Ecaterina MAȚOI
Disclaimer: All data and analysis presented herein are current as of March 17, 2026, the date on which research for this article was finalized.
1. Introducere
In primele doua luni ale anului 2026, Statele Unite (SUA), sub conducerea presedintelui Donald J. Trump, l-au arestat si incarcerat pe presedintele Venezuelei, Nicolás Maduro, care supravegheaza cele mai mari rezerve de petrol brut din lume, si l-au asasinat, alaturi de Israel, pe liderul suprem al Iranului, Ali Khamenei., o țară care deține a doua cea mai mare rezervă dovedită de gaze naturale din lume și a treia cea mai mare rezervă de petrol, care, în ciuda competiției geopolitice, nu a invadat militar nicio țară de cel puțin un secol. Rapoartele sugerează existența unor contacte diplomatice anterioare, deși solicitările unilaterale de supunere cu greu pot fi considerate propuneri de negociere.
28 Februarieth, în 2026, Statele Unite, împreună cu Israelul, au inițiat campanii de bombardament pe teritoriul iranian, vizând atât infrastructură militară, cât și, potrivit relatărilor, infrastructură civilă, precum și alte obiective neintenționate. Este utilizat un limbaj sofisticat pentru a descrie atrocitățile într-un mod care le reduce amploarea și semnificația (Stewart & Ali, 2026), cum ar fi bombardarea unei școli din Iran (UNOHCHR Iranian School Bombing, 2026), care ar fi dus la moartea a 165 de eleve: articolul de presă citat invocă bune intenții, presupusa proximitate față de facilități ale Corpului Gărzilor Revoluționare Iraniene și sugerează apariția unor „noi dovezi” care ar putea „să exonereze Statele Unite de responsabilitate și să indice o altă parte responsabilă” (Stewart & Ali, 2026), deși investigațiile preliminare indică o posibilă responsabilitate a SUA.
Iată traducerea în limba română a propoziției tale: Costul uman al conflictului, care depășește datele limitate furnizate în rapoartele militare oficiale, crește în Iran, Liban, Israel și statele arabe din Golful Persic. Această escaladare are loc în paralel cu extinderea geografică a protestelor și a violenței intercomunitare, care acum s‑a extins și în state precum Pakistan și India.
Iran’s retaliation included strikes on American bases in surrounding countries, that resulted in perturbation or destruction of civilian infrastructure, such as airports, hospitality facilities, energy or water desalination assets, besides American military assets. Additionally, persons were killed or injured by debris and shrapnel. The US security umbrella stretching across the Persian Gulf Arab states turned into a potential liability, this conflict emphasizing the importance of prioritization within partnerships. The fluid trajectory of regional peace, that was supposed to result from initiatives like Abraham Accords, appears to be impacted by higher-order priorities such as Greater Israel project, and the American necessity to reinstate control over global energy flows, impacting macro-projects such as Persian Gulf Arab monarchies’ transition to post-oil economies.
While acknowledging that hostilities are ongoing at the time of this study, the unilateral nature of reports on the conflict is reflected by their scope and numbers. Military reports and forecasts are focusing on casualties and whether these are military or civilian, strikes and associated statistics, damage assessment, weapons deployment, stocks and availability.The economic impact of the war on Iran is associated to oil prices, and analyzes scenarios such as a blocked Strait of Hormuz. It fails to identify the similarity between Europe’s energy strain in the aftermath of Ukraine’s invasion by Russian Federation, and Eastern Asian drift towards limited oil and gas supplies: India, China, Japan and South East Asia represent largest importers of largest energy suppliers in the world, i.e. Persian Gulf Arab countries and Iran.
The purported “imminent” threat shifted at declarative level after first days of US and Israeli attack on Iran, being replaced by the recurrent theme of regime change. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decades-long argument against Iran’s theocratic system erodes, the regional geopolitical calculus and power balance depend on the competition between the US and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), that has reached a potentially critical phase due to several structural factors: nationalization waves, poor competitiveness of shale oil and gas due to production costs, dollar’s eroding position as reserve currency and in financial transactions for hydrocarbon energy, and the failure of traditional powers to transition to a post-carbon era in an orderly manner.
Utilizing a framework reflective of contemporary international cooperation variables—namely the five pillars of the Global Cooperation Barometer 2026—this study aims to achieve two objectives: first, to identify which fields of global cooperation are disrupted by the March 2026 conflict; and second, to analyze the conflict’s specific impact on economic, geopolitical, and military dynamics regionally and globally.
This analytical approach is necessitated by a fundamental tension in contemporary international relations: Washington’s gradual replacement of global leadership by example with a unilateral pursuit of national interest. Yet, despite this shift, international cooperation remains anchored in globalization and re-globalization processes, albeit in various forms and at different speeds. Consequently, the pillars of global cooperation as defined by World Economic Forum (WEF) and McKinsey & Company in the latest Global Cooperation Barometer (2026) have been selected as an exhaustive set of domains (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026) potentially impacted by the US/Israel–Iran armed confrontation. The selection of this particular framework is further justified by its distinct departure from classical theoretical categorizations.
Unlike traditional models that focus either on institutions or on interstate competition, the WEF’s pillars reflect a contemporary and representative structure expressly designed to emphasize the interconnectedness of the global economy. This architecture offers a significant analytical advantage: it assesses global cooperation with less dependency on any particular national strategy, thereby providing a more neutral and comprehensive lens through which to evaluate the multifaceted disruptions caused by the conflict.
2. Analytical framework: the Pillars and International Relations Theory
2.1 Impact dimensions (categorization criteria)
The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 consists of five pillars, representative for global development and cooperation, and dependent on cooperative efforts. The defined pillars of global cooperation are: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and wellness, peace and security (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026, pp. 5-6).
The authors identified in 2026 barometer that innovation and technology cooperation increased, and while climate and natural capital cooperation expanded, it fell short of expectations. Trade and capital cooperation registered a modest growth, as health and wellness decreased moderately. The pillar that registered “sharp” regress was peace and security cooperation, main indicators considered being escalation of conflicts, increasing military spending, and burdened international conflict resolution mechanisms. The Barometer identifies trends such as cooperation along alignment lines, “minilateralism” in the sense of limited cooperation when compared to a single multilateral system and market, and the need to develop new capacities, as well as forums that match issues (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026, pp. 4-27).
Particularly trade and capital are relevant in the context of US endeavors to reassert renewed influence over global economy, while the latest conflict from Iran and wider region emerged reportedly amid a deteriorating peace and security landscape at global level. Both pillars reflect macro-trends such as the rise of far-right politics and economic protectionism, particularly in Western states, and the results of a prolonged war in Ukraine.
2.2 Structural realism and the five global cooperation pillars
Explanatory theories of international relations are correlated with both empirical data and multiple fundamental principles of international relations. Selecting realism as lens for this research enables the characterization of relative power balance and dynamics. Particularly structural realism (Mearsheimer, 2013) matches analyzed case, since the framework ignores cultural differences among states, assuming that the international cooperation system creates similar incentives for all great powers.
Empirical data confirms that, in attacking Iran, the US ignores or overlooks various political and cultural differences, literature describing this action framework as unilateralism. An assessment of US policy towards Iran as consequent in the last two decades implies defining the policy as unstable and increasingly coercive. The American and Israeli policy of assassinating various leaders, in what is called a non-war, or a special operation, carried out against another’s state officials, was met with a completely different political and cultural response by Iran’s former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who reportedly refused special protection (Eslami, 2026) and became a martyr in the Shi’a Islamic and Iranian political tradition.
From a political culture perspective, the hegemonic attitude the US displayed in this conflict is consistent with structural realist power maximization assumption, but various countries questioned it, revealing additional political culture differences. Oman, as a mediator in the so-called diplomatic negotiation between the US and Iran prior to the attack, called the war imposed on Iran by the US and Israel as “immoral and illegal” (MEMO Oman, 2026), Spain catalogued it as “unjustifiable” and “dangerous” (European Interest, 2026), while Swiss Defense Minister reportedly declared that the American-Israeli attacks on Iran breached international law, alongside Iran (Reuters CH, 2026).
The adoption of structural-realist approaches in trade and capital cooperation by the US administration is reflected in the prioritization of relative gains, and geopolitical securitization rather than economic co-development. Measures reflecting this dynamic include successive waves of tariffs and sanctions, the dismantlement of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, and the more recent bid to impose unprecedented control over world’s hydrocarbon economy at any political cost.
Structural realists claim that great powers are the main actors in an anarchic system, they compete for survival, while possessing military power, are generally not certain about others’ intentions, and act as rational actors. Structural realism is particularly relevant in the assessment of American actions along three pillars: trade and capital, innovation and technology, and peace and security. The lack of neorealist theoretical support in assessing key cooperation pillars such as climate and natural capital, and health and wellness, will be emphasized upon, contextualized and complemented throughout the study.
3.The five pillars under pressure
Throughout the 1990s, a US-led unipolar world managed to accommodate both national instruments of power, and a rules-based international cooperation that was pursuing globalism. Subsequently, various rifts and conflicting interests emerged, fracturing the international community along old and new lines of interest, and transforming the US from uncontested hegemon to competing actor. The contemporary geopolitical architecture, and the relevance of the five global cooperation pillars, resulted from a sinuous development of realist competition among states, and a relentless strive to pacify the globe by defenders of peace, justice, human rights, and related universal human values and aspirations. Consequently, a structural-realist assessment of impact along the five global cooperation pillars is considered relevant for both main approaches to international relations..
Challenging the assumption that the new tariffs-based world order entails more components. First and first most, the question whether the path selected is a reiteration of American 20th century, power, and historically, slightly upgraded approaches to new global challenges have hardly defined history when compared to progress and innovation. Secondly, US trade imbalance is entangled with many other power instruments, like debt market and military guarantees, among others. While insisting on current account may represent a solution, there are many other solutions that a financial superpower can utilize in order to re-balance global economic relations, a classical one being inflation.
3.3 Pillar trade and capital
There are at least two geopolitical components related to trade flows considered in this research: traded goods and dynamics in development of trade routes.
The most traded commodity on the planet by value in 2024 was crude petroleum ($ 1.31 trillion), with refined petroleum ($ 890 billion) on the 4th position and petroleum gas ($ 489 billion) on the 8th position (oec.world, 2026). While the US shares the second place alongside the Russian Federation as exporters of crude petroleum (each with $ 124 bln.), behind the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it is also world’s second largest importer with $ 167 bln., hence a trader and net importer of this commodity.
In figure 1, the flow of crude petroleum (HS4 code 27.09 according to Harmonized System 17), refined petroleum (HS4 27.10) and petroleum gas (HS4 27.11) from Persian Gulf Arab countries to major importers is presented alongside secondary hydrocarbon flow data, based on oec.world database entries. The graphic representation tool Sankeymatic (Sankeymatic, 2026) has been utilized to design the transfers, in billions of $ (USD). All transfers with values less than $ 0.1 bln. have been assigned as transfers to the category “Other”.
The database does not include conclusive data on Iran’s hydrocarbon exports, hence it was not included in the representation. Reports estimate that Iran’s crude petroleum output was slightly higher than that of Kuwait in Q1 2025, based on US Energy Information Administration data (Conte & Diederichs, 2026). Likewise, Iran’s exports of are assumed to be less than one tenth of Qatar’s exports, although reserves are comparable. Bahrain exported a limited amount of refined petroleum in 2024, with relatively insignificant impact on selected importing countries and was thus not included.
Considering this data representative for the situation before attacking Iran, Fig. 1 confirms that all Persian Gulf Arab countries exported their hydrocarbon resources mainly to Asian countries: the exports of the three considered commodities to countries other than the ones specifically mentioned, is slightly higher but comparable to China’s imports from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq. The total value of transactions (export/import) from Fig. 1 is $ 640.32 bln., hence almost a quarter from total global transactions with considered commodities.
China, world’s largest importer of crude petroleum and petroleum gas, is the main destination of Persian Gulf deliveries, followed by India, Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.
Although the US increased its production of oil and gas in recent years, its interest to impose control over world’s largest resources like the ones from Venezuela and Iran, was not maintained as secret, US Senator Lindsay Grahamam reportedly declaring that this would be to the detriment of China (MEE Staff, 2026). Washington’s structural-realist approach to global hydrocarbon trade, and the bid to control China’s supply with oil and gas, are also confirmed by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s recent “big ask for China”, to buy less oil from Russia and more from the US (Wei & Bade, 2026), and fundamentally accept US control of its energy supply.
The US influence over hydrocarbon trade contracted gradually in the past century, and the direct routes between Persian Gulf Arab countries and Asia were probably considered acceptable as long as transactions were carried out in USD. However, the gradual switch to Saudi-Chinese currency swaps, and Emirati sales of energy in Chinese Renminbi erode dollar’s intermediary and control role, with potential impact the entire American financial system.
The attack on Iran and prospects of US control over Iranian oil may relate to Israel’s security concerns, but is emerged also amid a gradual de-dollarization trend that spans from China to all sides of the Persian Gulf.
From a trade perspective, the interruption of oil and gas transactions between the Persian Gulf and Asia impacts minimally US economy, compared to impact on Asia’s energy supply, although American companies may suffer losses. However, the prospect of long-term non-dollar energy transactions with large economic powerhouses like China, India, Japan, ROK, and the rise of economies such as Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand, may have security implications for the US economic and financial dominance in decades to come.
In Fig. 1, the refined petroleum trade flows from Persian Gulf Arab states are directed to countries other than Asian main importers of crude petroleum and gas. Hence, strategic markets such as Europe and Africa, receiving refined petroleum, become increasingly impacted by a potential blockade of Hormuz Strait, and to a potential change in power balance should the US manage to install a puppet regime in Iran, or balkanize it and instate hegemonic rule over this waterway.
In terms of trade, trade security, and the sticks and carrots approach to an envisioned containment of China, Iran’s role in the development of alternative trade routes has increased in recent years. India’s Chabahar Port agreement, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the first significant commercial freight train connecting Iran and China, announced in May 2025, signalize an accelerated transition to economic development outside the dollar financial system.
The fundamental significance of attempts to change power balance in the Persian Gulf is also reflected by the prompt reaction of riparian states, that responded with a potential review of investment commitments, in the range of trillions of dollars, in order to cope with financial strains caused by the attack of Iran, and latter’s response (Kerr & England, 2026).
Consequently, the attack of Iran does not only impact Iran and its neighbors, or the price of oil and financial/stock market indexes, but major global and fundamental economic dynamics, with security implications. The cooperation in trade and finance has thus become directly conditioned by the evolution of war on Iran, and indirectly from a looming struggle to control China’s energy supplies, in this case from the Persian Gulf.
3.2. Pillar innovation and technology
The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 analyzes parameters such as international students, cross-border data flows, or IT goods and services trade (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026, p. 15). Despite challenges in advancing projects such as India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC), the Persian Gulf region had accelerated the adoption of technology before the conflict, aiming to transition towards non-oil economies. The deployment of capital by regional countries aimed at attracting both talent and companies investing in cutting-edge technology, and at developing own competitive technologies.
As a key meeting point among continents, Middle East hosted major submarine fiber-optic cables, worth billions of dollars and transmitting significant daily amounts of data. In the global Artificial Intelligence (AI) race, hydrocarbon-rich countries, particularly the ones with low extraction costs such as Persian Gulf monarchies, qualify as competitive actors due to energy capacity and availability, a major factor in AI computing. The project Stargate UAE, launched in May 2025, united Emirati G42 with powerhouses Oracle, NVidia, Oracle, Cisco in building a 1 GW computing cluster in Abu Dhabi (G42, 2025). Advantageous energy environment attracted investments and partnerships with OpenAI, Microsoft, Google and Amazon Web Services (AWS). Other partnerships, in the military field, are not considered in this section.
As the tit-for-fat escalation develops, reports confirmed that three AWS data centers from the UAE and Bahrain were struck by Iranian drones and missiles (Kahn, 2026)
. Furthermore, the interruption of air traffic, and security breaches resulting in casualties, raise questions related to host state’s capacity to offer a long-term stable and peaceful environment for technological development and innovation.
In the escalation spiral, the attack of high-value critical technological infrastructure has turned from plan to action on both sides. The set of guarantees offered to technology companies in these cases, included indigenous and American deterrence. Precedents set in the war, from this perspective follow two directions: critical infrastructure targeted includes technology corporations, whose activities became increasingly intertwined with security and war, and the failure of American deterrent to protect very high-value assets abroad despite significant agreements with hosting countries, and largest military budgets. In the broader great power competition, the impact of this war on technological and innovation cooperation, irrespective of outcome, has the potential to lead to a revision of partnership and investment models.
3.3 Pillar peace and security
At global level, cooperation on peace and security was negatively impacted by indexes such as ratio of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to conflicts, ratio of multilateral peacekeeping operations to conflicts, or forcibly displaced people, among others (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026, p. 24). Middle East’s security architecture has been particularly fragile long before March 2026.
Besides the conflict from Occupied Palestinian Territory, that represented for almost half of century a core element of Iran’s regional policy, relatively large and complex wars took place in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The oil business gradually transformed for the US in a financial and military cooperation, resulting, besides the unwavering support for Israel, in an American infrastructure of military bases equated to a security umbrella, to which oil powerhouses contributed with base accommodation and unmatched expenses for military equipment. The projected unbreakable security paradigm based on US guarantees and traditional military power was complemented by proxy-war elements.
With the Russian Federation fading as a major arms exporter, the US and European partners dominate arms sales in the Middle East. The US is by far the largest arms exporter in the world, with reported record sales amounting $ 318.7 bln. in 2024 (Clapp, 2025). For the period 2021 – 2025, the US held a 42 % share of global arms exports according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (George, Djokic, Hussain, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2026). Considering that the second major exporter has a market share of less than 10 % for the same period, US arms exports significantly dominate the global market.
For the period 2021 – 2025, SIPRI lists Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain among the top 30 arms importers. In Fig. 2, the flow of arms from major suppliers to selected importers is represented as percentage from total arms flows at global level, based on data from SIPRI report (George, Djokic, Hussain, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2026)
, with Sankeymatic tool (Sankeymatic, 2026).
Besides the increasing conflict potential determined by the amassment of weapons in relatively small countries, with small populations, the disconnect between hydrocarbon trade partnerships and arms transfers becomes obvious: although oil and gas trade originating in the Persian Gulf migrated to Asia, this region’s foreign military bases and weapons infrastructure remained strongly connected to the US. The classical security architecture remained dominant before the conflict, although a major strategic shift was noticed in September 2025, when KSA signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, in the aftermath of Israeli attack on Doha.
The peace and security pillar fully fractured with the American-Israeli attack on Iran, and the Iranian response, that entailed systematic bombing of US bases and gathering points across, the region, of Israel, and of host countries’ infrastructure considered to be related to US power projection mechanisms. Multidimensional security of Arab states from the Persian Gulf was infringed not only by the attacks themselves and a blocked Hormuz Strait, but the broken paradigm of US deterrent’s sufficiency in maintaining regional peace and security. As in the case of Soviet Union’s fall, that had been considered a final outcome and sufficient to allow Western block’s expansion in Ukraine and Central Asia but resulted in renewed conflict, breakthroughs in Iraq, Syria, and partially Lebanon, and the decimation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, were considered a partial outcome in weakening Iran, towards the final outcome of defeating it.
The data presented above hints at a fundamental and uninterrupted conflict, and prevalence of a realist, combative, perspective over cooperation frameworks: the attack on Iran matches a power-maximization agenda and not the development of a regional pacification agenda that accommodates cooperation and visions. This distinction is confirmed by the fluid but yet exogenous reasons provided by Washington as reasons for the attack, as well as its new geopolitical and military posture.
While the US deepens into a costly and unpopular war, Iran insisted on expanding the area of hostilities, overstretching US forces and testing its alliances. Tehran’s strategy increases pressure on the US internally and internationally, with the aim of ending the conflict in favorable terms, a situation that the US faced in Afghanistan as well, although in a completely different context.
From a geopolitical perspective, the attack on Iran by the US and Israel provides at least temporary cover for Tel Aviv’s territorial expansion, carried out mainly in the form of security corridors in the Gaza Strip, Syria and more recently Lebanon.
3.4 Pillar climate and natural capital
Prior to the conflict, Saudi Vision 2030, UAE Centennial 2071, as well as Net Zero 2050 international initiative to switch from fossil fuel to renewable energies represented a cornerstone of regional economies’ transformation into environmentally-sustainable ecosystems. Furthermore, investments in Africa’s renewable capacity were also financed by Persian Gulf monarchies.
While the attack on renewable energy infrastructure is limited, there are secondary order implications for climate change. The US military had been already world’s largest institutional consumer of hydrocarbon, and a leading greenhouse gas emitter (Mallinder, 2023). The billions of dollars in costs related to bombing Iran (Walsh, 2026) (BD-Pratidin, 2026) entail significant amounts of fossil fuel. Furthermore, the security chokepoint created disincentivizes petroleum and gas exporters to pursue strict decarbonization policies. Instead, OPEC members are pushed towards maintaining focus on hydrocarbon due to at least two reasons. If the US pursued oil and gas in Venezuela and Iran, then the importance of these assets is central to geopolitical calculus, assuming that the US influences significantly the future power balance. Secondly, hydrocarbon becomes a central security variable, instead of energy source, hence essential for Persin Gulf states’ survival.
Indexes such as “terrestrial protected area”, “marine protected area” or “ocean health index” (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026) are negatively impacted by hostilities. Persian Gulf waters, increasingly used for desalination plants, are directly polluted by ordinance, intensified operations, and sunken ships.
Although not natural capital, the destruction of world heritage sites and monuments by US and Israeli bombs was comprehensively documented by reports (Amiri, 2026) (Fassihi, 2026). Despite a vast literature emphasizing on “lessons learned” from Iraq, humanity’s heritage landmarks continue to be destroyed at discretion of hegemonic actors, reconfirming the dominance of structural-realist considerations over international institutionalism and law. Bombing of sites such as Khorramabad Valley, providing evidence of human occupation dating 63’000 Before the Common Era (BCE), palaces and castles, that recorded human history the Persians and other nations built for millennia, deprives entire humanity of the right to experience key parts of universal heritage, and increases the risk of replacing historic reality with invented history, a scenario that moderna propaganda and AI could support.
3.5 Pillar health and wellness
Beyond significant challenges the global health cooperation had to overcome during the COVIF-19 pandemic, health and wellness of large populations is being increasingly affected by a rearming race, at least indirectly.
Iran alone reportedly welcomed approximately one million foreign patients annually in recent years (TV BRICS, 2025), seeking treatments such as cardiac care, ophthalmology, infertility treatment, orthopedic and cosmetic surgery (Medical Tourism, 2026). This destination offers, according to cited reports, advantageous prices and innovative treatments. Furthermore, Persian Gulf Arab states also increased investment in premium wellness, high-tech medicine and are expecting an increase in tourism to capitalize on this strategic expenditure (Domat, 2025).
Prior to the conflict, Iran and many other regional countries had hosted a significant number of refugees, at the limit of survival and economic liability. Any burden on this fragile balance impacts directly the livelihoods and survivability of millions of refugees. As the UAE and competing regional ports and airports emerged as key global gateways for passengers and commodities, service interruptions due to the war affect normal travelers and their health, medical and emergency transport, as well as the delivery of medicine through the affected transit hubs.
There are reports claiming a higher number of victims, but the source selected reports that over 1’200 persons have been killed by American and Israeli bombings, from which 30 % were children (Abushamala, 2026). Additionally, more than 10’000 were reportedly wounded in the first week of the conflict. Israel reported As of March 12th, 2026, a death toll of 14, with additional 2’745 wounded, from which 85 were still hospitalized and 11 of them in serious conditions (Arnaout, 2026). A lower but yet equally tragic number of victims has been registered in neighboring countries, resulting either directly or indirectly from Iranian retaliation on what it called American targets: Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (AJ Labs, 2026).
As of March 14th, 2026, Israel reportedly killed 12 medical workers, including doctors, in the Lebanese village Burj Qalawiyah (AFP in The Sun, 2026), in a continuation of March 2025 acts that Amnesty International demanded to be investigated as war crimes (Amnesty International, 2025).
Dangerous precedents set in this conflict include the attack on desalination plants initially in Iran, and then as retaliation by Iran (Nereim, 2026). The breach of health and wellness of civilians on a wider scale includes, besides victims and interdiction of basic supplies such as water, unpreventable threats to civilian life: US Central Military Command (CENTCOM) informing that it “cannot guarantee” civilian safety in or near Iranian military facilities (Sio, 2026) equates to an apology in advance for civilian casualties that, even if informed, do not have the resources and the means to disengage, since secret military bases are clearly not identified by government for the surrounding civilians.
A stark contrast emerges between Western and Iranian narratives concerning the Iranian women’s football team. Western media portray Australia’s asylum grant as humanitarian, while Iran’s football authorities have responded with accusations of kidnapping (AFP in Al-Monitor, 2026).This incident acquires particular salience given historical extrajudicial interventions by US- and UK-aligned Commonwealth states. Although no direct causality is asserted, the psychological impact of such episodes during active conflict should not be underestimated. Reports that a player’s text message to the Iranian Embassy revealed the team’s location raise a fundamental question: why was the team’s whereabouts unknown to Iranian officials prior to that communication?
Consequently, the health and wellness of civilians is affected, besides material, direct and indirect impact, by psychological warfare, false flags and similar operations. Structural realism fails fundamentally in addressing human aspects of wars, in considering states as main actors of international relations. This flaw is reflected by the realist confrontation from Iran, which prioritizes the maximization of power and material assets, with a decreasing consideration of human factor, which itself represents a factor as real as material assets contributing to power.
4. The emergence of a new regional order
4.1. The “minilateral” shift
The structural-realist analysis of the American-Israeli attack on Iran, framed by the Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 pillars, confirms the accelerating fragmentation of the international order. Although all cooperation domains are affected, trade and capital, together with peace and security, reveal the most consequential divergences in the post-US-controlled petroleum era. Two dynamics are particularly salient: first, the dollar-based financial system, which disproportionately advantaged US hegemony while benefiting the global economy, faces unprecedented strain; second, the conflict has exposed a widening chasm between petroleum-trading relationships and the parallel structures of finance and arms transfers.
The Barometer identifies the emergence of “smaller and more adaptive cooperative coalitions”, a dynamic called “minilateralism” or “plurilateralism” (WEF and McKinsey & Company, 2026, p. 7). The latter two terms are both alternative to American unilateralism, and the global cooperation frameworks such as the United Nations.
The assumption that the US envisions a prolonged domination through the traditional combination of soft and hard power has been discarded by the US President himself, through initiatives such as the “Peace Board”. In an empirical assessment, while the world expects the US to follow and develop the peace rules it championed, the US is contesting them and attempts to replace them with more favorable terms, even by force. There is no comparison between Russian invasion of Ukraine and American-Israeli attack on Iran whatsoever, but it must be emphasized that at a quarter of century since the Fall of Berlin’s Wall, both hegemons of the Cold War find themselves entangled in unilaterally-non-declared wars: the Russian Federation with its neighbor, and the US with the contestant of its power claims since 1979 and the survivor of numerous coup attempts, among which the 1953 successful coup against Prime Minister Mosaddegh remains an iconic instance of American unconventional domination bid.
While anarchy is a given in the structural-realist explanatory framework, certain variables of this anarchy and relative advantages of powers in the global competition become clear in the context of war imposed to Iran. The circular argumentation of attacking Iran includes, among others, the control of oil resources, and the relative US control and posture of material power vis-à-vis China.
While remaining faithful to its legacy of a petroleum neo-empire, the US revolves around the control of major petroleum resources and their flow in major economies. Tailored action and public communication are consistent with this purpose, which is openly declared while hard power is deployed to secure denying China access to hydrocarbon from third countries. The pause/play approach to Russian petroleum exports, and bids to overtake OPEC sovereign petroleum hints that the US might not stop at Iran, should the regime change goal be achieved.
Consequently, both the US and rest of the world pursue a reshuffle of global order, all initiatives aiming to rebuild cooperation paradigms and structures. The deployment of hard power is a clear indication of preceding policies’ failure, but not a guarantee yet. The “minilateral” realignment considers American requests and action to a certain extent, but fundamental transformations in global geopolitics and economy as well. Irrespective of the war on Iran, failures such as overlooking contributions to global progress by African nations or India, among others, and accommodate their strive to peacefully contribute to development, cannot be compensated with bombing campaigns. Likewise, repeated attempts to deconstruct global historical heritage and project superficial identity definitions in the war on the mind, might result in relative gains, but risks alienating both warring parties and relatively weakening them in relation to non-combatants.
The US and Israel might achieve a sort of victory on Iran, depending on the terms and explanatory framework for ending the conflict. However, this war may strengthen cooperation frameworks such as BRICS and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and initiatives such as the Saudi cooperation with Pakistan. “Minilateralism” is clearly a smaller-scale trend, and it does not match a global governance system. However, this argument becomes circular, if a global system did not manage to accommodate at least global majority’s fundamental needs, despite anarchy’s deployment as a confrontation paradigm.
The “minilateral” shift does not interfere with structural-realist power assumptions, but it questions the basis of international cooperation and has the potential to reform global trust, affected by the increasingly-visible rift between commitments and actions, often portrayed as a display of power and mastery of deception.
4.2. Trajectories for the region and scenarios
In terms of cooperation pillars, a global alignment similar to the post-1990 decade becomes less probable in the recent war context, hence cooperation indexes are likely to continue falling. The US will certainly attempt to export anarchy narratives whenever considered suitable for its national interest, and resort to “Wild-West” tactics on the international stage, such as assassinating, arresting, or placing bounties on heads of state, in the name of a self-declared exceptionalism, meant to bring an alleged global progress.
In terms of trade and capital, the US already disconnected from the Persian Gulf in terms of hydrocarbon trade, and only a renewed American bid to overtake further OPEC petroleum and gas assets can rebalance this shift towards Asia. The main difference between bids to overtake Greenland and Iran from a structural-realist perspective may consist in the deterrent European powers displayed at military and diplomatic level, although no victory is definitive. Financial exchanges and investments among the US and Persian Gulf monarchies were identified as replacement for previous hydrocarbon trade, but various dynamics may impact this cooperation as well, irrespective of the war on Iran. Assuming a peaceful region in the aftermath of the war, competing China may resurface as a policy imposed in various forms.
Furthermore, in President Trump’s second term spanning to March 2026, the US bombed, under various pretexts, Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Syria and Iraq (Aljazeera Staff & News Agencies, 2026). Hence, US tendency to attack countries remains a fundamental factor for global and Middle East dynamics.
The gradual shift of trade and financial shift towards Asia emerges as a red line for the US, hence future work may be required to identify if and under which conditions might the US agree to agree with payments for Saudi crude petroleum in Chinese Renminbi or other alternative currencies. Reciprocally, Persian Gulf monarchies are presented with a new economic paradigm in which US assets’ value is impacted by dynamic definitions, inflation and a depreciating US dollar. Furthermore, while the US technology for 5G and AI is competitive, the prices are very high, as are the ones of US military gear. The sensible economic and military balance of this region was strongly impacted by the war on Iran, and a revisionist US attitude, reflected in attempts to build alternative cooperation mechanisms.
The major question is whether the region will remain in the already ongoing state of fragile equilibrium, or it will move towards decoupled blocks. In asking the Russian Federation to deliver petroleum and gas to the world for one month, and China to buy more American petroleum, the US fails to address questions on multilateral global cooperation, peace and security. There are two main factors maintaining Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors in the American sphere of influence, based on the finding from previous chapters: traditional ties, and the dependency on US security in terms of technology and exogenous bases on its territory. However, the unilateral approach to international relations the US appears to have adopted post – JCPOA might outweigh US cooperation incentives, especially when considering the prospect of US hegemony over all significant petroleum and gas sources.
While Israel’s territorial expansion has become a constant in recent years, the prospect of Abraham Accords expansion to include Saudi Arabia remains insignificant. There was no proposal yet to include an envisioned divided Iran in US-aligned cooperation structures, but the endeavor of collapsing Iran has been expressed in various forms. From this perspective, should Iran be hypothetically subdued and an American-Israeli alliance would dominate Iran, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab kingdoms would exchange the encirclement of a Shi’a Crescent with another one.
Consequently, the probability of switching Middle East order from fragile equilibrium to decoupled blocks remain low, in a conservative assessment: it has been traditionally fragile, and the world is arming for confrontation. However, exogenous powers project tension in this region, and major hydrocarbon producers from this region, are with one leg in the Asian industrial revolution and with the other in US military control area. Hence, the implications of the war from Iran greatly exceed declared war goals: the current US administration hypothesizes that an Oil Curtain may secure its future hegemony, and in doing so, it moved to gradually seize control of major resources.
5. Conclusions
This study aimed to identify which global cooperation pillars were affected by the American-Israeli attacks on Iran from February/March 2026, that resulted in a wider regional retaliation. The structural-realist framework represented a consistent analysis loop for American action, and its gap addressing human values, and an established international order, is consistent with Washington’s increasing decoupling from universal values it promoted as a global leader and subsequently hegemon.
The research established that, irrespective whether US indeed considers the control of petroleum and gas reserves as an asset in competing China, it initiated the deployment of hard power in to order to realign countries according to its national interests.
All five pillars identified in the “Global Cooperation Barometer 2026” were negatively impacted by the war against Iran, although the pillar pace and security cooperation had already experienced strong regress. In the pursuit of relative gains, the US stretched its leadership beyond traditional limits, increasingly overlooking potential infringements of human rights, such as the bombing of a school for small girls in Iran, and subsequently announcing that it cannot guarantee civilian security during its campaign from Iran.
According to analyzed data, Persian Gulf Arab states are connected to Asian hydrocarbon markets, which generate revenues for their world-leading public investment funds and governments, whereas the US controls arms deliveries and maintains bases on their territory. Iranian retaliation to American-Israeli strikes from the beginning of 2026, outlined vulnerabilities in the expensive American guarantees offered to partner states, and thus increased the risk of a widening rift between Arab monarchies from the Persian Gulf and Washington, due to the hard stops the intervention determined in revenue, technological development, security, and efforts to peacefully transition to sustainable and competitive economies.
Two potential scenarios have been compared: fragile equilibrium and decoupled blocks. Since the Middle East region is inherently prone to instability, this argument maintains the advantage from a conservative perspective. However, competing initiatives, such as American-Israeli attack on Iran on one hand, and the previous Chinese brokerage of the Iranian-Saudi renewed cooperation on the other hand, emphasize the centrality of this region in global power calculus.
The US-Israeli attack on Iran resulted in a more fragmented, insecure and “minilateral” regional order. Regional states, as well as their cooperation partners, are being forced to navigate a sea of competing frameworks for cooperation, and develop costly strategies, that include more flexibility and resilience to shocks. Furthermore, future cooperation frameworks have to consider the enormous depletion of resources resulting from the large scale and high intensity the conflicts have reached in the 21st century. Global rearming and plans to deploy unprecedented quantities of energy for confrontations do not result only in war casualties and material damage, but flooded or sunken islands and coastlines.
The gravity of the peace and security situation in the Middle East has reached unprecedented levels, as did the US strive to maintain energy trade under its influence at any cost, while China observes. The developments reinforce previous pursuit of new global cooperation frameworks, adapted to the 21st century and to the interaction level between states and individuals that had been achieved.
Abushamala, R. (2026, March 08). Iran says children make up 30% of those killed in US-Israeli attacks. Retrieved from Anadolu Agency: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-children-make-up-30-of-those-killed-in-us-israeli-attacks/3855101
AFP in Al-Monitor. (2026, March 10). Iran women footballers evacuate from safe house in Australia. Retrieved from Al-Monitor: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/03/iran-women-footballers-evacuate-safe-house-australia
AFP in The Sun. (2026, March 14). An Israeli strike killed 12 medical staff at a clinic in southern Lebanon, as Hezbollah’s leader vowed readiness for a long war with Israel. Retrieved from the Sun: https://thesun.my/news/world-news/israeli-strike-kills-12-medics-at-lebanon-clinic/
AJ Labs. (2026, March 01). US-Israel attacks on Iran: Death toll and injuries live tracker. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/us-israel-attacks-on-iran-death-toll-and-injuries-live-tracker
Aljazeera Staff & News Agencies. (2026, February 28). What countries has Trump attacked since returning to office? Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/what-countries-has-trump-attacked-since-returning-to-office
Amiri, F. (2026, March 12). U.S and Israeli strikes are damaging Iranian historical sites. Retrieved from pbs.org: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-and-israeli-strikes-are-damaging-iranian-historical-sites
Amnesty International. (2025, March 05). Lebanon: Israeli attacks on health facilities, ambulances and paramedics must be investigated as war crimes. Retrieved from Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/lebanon-israeli-attacks-on-health-facilities-ambulances-and-paramedics-must-be-investigated-as-war-crimes/
Arnaout, A. R. (2026, March 12). Israel says nearly 2,750 people injured in Iranian attacks since war outbreak. Retrieved from Anadolu Agency: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-says-nearly-2-750-people-injured-in-iranian-attacks-since-war-outbreak/3861327
BD-Pratidin. (2026, March 14). Trump blew $19 billion during US-Israeli war on Iran. Retrieved from Bd-Pratidin: https://en.bd-pratidin.com/international/2026/03/14/58892
Clapp, S. (2025). United States Defense Industrial Base – How does it differ from the European defence technological and industrial base? https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/777967/EPRS_BRI(2025)777967_EN.pdf#:~:text=The%20US%20is%20the%20largest%20arms%20exporter,with%20exports%20to%20Europe%20more%20than%20tripling.: European Parliament Research Service.
Conte, N., & Diederichs, A. (2026, March 03). Charted: Oil Trade Through the Strait of Hormuz by Country. Retrieved from Visual Capitalist: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-oil-trade-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-by-country/
Domat, C. (2025, August 01). The GCC Welcomes Wellness Tourism In Section: GCC Regional Report 2025 Wellness Tourism . Retrieved from Global Finance Magazine: https://digital.gfmag.com/gfdigital/july_august_2025/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=2075421#articleId2075421
Eslami, S. (2026, March 03). Why Iran’s Leader Refused Special Protection, Leading From the Front until Last Breath. Retrieved from Islam Times: https://www.islamtimes.com/en/article/1267392/why-iran-s-leader-refused-special-protection-leading-_________from-the-front-until-last-breath
European Interest. (2026, March 03). Trump threatens to halt trade with Spain after it denied US access to joint bases in the Iran war. Retrieved from European Interest: https://www.europeaninterest.eu/trump-threatens-to-halt-trade-with-spain-after-it-denied-us-access-to-joint-bases-in-the-iran-war/
Fassihi, F. (2026, March 11). Strikes on Iran Damage Cultural Heritage Sites, Infuriating Iranians. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/11/world/middleeast/iran-heritage-sites-damaged.html
G42. (2025, May 22). Global Tech Alliance Launches Stargate UAE. Retrieved from G42: https://www.g42.ai/resources/news/global-tech-alliance-launches-stargate-uae
George, M., Djokic, K., Hussain, Z., Wezeman, P. D., & Wezeman, S. T. (2026). TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2025. Stockholm: SIPRI.
Kahn, J. (2026, March 09). Iran’s attacks on Amazon data centers in UAE, Bahrain signal a new kind of war as AI plays an increasingly strategic role, analysts say. Retrieved from Fortune: https://fortune.com/2026/03/09/irans-attacks-on-amazon-data-centers-in-uae-bahrain-signal-a-new-kind-of-war-as-ai-plays-an-increasingly-strategic-role-analysts-say/
Kerr, S., & England, A. (2026, March 05). Gulf states could review overseas investments to ease financial strains caused by Iran war. Retrieved from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/ab7d597d-5e72-4cbf-8d3b-53815695d68f
Mallinder, L. (2023, December 12). ‘Elephant in the room’: The US military’s devastating carbon footprint. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/12/elephant-in-the-room-the-us-militarys-devastating-carbon-footprint
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2013). Structural Realism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith, International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity – Third Edition (pp. 77-93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Medical Tourism. (2026, March 14). Destination: Iran. Retrieved from Medical Tourism: https://www.medicaltourism.com/destinations/iran
MEE Staff. (2026, March 09). Lindsey Graham criticises Israel over targeting Iranian oil facilities . Retrieved from Middle East Eye: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lindsey-graham-criticises-israel-over-targeting-iranian-oil-facilities
MEMO Oman. (2026, March 09). Oman condemns US-Israeli war on Iran as ‘immoral and illegal’. Retrieved from Middle East Monitor: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260309-oman-condemns-us-israeli-war-on-iran-as-immoral-and-illegal/
Nereim, V. (2026, March 08). Vital Desalination Plants in Iran and Bahrain Are Attacked. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/08/world/middleeast/desalination-plants-iran-bahrain.html
oec.world. (2026, March 09). The observatory of Economic Complexity. Retrieved from oec.world: https://oec.world/en
Reuters CH. (2026, March 08). Iran attacks breach international law, Swiss Defence Minister says. Retrieved from Reutrers: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/iran-attacks-breach-international-law-swiss-defence-minister-says-2026-03-08/
Sankeymatic. (2026, March 10). SankeyMATIC. Retrieved from SankeyMATIC: https://sankeymatic.com/build/
Sio, M. (2026, March 08). US says ‘cannot guarantee’ civilian safety in or near facilities used by Iran for military purposes. Retrieved from Anadolu Agency: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-says-cannot-guarantee-civilian-safety-in-or-near-facilities-used-by-iran-for-military-purposes/3855316
Stewart, P., & Ali, I. (2026, March 06). Exclusive: US investigation points to likely US responsibility in Iran school strike, sources say. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-investigation-points-likely-us-responsibility-iran-school-strike-sources-say-2026-03-06/
TV BRICS. (2025, February 22). Retrieved from TV BRICS: https://tvbrics.com/en/news/iran-advances-medical-tourism-with-strategic-development-plan/
UNOHCHR Iranian School Bombing. (2026, March 06). UN experts strongly condemn deadly missile strike on girls’ school in Iran, call for independent investigation. Retrieved from UNOHCHR: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/un-experts-strongly-condemn-deadly-missile-strike-girls-school-iran-call
Walsh, J. (2026, March 12). First week of Iran war cost U.S. over $11 billion, military told lawmakers. Retrieved from CBS News: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-war-cost-first-week-military-congress/
WEF and McKinsey & Company. (2026). The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026. https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Cooperation_Barometer_2026.pdf: World Economic Forum in collaboration with McKinsey & Company.
Wei, L., & Bade, G. (2026, March 05). U.S. Has a Big Ask for China: Buy Less Oil From Russia, More From America. Retrieved from The Wall Street Journal: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/u-s-has-a-big-ask-for-china-buy-less-oil-from-russia-more-from-america-3935df4b
Cover image credit: Strait of Hormuz, screenshot from Google Earth, accessed on March 19, 2026; image cropped by the author. The original source and Google attribution were retained in accordance with Google’s requirements.
About the author: Ecaterina MAȚOI is the President of Strategic Dialogue for Global Affairs Initiative