ballistic missiles have gained such prominence in Turkey’s defense strategy despite the country’s membership in NATO and its position under the Alliance’s missile defense architecture.
For years, Türkiye closely monitored Iran’s rapid progress in missile and drone capabilities. Yet Ankara did not initially perceive an urgent need for an advanced national ballistic missile program because it relied on Western security guarantees, NATO membership, the NATO missile defense system, and its fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft. The turning point came after the events of October 7, the subsequent 12-day war, and especially the 2026 Iran war. These conflicts revealed the strategic and operational importance of accurate, high impact missile strikes and encouraged Türkiye to accelerate indigenous ballistic missile development.
With a reported range of 6,000 kilometers, Tayfun places Israel and the wider Middle East within reach. In doing so, Turkey appears to be adapting, with considerable ambition, elements of the deterrence model that Iran has pursued in the missile domain. Amid intense rhetorical escalation, including personal mockery of President Erdoğan by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the missile’s public presentation delivered a clear message to Tel Aviv: any action against Turkish interests would entail significant strategic costs.
Turkish defense officials have repeatedly emphasized that the Tayfun project is a wholly national endeavor with no connection to NATO. This claim is strategically significant. It signals Türkiye’s pursuit of autonomous deterrence and sends a message to both NATO and the European Union. If Alliance security guarantees weaken, particularly in light of Türkiye’s increasing isolation over Syria and Iran, Ankara intends to retain the capacity to defend itself through the highest available level of deterrence. Turkey must still manage the gap between symbolic demonstration and operational reality.
Turkish authorities eventually acknowledged that the Tayfun missile is not yet a fully tested operational system and that the widely circulated promotional video depicting a hypothetical strike on the United States was generated with artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, the political objective was achieved. By publicly presenting the system, Turkey positioned itself, at least declaratively, within the restricted group of states that claim intercontinental ballistic missile capability. This has increased Ankara’s perceived geopolitical weight and bargaining power.
In sum, the Tayfun project has become a central pillar of Türkiye’s broader strategy to reduce dependence on external security providers and to project an image of self reliant strategic maturity in an increasingly unstable international environment.
Strategic Triangulation: Managing the Fractured Relationship with Washington
Turkey’s pursuit of a comprehensive strategic partnership with the United Kingdom is closely connected to the continuing crisis in Turkish American relations. Ankara appears increasingly dissatisfied with repeated alignment with United States policies and with the concessions it has made in pursuit of American support, particularly under the current Trump administration. In response, Türkiye is seeking an alternative partner that retains the diplomatic memory and institutional depth of a former global hegemon.
By visibly cultivating Britain as a robust alternative, Türkiye strengthens its negotiating position with Washington on unresolved disputes. These include possible reentry into the F-35 program and the management of issues related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the People’s Defense Units. Ankara’s message is clear: the United States no longer holds a monopoly over the management of international and regional crises. It is noteworthy that Washington expressed interest in Turkey’s return to the F-35 project only after Ankara had significantly deepened its defense and strategic cooperation with London. This sequence illustrates the effectiveness of Türkiye’s diplomatic timing.
Türkiye’s current foreign policy is therefore encouraging the emergence of a new pole within the broader Western bloc. This alternative Anglo-Saxon axis, centered on the partnership between London and Ankara, may operate with considerable autonomy from Washington while also functioning as a bridge to continental Europe through defense industrial cooperation. Türkiye is not abandoning the West. Rather, it is repositioning itself within it. Ankara is shifting from a peripheral actor dependent on United States security guarantees to a pivotal actor capable of shaping intra Western dynamics in its own favor. This is a sophisticated hedging strategy designed to maximize strategic autonomy while preserving access to Western technology, markets, and political capital.
How Iran Changed Turkish Foreign Policy and Pushed It toward Militarization
The 2026 war among Iran, Israel, and the United States produced major shifts in the military and defense policies of several countries. Türkiye was no exception. The conflict transformed Ankara from a concerned observer, limited largely to monitoring developments or attempting mediation, into a more purposeful and order shaping actor. The flight of Iranian missiles over Turkish territory delivered a direct message to Ankara. Neither the Russian S 400 systems nor the NATO defensive umbrella, despite neutralizing some projectiles, could fully prevent threats from penetrating Turkish airspace. This experience produced a fundamental shift in the thinking of Türkiye’s political and military elites. They concluded that Iran’s defeat would not automatically strengthen Turkey’s security. Instead, it could leave Ankara exposed as Israel’s next strategic target.
This new sense of vulnerability contributed to the telephone conversation between President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Starmer on 7 March, followed by the executive agreement for the acquisition of Typhoon fighter aircraft. In practical terms, the war elevated Britain from a defense industrial partner to an informal security guarantor. London, less exposed than Washington to the volatility of United States domestic politics, committed itself to addressing critical gaps in Türkiye’s air defense posture that NATO had failed to fill.
The 2026 Iran war also accelerated Türkiye’s adoption of armed asymmetric neutrality. This posture was reflected in the development of the Yıldırım Khan intercontinental ballistic missile and in the signing of defense contracts valued at 8 billion dollars at SAHA 2026. By refusing to join the naval blockade of Iran led by the United States, Turkey demonstrated that Western security architecture was no longer monolithic. This strategic defiance paradoxically became an asset. It attracted customers in Europe and Asia seeking alternatives to Western weapons that may prove unreliable, politically conditional, or rapidly depleted during major conflicts.
The unveiling of a 6,000-kilometer range missile was therefore not merely a technical achievement. It was a calculated political gesture. Rather than depending entirely on fragile security guarantees from an unstable alliance environment, Türkiye has chosen to invest in independent deterrence and strategic autonomy in defense and military affairs. For Türkiye, the 2026 Iran war became a paradoxical blessing. It brought direct security threats closer to Turkish borders, but it also shattered the existing regional security order and created a market for Ankara’s emerging doctrine of security exports and strategic nonalignment. The conflict gave Türkiye both the necessity and the opportunity to accelerate its transformation into an autonomous defense actor capable of reshaping regional and extra regional balances.
Conclusion
Türkiye is currently pursuing a form of neo-Gaullism by adapting the strategic autonomy doctrine originally associated with Charles de Gaulle. Ankara has repeatedly attempted to refine this approach across different periods of its foreign policy. With British support, a new opportunity has opened for this doctrine to assume a more assertive form, emerging directly from Turkey’s increasingly militarized foreign policy. The ultimate objective is to break out of Ankara’s growing isolation within NATO and to establish Türkiye as an indispensable actor in Europe’s emerging security architecture. Several issues require careful attention. A central question is whether the 6,000-kilometer range attributed to the Tayfun intercontinental ballistic missile is intended purely for conventional deterrence or whether it also signals interest in nuclear latency. Türkiye’s nuclear ambitions, while more cautiously managed than Iran’s, should not be dismissed. Any possibility of British assistance in advancing Turkish nuclear capability would need to be assessed with great caution and in light of nonproliferation constraints.
The emergence of an informal Anglo Turkish axis also carries two possible implications for the Atlantic Alliance. It may strengthen NATO by adding new capabilities and reinforcing European defense production. Conversely, it may encourage the formation of a rival bloc within the Alliance and complicate consensus building and decision making.
The next stages of Türkiye’s European strategy, beginning with Britain, will need to be completed in Paris and Berlin. It remains to be seen how France and Germany will respond to the deepening partnership between London and Ankara. The high-level meetings and the strategic partnership agreement with the United Kingdom represent two sides of the same strategic logic. Türkiye seeks national security through greater strategic independence while also building new and unconventional alliances. Within this framework, Ankara is attempting to transcend the limitations of conventional Western alignments and to position itself as a pivotal actor capable of reshaping European security dynamics on its own terms.
The 2026 Iran war had a profound and lasting effect on the architecture of alliances, coalitions, and bloc formations at both regional and international levels. In the Arab world, the conflict accelerated existing fragmentation, including the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from OPEC, and exposed deep divergences among Arab states, particularly between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It also intensified tensions between key NATO and European Union members and the United States. Türkiye, long skilled at exploiting regional and international opportunities, divisions, and contradictions, again demonstrated its capacity to operate effectively in such an environment. Although the war imposed tangible costs on Ankara, including higher domestic inflation and a severe energy crisis, it also created significant strategic opportunities. These developments have given Turkish foreign policy a distinctly new character: the militarization of Türkiye’s foreign policy.
Citations
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Cover image credits: Burak Başgöze via Unsplash. For illustrative purposes only.
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About the author: Mohammad Ali Fallahi is an International Relations scholar and researcher at the Iran-China Strategic Study Institute and the Iran Chamber of Commerce. His expertise spans geopolitical risk analysis, geoeconomics, and China-Middle East relations. He holds an M.A. in International Relations from Tarbiat Modares University and has published extensively on Turkish foreign policy and regional diplomacy in journals such as the Journal of Middle East Studies.